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ABSTRACT
Embedding network capabilities in a plethora of new devices and infrastructures–the
Internet-of-Things, vehicular and aviation networks, the critical national infrastruc-
ture, industrial plants–are dramatically transforming the modern way of living. The
rapid deployment pace of these emerging applications has brought unprecedented
security challenges related to data confidentiality, user privacy, and critical infras-
tructure availability. A significant portion of these threats is attributed to the
broadcast nature of the wireless medium, which exposes systems to easy-to-launch
passive and active attacks. The slow security standards rollout combined with the
ever-shrinking time-to-market, the device heterogeneity and the lack of user-friendly
input interfaces (screen, keyboard, etc.) only exacerbate the security challenges.
In this dissertation, we address the fundamental problem of trust establishment
in the context of emerging network applications. We present techniques integrating
physical layer properties with cryptographic primitives to guarantee message in-
tegrity and bootstrap initial trust without relying on any prior secrets. We present
the “helper” security paradigm in which security is outsourced to one or more dedi-
cated devices to allow for the scalable pairing of off-the-shelf heterogeneous devices.
In addition, we present our work on message integrity verification of navigation
information for aircrafts (speed, location, and heading) by exploiting the Doppler
spread of the wireless channel. Finally, we develop a secure and fast voting tech-
nique for distributed networks which allows fast coordination of a group of devices
without the overhead of messaging.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Embedding network capabilities in most contemporary systems has fundamen-
tally changed the course of our everyday lives. A plethora of new services and
infrastructures–the smart grid, transportation, and aviation networks, the cloud,
the critical national infrastructure, the Internet-of-Things, and how we interact with
our physical world–have dramatically transformed the modern way of living [1–6].
With the improvement in utility, our dependence on this rapidly expanding network
ecosystem has brought unprecedented security challenges related to user privacy,
data confidentiality, and critical infrastructure availability. As most of our commu-
nications occur in wireless platforms, new serious threats have emerged that cause
widespread disruption and substantial monetary losses [7–10]. A significant portion
of these threats is attributed to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, which
exposes systems to easy-to-launch passive and active attacks. Using commodity
radio hardware, unauthorized parties can easily eavesdrop on or modify over-the-
air transmissions [11–14]. In addition, the rapid commercialization of new devices
and systems does not allow for careful consideration of the possible threats, with
security only being an afterthought. Security challenges are only exacerbated by
the lag in standardization efforts, the plethora of vendors flooding the market with
poorly engineered devices, and the complex nature of today’s security solutions (e.g.,
password etiquette and two-factor authentication) [15–17]. In such a heterogeneous
environment, classical cryptographic solutions alone cannot meet the scalability,
interoperability, usability, and most importantly, security requirements.
My dissertation is focused on answering fundamental security problems that lie
in the intersection between privacy, security, usability, and efficiency. These include
the basic problem of establishing trust between two or more legitimate parties in
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(a) (b)
Figure 1.1: (a) Entering password to pair a smart thermostat with a network, and
(b) scanning QR code with embedded default password to pair a smart camera with
a network.
heterogeneous networks; how to seamlessly integrate security services without re-
quiring user involvement; how to make security scalable and interoperable; how to
retrofit security in already deployed systems; and how to automatically recover from
unavoidable security breaches.
Classic techniques for secure pairing either involve the manual input shown in
Figure 1.1(a) of the hub’s secret to the device or the preloading of a unique se-
cret. This secret is loaded to the hub via an out-of-band (OOB) channel, e.g., the
user scanning QR code with embedded password shown in Figure 1.1(b), a public
key infrastructure [18]. Nevertheless, traditional solutions pose significant usability,
scalability, and interoperability hurdles. Alternatively, several device pairing proto-
cols have been proposed for without pre-shared secrets [19–30]. Most such protocols
require an auxiliary secure out-of-band (OOB) channel, an audio or visual chan-
nel, for example, that is observable by a user to aid the authentication of messages
transmitted over the public wireless channel. However, such OOB channels intro-
duce practical interoperability issues due to the heterogeneity of the devices and are
not user-friendly. Recently, in-band pairing protocols [31–35] have been proposed
as an alternative to OOB pairing. The former protocols only require that devices
possess a common wireless interface to communicate. Since the wireless channel
is known to be insecure in general, the security of these protocols relies on the as-
sumption that wireless signal cancellation is infeasible, so that message integrity and
22
Hub 
(A)
Device (D)
Adversary
(M)
Figure 1.2: Trust establishment between a device with a hub in presence on an
adversary.
authentication properties can be derived by encoding the messages in a special way.
However, as demonstrated by Popper et al. [14], this assumption may not hold in
many cases. Thus, it remains an open problem as to whether secure in-band device
pairing protocols can still be designed under a strong Dolev-Yao attacker which can
annihilate wireless signals.
To address these challenges, we proposed original techniques for pairing devices
that lack preloaded security credentials by exploiting hard-to-forge physical limita-
tions in signal propagation laws. Our techniques can withstand both passive and
active attacks and are even suitable for devices without advanced interfaces such as
screens and keyboards. We also proposed methods for retrofitting integrity verifica-
tion in aviation navigation broadcasts without relying on cryptographic primitives.
Such broadcasts are currently transmitted in the clear and are easy to forge. We
have also integrated security mechanisms at the lower layers of the network stack to
enable the fast and secure collaboration of groups of devices such as network-enabled
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), distributed spectrum sensing, and wireless sen-
sor networks.
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1.1 Main Contributions
1.1.1 Trust Establishment
From logging in to our personal computers, to gaining access to our mobile de-
vices, to accessing bank accounts, and more recently accessing data collected by
wearables, thermostats, remotely opening garage doors, we are constantly asked to
prove our identity. This is typically achieved by entering a password or a pin, ver-
ifying a fingerprint, or performing face recognition [36]. Such methods of proving
one’s identity, also known as user authentication, rely on advanced interfaces such
as keyboards, cameras, fingerprint readers, and other biometric sensors. With the
advent of Internet-of-Things and the miniaturization of networked devices, such in-
terfaces may no longer be available. In general, the network enabled device and the
hub has to prove mutual authenticity in the presence of an adversary as shown in
Figure 1.2. Conventional authentication solutions include the use of default pass-
words [37], the preloading of common secrets, or the establishment of a public key
infrastructure [18, 38]. However, such solutions pose serious key management, scal-
ability, and interoperability challenges. Often, manufacturers opt to preload de-
vices with default keys that are easily leaked [8]. Moreover, without keyboards and
screens default passwords are hard to change. To address these challenges, recent
works have proposed secure device pairing methods that do not rely on pre-shared
secrets [23, 32, 34, 35, 39–41]. Most rely on out-of-band (OOB) human verification
to provide authentication and verify the protocol success. Human-dependent solu-
tions scale poorly with the number of devices. Some in-band solutions have also
appeared, but they almost unanimously derive security from the infeasibility of ad-
vanced wireless signal manipulations. However, for an advanced adversary capable
of manipulating wireless transmissions [14], the current state-of-the-art solutions are
vulnerable to active attacks that breach the authentication process. We addressed
this problem in three different scenarios:
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Trust Establishment Under Active Signal Manipulations
We proposed a PHY layer-based message integrity assurance mechanism by detect-
ing active signal manipulations, including hard-to-detect signal cancellation attacks.
To thwart an adversary that is capable of perfect signal cancellation, we exploited
a helper which is co-present with the legitimate device by letting the helper insert
authentication signals onto the channel at random times. The security of our primi-
tive rested on the infeasibility of differentiating the helper’s and device’s activities in
real time. We used this message integrity verification primitive in conjunction with
commonly-used key establishment protocols (e.g., the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol) to implement a complete trust establishment protocol.
Modulation-Agnostic Secure Trust Establishment
The majority of existing integrity verification methods that do not rely on pre-
shared secrets [31–35] utilize a specific type of digital modulation. Although ON-
OFF keying can be implemented from common modulation modes (BPSK, QPSK,
ASK, etc.), it is not necessarily natively supported by legacy and new devices.
Thus, the adoption of those methods may require firmware/hardware modifications.
To be compatible with Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices, we proposed
a novel message integrity and authentication primitive that does not rely on any
special modulation. The core principle of our approach is to create a “received
signal strength (RSS) authenticator” by analyzing the RSS fluctuation patterns,
measured simultaneously at the helper placed close to the device and the hub. We
concentrated our efforts on RSS because it is readily available on any wireless device
and can be acquired in-band. Whereas some previous methods have tried to exploit
RSS for device pairing, security was shown only if some specific channel conditions
were met (e.g., rich scattering environments). The security of our method relies
on hard-to-break physical signal propagation laws such as requiring extremely high
transmission power, and the inability of an adversary to predict the helper’s motion
in real time.
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Group Device Pairing Resistant to Active Signal Manipulations
In several scenarios, a group of devices is initialized within a short time. For such
scenarios, executing pairwise pairing poses scalability challenges. In addition, the
success probability of an adversary to pair with the legitimate setting increases ex-
ponentially with the number of devices in the group. We proposed a novel primitive
to verify the integrity of messages transmitted among a group of devices, without
preloaded secrets. Our method hardened active attacks by exploiting the simultane-
ous integrity verification of the protocol transcripts from multiple devices including
the helper. During the pairing, each device broadcasts their primitive which is
recorded by all other devices in the group (a helper device is included if the number
of devices is less than the required number) to compile a transcript. Further to
verify the integrity of the primitives exchanged all devices simultaneously transmit
the transcript, which is verified by the group. Intuitively, with more verifiers, it
becomes increasingly harder for an attacker to carry our simultaneous signal manip-
ulation attacks, as there are more constraints imposed by the geometry and physical
propagation laws. Contrary to prior methods, we showed that the introduction of
more devices improves security rather than weakening it.
In our security analysis for all the three scenarios, we always assumed a worst-
case attacker where the channels to the legitimate devices are ideal and known to the
adversary. These assumptions are different from information-theoretic approaches
that rely on a channel advantage to realize secrecy gains.
1.1.2 Aircraft Navigation Verification
The International Air Transport Association has forecasted that over 7.8 billion pas-
sengers to travel by 2036 [42]. To cope with the anticipated increase in air traffic,
the relevant governing bodies around the world have agreed to NextGen air traffic
control technology that shifts traffic surveillance from the uncooperative and in-
dependent radar system to a cooperative and dependent digital one [43]. At the
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heart of NextGen lies the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
standard. In ADS-B, aircraft independently determine their navigation information
(location, airspeed, heading, etc.) using onboard satellite equipment (GPS) [13].
To facilitate air traffic management, this navigation information is broadcasted to
nearby aircraft and ground air traffic control (ATC) centers. Despite its critical
function, ADS-B does not integrate strong security mechanisms. This is because
a timely agreement to a common security management framework is an impossible
task. Over 190 aviation federations need to manage security across continent and
country borders. In NextGen, the aircraft’s location is verified by ground stations
using a multilateration technique. In this technique, three or more ground sta-
tions compute the time difference of arrival from an ADS-B broadcast to validate
the claimed aircraft’s position [13]. However, an aircraft has no way of verifying
the ADS-B broadcast of another aircraft. The ADS-B security vulnerabilities can
be abstracted to classical cryptography problems for which solutions are readily
available. However, implementing cryptographic solutions on a global scale requires
coordination between multiple governing agencies, administrators and operators.
Key management operations including key establishment, key refresh, key revoca-
tion, certificate management, etc. introduce a substantial layer of complexity and
cost to the ADS-B standard.
To cope with these challenges, we examined non-cryptographic solutions for veri-
fying the navigation information broadcasted in ADS-B. We proposed to exploit the
Doppler spread phenomenon observed on the wireless channel due to the aircraft
motion to verify the claimed aircraft speed, location and heading. The Doppler
spread extracted from the channel state information directly translates to the rel-
ative radial velocity between the claimer aircraft and the verifier (another aircraft
or single ATC). We proposed to use the speed, location and heading of the claimer
aircraft estimated from the relative radial velocity using kinematic equations to ver-
ify claimed speed, location and heading in the ADS-B frame. We showed that it
is very difficult for a static transmitter (or one that moves at speeds significantly
lower than those of an aircraft) to emulate the presence of an aircraft moving at a
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desired velocity and heading.
1.1.3 Fast and Secure Physical Layer Voting
Distributed wireless networks fundamentally rely on the principle of cooperation.
Nodes often share information to coordinate network functions and improve the
fault-tolerance of distributed operations. As an example, cooperative spectrum
sensing is known to improve the detection of licensed user activity in dynamic spec-
trum access (DSA) [44]. Data fusion is also widely used in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) for improving the performance of target detection, target tracking, and
distributed sensing [45]. For many cooperative functions, binary voting algorithms
increase fault-tolerance at relative low cooperation overhead. In binary voting, a
community of distributed entities shares binary decisions (“yes” or “no”) on a pa-
rameter of interest (e.g., channel state, the presence of a target). A combining
decision rule is applied to collectively determine the decision outcome. This rule is
based on some form of majority voting, plurality or threshold, to achieve the desired
level of reliability. Typically, binary votes are casted using a messaging scheme, in
which 1-bit votes are carried by individual messages. However, message-based vot-
ing incurs a relatively high voting delay. In this work, we define the voting delay
as the time period between the initiation of the voting process with the transmission
of the first vote by any of the participants until all votes have been received at the
tallier. The tallying time is not accounted as part of the voting delay. For message-
based voting, each 1-bit vote is carried by a packet that contains a PHY layer and
MAC layer headers. Moreover, verifying the voter authenticity and protecting the
integrity of binary votes via digital signatures and message authentication codes, re-
quires additional packet fields. All additional fields (headers, message authentication
codes, digital signature) increase the overall transmission time per vote. Further,
voters must sequentially access the shared wireless channel to cast their votes. Most
popular channel access protocols include anti-collision mechanisms (e.g., backoff pro-
cess) that further increase the voting delay to cast multiple votes. For time-critical
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applications, a high voting delay could be unacceptable [46,47].
To address the poor delay scalability of message-based voting, we proposed a
fast and secure voting scheme that implements voting at the PHY layer. Wireless
devices exploit the subcarrier orthogonality in the widely adopted orthogonal fre-
quency division modulation (OFDM), to simultaneously cast their votes to an FC
within just a few symbols. To overcome the challenges related to decoding simulta-
neous transmissions from multiple senders, binary votes are cast by adding energy to
designated subcarriers. No transmission of preambles and headers is required, as the
receiver does not demodulate the OFDM signal. Simple energy detection suffices.
We studied the robustness of the proposed scheme against an external and an inter-
nal adversary. The former attempts to modify votes by inserting energy into various
subcarriers without knowing the subcarrier allocation. The latter is aware of any
group secrets used to assign subcarriers, but not of pairwise secrets. The proposed
scheme guarantees the integrity of the voting outcome. In addition, we showed that
an active adversary who attempts to modify the casted votes, cannot flip the voting
outcome at the FC with overwhelming probability. Also, the adversary cannot in-
ject additional votes at the FC. Further, we proposed to improve voting robustness
by incorporating the transmission of multiple OFDM symbols to cast a single vote,
thus realizing a repetition code. Since OFDM symbols have a very short duration, a
repetition code is still far more efficient than messaging. We analytically evaluated
the voting robustness as a function of the relevant system parameters under a secret
and an open vote model. We presented a prototype implementation of the voting
technique on the NI-USRP 2921 platform.
1.2 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we dis-
cuss related works. In Chapter 3, we introduce the helper security paradigm that
is adopted in several of our works. We also propose HELP, an in-band trust es-
tablishment protocol that is resistant to advanced signal manipulations including
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signal cancellation. In Chapter 4, we present a modulation agnostic in-band pairing
protocol which relies on hard-to-forge physical layer property such as signal propa-
gation laws to guarantee message integrity. In Chapter 5, we present a group device
pairing protocol, where we exploit the presence of a minimum number of devices
in the group to guarantee message integrity during the pairing process. In Chapter
6, we present a technique to authenticate and verify message integrity of ADS-B
frames, exploiting the Doppler shift of the channel. In Chapter 7, we present a fast
and secure voting scheme for distributed wireless networks, where multiple nodes
are able to simultaneously submit votes on a single OFDM symbol. Finally, Chapter
8 summarizes the contributions of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
In this chapter, we highlight the basics of trust establishment and review the state-
of-the-art of trust-establishment techniques. Trust establishment typically consists
of two parts. Authentication or verification of identities and key establishment to
further bootstrap security services. This is equivalent to the scenario where Alice
meets Bob for the first time in the presence of Mallory, as shown in Figure 2.1.
To establish trust, Alice and Bob need to first verify each other’s identity (mutu-
ally authenticate) and agree on a common secret to secure future communications.
Trivially, this can be achieved by exchanging a common password over a private
channel. However, this method is not scalable for a large number of devices. In
addition, many of these devices lack essential interfaces (keyboard, screen, etc.) to
enter a common password. Manufacturers attempted to bypass this challenge by
shipping network-enabled devices with default passwords. However, such a practice
has led to many security vulnerabilities. For instance, the Mirai botnet attack [8]
exploited the same default passwords preloaded to IoT devices such as IP cameras,
digital video recorders, etc. and attack the DNS infrastructures across the east coast
of the US.
Alternately, trust can be established without depending on pre-shared secrets.
When pairing without secrets, authentication can be achieved by a Push Button
Configuration (PBC) mechanism [48]. A user pushes a button on the legitimate
entities D and A within 120 seconds to initiate a pairing protocol. Here authenti-
cation is derived from the fact of co-presence. After authentication, a key exchange
protocol [49–52] can be executed to establish a common secret. For instance, the
two devices can execute the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [49]. Dur-
ing the DH key exchange shown in Figure 2.3, D and A select DH exponents xD
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Mallory
Alice Bob
Figure 2.1: Trust establishment between Alice meeting Bob for the first time in
presence of Mallory.
and xA, respectively. Further, D and A raise their DH exponents to the power of a
primitive root gxD and gxA), where g is the primitive root of a large prime number p.
Each party then independently computes the DH primitives as (gxD mod p) and
(gxA mod p). The two devices exchange the DH primitives (gxD mod p) and (gxA
mod p) over the public channel. Each device independently computes the key with
access to other’s DH primitive and its own DH exponent as kDA = g
xDxA mod p. A
passive adversary eavesdropping the key exchange is unable to compute DH expo-
nents xD and xA from DH primitives (g
xD mod p) and (gxA mod p), respectively
due to discrete logarithmic problem [53]. However, public message exchanged over
the wireless medium is vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, which are
notoriously difficult to thwart without any prior security associations.
As the message exchange during key establishment takes place over the wireless
medium an adversary can launch a MitM attack by performing an overshadowing
attack [31, 54]. Let the adversary M compute his own DH primitive (gxM mod p)
by selecting his DH exponent xM . During the overshadowing attack, the adversary
M transmits (gxM mod p) at a significantly higher power than D’s message (gxD
mod p), such that A receives (gxM mod p). Figure 2.2 shows M performing
an overshadowing attack on D’s transmission such that A receives M ’s intended
signal. The figure shows legitimate D transmitting symbols x corresponding to
(gxD mod p) which is received as y at A. Simultaneously, M transmits symbols
x′ corresponding to (gxM mod p) received as y′ at A. Here, y′ is at significantly
higher power such that A decodes it instead of y.
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Figure 2.2: Signal overshadowing attack by M on the constellation plane to move
the signal transmitted by D to intended signal at A.
D A
Given (G, q, g), Given (G, q, g),
Pick xD ∈U Zq Pick xA ∈U Zq
mD ← gxD mod p mD−−−−−−−−−−→
mA←−−−−−−−−−− mA ← gxA mod p
kDA ← (mA)xD mod p kDA ← (mD)xA mod p
Figure 2.3: Diffie-Hellman key-agreement on kDA between network-enabled devices
D and A.
To thwart MitM attacks, additional message authentication and integrity pro-
tection mechanisms are required during the key establishment. Therefore, next, we
review the state-of-the-art in authentication/integrity protection without pre-shared
secrets. Two classes of authentication protocols are the out-of-band authentication
approaches, and in-band authentication approaches.
2.1 Out-of-band Authentication Approaches
To combat a MitM attack, message integrity verification is required during the key
exchange of a pairing protocol. For message integrity verification, the out-of-band
(OOB) implement a private (other than the radio-frequency (RF)) channel that
cannot be accessed by the adversary. However, OOB channels need non-trivial
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Figure 2.4: Out of band pairing for the network-enabled devices D and A.
human support and advanced device interfaces. Figure 2.4 shows the general tech-
nique for pairing on an OOB channel. After a successful key exchange between D
and A. A human user compares a verification string derived from the key estab-
lished also known as short authentication string (SAS) on an OOB channel. Several
secure pairing techniques rely on some OOB channel to defend against MitM at-
tacks [23,39–41,55].
Liang et al. [39] proposed a technique for pairing a wearable with a computer.
The technique guaranteed message integrity by transmitting the hash of the ex-
changed messages during key establishment over a brightness-modulated visible light
channel. This channel requires the availability of a screen and a sensor to detect
a change in the levels of brightness. Therefore, this method is not applicable to
devices missing these interfaces. Berg et al. [55] proposed a pairing method for
Bluetooth, in which the user has to perform an action randomly displayed as visual
stimuli (action displayed on a display) during the pairing session. Shen et al. [40]
proposed a commitment-based pairing protocol, where the message integrity during
the key established is provided by a user comparing a short authentication string
on a visual or verbal channel.
Perkovic` et al. [23] proposed a group message authentication protocol which uti-
lized a short authentication string (SAS) transmitted over the visual light channel
34
for verification of the messages exchanged over the radio channel. The hash of
the exchanged key primitives is displayed by all the devices on the blinking LED
channel. Li et al. [56] proposed a group device pairing algorithm for body area
networks, in which message integrity during the key exchange is provided by match-
ing a short authentication string on flashing LEDs. The protocol supported fast
batch deployment, addition and revocation of sensor devices, and did not rely on
any additional hardware device. The authentication protocol proposed by Nyang et
al. [41] depended on a helper device to read a one-time password through a quick
response (QR) code. This protocol required the device to have a visual interface
like a screen. A cryptographic key distribution algorithm [57, 58] proposed placing
legitimate devices attempting to pair inside a Faraday cage. Such that the message
exchanged during the pairing protocol is secure and guaranteed message integrity.
As an adversary from outside cannot modify the wireless signals inside a Faraday
cage. He et al. [59] proposed a trust establishment algorithm for WBANs. A trusted
third party performed key management such as key establishment, and revocations
for all the participating legitimate devices. The third-party management might not
be available during the pairing sessions of network-enabled devices.
Biometric based pairing: Alternatively, information such as biometrics can
be utilized for pairing which is not accessible for an adversary. These techniques
exploit the fact that the legitimate devices placed on the same body record the
same biometrics information. This biometric information can be fingerprinted to
derive a symmetric key by each device independently. Further, these techniques
utilized some error correction such that each device derived the same key even with
some error in reading the biometric information. Zheng et al. [60] and Karimian et
al. [61] utilized the fingerprint of the electrocardiogram signal to generate a key on
multiple devices within the same body area network. Trust establishment between
implantable medical devices and the remote control was proposed [62, 63] utilizing
fingerprinting of biometrics for generating a symmetric key. Xu et al. [64] proposed
symmetric key generation during a pairing between multiple devices on the same
body utilizing the characteristics of the gait of a user. However, their applications are
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Figure 2.5: Attack by M on ambient context based key establishment between the
network-enabled devices D and A.
limited to wearable devices, require uniform sensing hardware, and are susceptible
to remote biometrics sensing attacks [65]. However, these protocols are limited
to network-enabled devices deployed on a body. In this dissertation, we target to
propose protocols that can be implemented for all network-enabled devices.
Ambient context based pairing: Others have exploited the shared physical
context for authentication and key agreement. These techniques exploit the fact
that the legitimate devices placed in proximity record the same ambient context
information. This context information can be fingerprinted to derive a symmetric
key by each device independently. Further, these techniques utilized some error
correction such that each device derived the same key even with some error in reading
the context information. Examples of common modalities include received signal
strength (RSS) at both the devices pairing [66] or [67] proposed a pairing method
where devices derive a symmetric key using ambient audio. Hayashi et al. [68]
proposed a probabilistic framework for dynamically selecting an ambient context
to derive a symmetric key that satisfied authentication and integrity verification
during pairing. Miettinen et al. [69, 70] proposed a zero-interaction based pairing
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protocol. This protocol presents a key establishment and evolution scheme based on
fingerprinting of the ambient factors. However, the time for the key establishment
depends on the entropy of the ambient factor. The legitimate devices utilizing these
techniques require additional and the same hardware to sense the same context. This
makes these techniques interoperable. Further, these techniques are vulnerable to an
adversary who has access to the common context or can predict a low entropy context
information which the legitimate devices use to derive the symmetric key. Figure 2.5
shows such an attack where the adversary can derive the same symmetric key as
the legitimate entities with access to the same ambient context as the legitimate
entities.
2.2 In-band Authentication Approaches
As an alternative, non-cryptographic authentication techniques usually derive trust
from hard-to-forge physical-layer characteristics unique to each device/link. They
usually transmit information “in-band” without requiring an OOB channel. Exist-
ing approaches on non-cryptographic device authentication [71–77] can be classified
into three categories: (a) device proximity, (b) location distinction, and (c) device
identification.
Device proximity: A proximity-based pairing between devices is based on the
assumption, that only the legitimate devices have access to a physically restricted
area. All these methods assume that the adversary does not have access to this
restricted area. Thus this technique derives message authentication from the prox-
imity. Zheng et al. [71] proposed proximity-based pairing method which exploits
the channel reciprocity. The legitimate devices participating in pairing derive key
by fingerprinting the channel state information (CSI) and received signal strength
(RSS). The adversary who is not in the proximity of the legitimate devices is unable
to derive the same fingerprint and the key as the legitimate devices. Cai et al. [72]
utilized multiple antennas on a receiver to verify proximity using the propagation
characteristics between the legitimate receivers. The proposed scheme is based on
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the propagation characteristic of the wireless signal that the power of the received
signal is inversely proportional to some exponent of the distance between the sender
and receiver. When a nearby sender moved very close to one antenna on the re-
ceiver, the receiver observed a large difference between the signal strength measured
on its two antennas, whereas a faraway sender would be unable to induce such a
large difference. Pierson et al. [76] refined the previous idea to be implemented for
the commercial-off-the-shelf devices and used a specialized device with two antennas
separated by 7cm to measure radio signal strength difference from a device to verify
proximity to another device. Some proximity-based authentication [74, 75] utilized
fingerprinting the RSS characteristics of an ambient radio source by the legitimate
devices in proximity to derive a symmetric key. Zhang et al. [77] exploited rapid
RSS variation due to wave polarization for detecting proximity between the pairing
devices. However, some of these techniques typically require advanced hardware
which is not suitable for constrained wireless devices. For example, [76, 78] require
multiple-antennas, and [75] needs a wide-band receiver. Moreover, these techniques
only address the common key extraction problem, leaving them vulnerable to MitM
attacks. Distance bounding techniques [79–81] were also proposed to ensure proxim-
ity, but they are not so practical yet (either resort to an OOB channel or a specially
designed hardware).
Location distinction: Pairing-based on location distinction assumes that only
the legitimate entities have access to certain locations which is inaccessible to an ad-
versary. Exploiting this fact, this technique provides message authentication during
key establishment. Varshavsky et al. presented amigo [73], where co-located devices
derived a symmetric key. The pairing scheme works as follows. First, two devices
brought to close proximity, perform an unauthenticated DH key exchange over a
wireless radio channel (Wi-Fi). Second, both devices start monitoring the ambient
radio environment for a short period of time and construct a signature containing
identifiers and signal strength of the packets received during the snapshot. Finally,
two devices exchange their signatures over a secure channel using a commitment
scheme in order to verify if the received and local measurements match. Location
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distinction methods such as temporal link signatures that detect location differ-
ences [82] require high bandwidth (> 40MHz) and training, which is not always
available to low-cost, resource-constrained devices. Ma et al. [83] presented two
location-aware defense mechanisms for enhanced RFID security and privacy. The
protocol used the location information to design selective unlocking mechanisms so
that RFIDs can selectively respond to reader interrogations. However, these tech-
niques either require historical PHY-layer data or location information from an OOB
channel.
Device identification: The device identification techniques are based on the
assumption that there is an initial trust established between the legitimate entities
and they know mutual identifiers. This is used for device authentication. Nguyen
et al. [84] proposed a technique which used a novel self-learning approach to clas-
sify devices into device types and builds normal communication profiles for each
of these that can subsequently be used to detect anomalous deviations in commu-
nication patterns. The proposed protocol utilized a federated learning approach
for aggregating behavior profiles efficiently. Robyns et al. [85] proposed method to
fingerprint the radio signals of LoRa transmitter. This technique utilized machine
learning and zero-shot image classification. Unfortunately, both location distinction
and device identification techniques require prior training or frequent retraining,
which is not applicable to devices first introduced to an environment. A physical
unclonable function (PUF) that has been extensively used by researchers to propose
solutions for re-authentication of devices [86–88]. In PUF, semiconductor devices
receive unique characteristics, which can be recognized during manufacturing. The
proposed solutions work very well in producing a unique digital fingerprint of de-
vices. However, these techniques are orthogonal to the initial trust establishment
which is the main focus of this dissertation.
Alternatively, in the in-band approach, the pairing process takes place over the
RF channel. The key establishment between the network-enabled devices D and A
can be achieved using a key agreement protocol such as DH [49]. The DH protocol
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Figure 2.6: D transmits an MC ON-OFF message x to A in the presence of M . To
modify x to x′, M has to annihilate ON slots of D’s transmission.
is proven to be secure against passive adversaries. However, it is still vulnerable to
the MitM attacks when DH key primitives are transmitted over wireless.
To preserve the message integrity during a key agreement and prevent MitM
attack, several prior works proposed techniques in which the messages during the key
establishment are encoded using Manchester-coded ON-OFF keying (MC ON-OFF)
[31,33–35], as shown in Figure 2.6. In MC ON-OFF keying, a zero bit is represented
with an OFF-ON signal sequence over two slots, whereas the one bit is represented
by an ON-OFF signal. ON slots are realized by transmitting random symbols from
the constellation plane, whereas OFF slots are realized by no transmission. When
using the MC ON-OFF keyed messages, the legitimate receiver or A is expecting
ON and OFF slots during each bit. However, when M is performing overshadowing
attack to inject m′ simultaneously as D is transmitting m, A receives two ON slots
in sequence on the bits where m 6= m′.
For example, Tamper-Evident Pairing (TEP) proposed by Gollakota et al. [33],
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and integrity codes (I-codes) proposed by Cˇapkun et al. [31] used MC ON-OFF
keying during key establishment for detecting overshadowing attacks. However,
both assumed the infeasibility of signal cancellation. Based on message integrity,
message authentication can be achieved by assuming the presence of the legitimate
device is known (a.k.a. authentication through presence). The infeasibility of signal
cancellation assumption does not always hold. Po¨pper et al. demonstrated an
effective relay signal cancellation attack using a pair of directional antennas, which
works regardless of the packet content and modulation [14]. Recently, Hou et al.
[34,35] showed that the success probability of signal cancellation attack in the one-to-
one setting depends on the randomness of the legitimate channel. A typical indoor
environment may not be sufficient because the devices are static and the channel is
usually stable. However, these protocols become vulnerable to active MitM attacks,
when cancellation of signal [14] becomes possible.
2.3 MitM Over Wireless - Cancellation Attack
Now, we discuss how the MitM attack on the in-band pairing technique can be
realized by launching a cancellation attack. A MitM adversary attempting to replace
m with m′ has to completely annihilate the ON slots of m on those bit positions
that the two messages differ. This is generally difficult to achieve under a rich
scattering environment due to the unpredictability of the wireless channel between
the legitimate parties. At the same time, device authentication is achieved via the
verification of co-presence when the user interacts with the devices. In Figure 2.7,
we show the cancellation of D’s transmission on the constellation plane by M as
received by A.
To perform an MitM attack, the adversary has to replace m with m′. Let
x = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(k)} denote the transmitted symbols modulating m and
y = {y(1), y(2), . . . , y(k)} the received symbols at A. Then,
y = hDAx, (2.1)
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Figure 2.7: Signal cancellation attack by M on the constellation plane to reduce the
signal transmitted by D to the noise floor at A.
where hDA = αDA · ejφDA is the impulse response of the D-A channel, αDA is the
channel attenuation factor, and φDA is the channel’s phase shift. Here, we have
assumed that the entire transmission of x completes within the channel’s coherence
time, so the channel remains constant. To modify y, the adversary M must transmit
x′, modified by the M -A channel to y′ = hMAx′ such that the superposition yM =
y + y′ decodes to m′. In other words, M must compute
x′ =
1
hMA
(yM − hDAx), (2.2)
and transmit x′ in a timely fashion such that y and y′ are superimposed as shown in
Figure 2.7. According to equation (2.2), the computation of x′ requires the knowl-
edge of the signal x transmitted by D and of the channels hDA and hMA. Moreover,
the reception of y′ must be synchronized with the reception of y such that y′ arrives
at A within an acceptable delay spread τA for correct symbol superposition [89].
Synchronization can be achieved using the preambles or the pilot symbols from the
device; such methods are discussed in detail in [90]. The delay spread requirement
imposes an important physical constraint on M ’s locations. The difference between
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Figure 2.8: MitM attack by M to modify D’s MC ON-OFF transmission such that
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the adversary’s path, and the direct path must satisfy
dDM + dMA − dDA ≤ τA · c, (2.3)
where dXY denotes the distance between X and Y and c is the speed of light.
When the signal x is MC ON-OFF encoded, denoted by [x], modification of
the received signal to yM requires some ON slots of [x] to be annihilated, i.e., the
amplitude of yM must be below the signal detection threshold (typically 10s of dBms
below zero) in some slots. Practically, obtaining x in advance to compute x′ is not
possible. This is because D can transmit random symbols to implement an ON slot
when ON-OFF keying is used. These symbols do not need to belong to a particular
modulation mode such as BPSK, QPSK, etc. Alternatively, the adversary can avoid
the requirement of knowing x, by performing a relay attack. For performing the
relay attack the adversary has to process the signal before relaying such that the
received signal at A is exactly opposite phase and same amplitude as that of the
signal received from D, as shown in Figure 2.8. To achieve that M with the channel
knowledge of hDA, hMA, and hDM , the adversary can compute a phasor and an
amplification factor to process the relayed signal. However, since this is an online
attack, it is favorable for M to reduce the processing overhead by just performing
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Figure 2.9: To perform signal cancellation, the adversary is placed on an ellipse,
centered at D and A that satisfies a path difference of (2w + 1)λ/2 and does not
violate the maximum delay spread τA.
the amplification before relaying. For this, the adversary’s position is strategically
selected such that the path difference between the direct path and the adversary’s
path satisfies:
dDM + dMA − dDA = (2w + 1)λ
2
, w = 0, 1, 2, . . . (2.4)
where λ denotes the wavelength. This guarantees that the inverse of y will be
received at A when the incoming signal at M is compensated for the respective
channel attenuation factors. Because the path difference is an odd multiple of λ/2, y
and y′ arrive at A with opposite phases, thus canceling each other (yM = 0). The
signal superposition at A for a cancellation attack is shown in Figure 2.7.
We now examine the candidate set of M ’s locations that lead to successful can-
cellation via relaying. The adversary’s location `M must satisfy the phase difference
equation in (2.4) and the delay spread constraints in (2.3). For (2.4) or (2.4), can-
didate `M form a series of ellipses with D and the A placed at the two focal points.
The set of such ellipses is shown in Figure 2.9 and is computed by considering all
odd integer values of w in (2.4). Finally, the delay spread constraint (2.3) upper
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Figure 2.10: (a) Experimental setup for evaluating signal cancellation for a sin-
gle device-hub pair, and (b) cancellation probability as a function of the distance
difference between the direct path from D-to-A and the relay path through M .
bounds w.
To verify the adversary’s ability to manipulate signal over wireless, we performed
a signal cancellation and injection experiment using four NI-USRP 2921 devices,
organized as shown in Figure 2.10(a). All devices were synchronized and transmitted
at 2.4GHz. D transmitted a random BPSK-modulated signals during ON slots and
no signal during OFF slots to the hub while the adversary M performed relay
signal cancellation attack. M is equipped with two USRP devices each having
directional antennas (LP0965 Log Periodic PCB Antenna, 850MHz to 6.5GHz), one
for receiving symbols from D and other to transmit symbols to A. M is placed
such that the path difference between the paths D-to-A and D-to-M -to-A is ` · λ/2
such that the symbols relayed through M are phase shifted by pi, to achieve signal
cancellation. M used two different techniques for computing the amplitude of the
relayed signal, either estimating channels or using LoS far-field channel model [91].
Figure 2.10(b) shows the cancellation probability of the ON slots achieved by
the adversary as a function of the difference between the length of the direct path
from D-to-A and the relay path through the adversary. We observe that when the
adversary is close and therefore, has dominant LoS (e.g., the difference between
the path lengths is λ/2 = 6.25cm), the success probability of symbol modification
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by relay attack is quite high (92.53% and 86.49% for channel estimation and chan-
nel modeling approaches, respectively). This motivates us to investigate a pairing
protocol that is resistant to active signal manipulations.
Thus, it remains an open problem as to whether secure in-band device pairing
protocols can still be designed under a strong Dolev-Yao attacker which can annihi-
late wireless signals. In this dissertation, we propose various secret-free techniques,
that provide message integrity protection during key establishment and are resilient
to advanced signal cancellation attacks.
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CHAPTER 3
HELP: HELPER-ENABLED IN-BAND DEVICE
PAIRING RESISTANT AGAINST SIGNAL
CANCELLATION
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
Recent works have proposed secure device pairing methods that do not rely on pre-
shared secrets [20–32,34,35,92]. Most rely on out-of-band (OOB) human verification
to provide authentication and verify the protocol success. Human-dependent solu-
tions scale poorly with the number of devices. Some in-band solutions have also
appeared, but they almost unanimously derive security from the infeasibility of ad-
vanced wireless signal manipulations, signal cancellation in particular. To preserve
the message integrity during the execution of a key agreement protocol, messages
are encoded using Manchester-coded ON-OFF keying (MC ON-OFF). A Man-in-
the-Middle (MitM) adversary attempting to replace m with m′ has to completely
annihilate the ON slots of m on those bit positions that the two messages differ.
This is generally difficult to achieve under a rich scattering environment due to the
unpredictability of the wireless channel between the legitimate parties. At the same
time, device authentication is achieved via the verification of co-presence when the
user interacts with the devices. However, as demonstrated by Popper et al. [14],
this assumption may not hold in many cases. Thus, it remains an open problem
as to whether secure in-band device pairing protocols can still be designed under a
strong Dolev-Yao attacker which can annihilate wireless signals.
In this chapter, for the first time, we seek an answer to the above question.
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Instead of trying to prevent signal cancellation attacks, we propose an approach to
detect the presence of an attacker who attempts to nullify the signal at a receiver.
Our core idea for verifying the integrity of a message m is to superimpose another
signal from a helper device (e.g., a smartphone) while m is being transmitted. Any
cancellation attack on m is bound to also cancel the superimposed signal from the
helper. The helper is assumed to have an existing trust association with one of the
devices in the network (e.g., the hub), and is co-present with the primary device that
is authenticated by the hub. The superimposed signal is later revealed by the helper
via the authenticated channel, to allow for the recovery of m. Our protocol achieves
a strong “tamper-evidence” property where there are no restrictions on what kind
of signal manipulation the attacker is allowed to do.
Specifically, the device’s message m is encoded with ON-OFF keying and
Manchester-coding. During the transmission of m, the helper synchronously injects
some random signal at randomly selected slots. Any signal nullification attempt will
cancel both the legitimate transmitter’s and the helper’s signal, presuming that the
activity periods for the helper are not easily discernible. The helper later reveals its
activity periods via an authenticated channel to enable the hub in the detection of
signal nullification attempts. Trust between the hub and the helper is established
using traditional means (e.g., input a shared random password on the smartphone
when it is first paired with the hub), which is a one-time cost. With only one helper
in a network, we can securely introduce many new devices at no extra hardware cost,
thus ensuring scalability and usability. Essentially, by exploiting the co-presence of
the helper with the new device(s), our protocol transfers the trust from the helper
to the new device(s).
3.1.2 Main Contributions and Chapter Organization
The main contributions of this chapter are four-fold:
• We construct a novel physical layer message integrity verification primitive to
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detect signal cancellation attacks over the wireless channel. We show that our
primitive achieves message integrity protection with only in-band communi-
cations.
• We utilize the proposed message integrity verification primitive to construct
a secure in-band device pairing protocol named HELP based on the Diffie-
Hellman (DH) key agreement [49]. Whereas the primitive provides one-way
integrity verification (device-to-hub), we show that HELP achieves two-way
authenticated key agreement (counter-intuitively). This is done via a novel
way that exploits the helper’s superposed random signals to simultaneously
protect both the integrity and confidentiality of the DH public parameters,
such that an adversary impersonating the hub cannot successfully establish a
key with a legitimate device.
• We theoretically analyze the security of the proposed integrity verification
primitive and the HELP protocol, and we establish bounds for the adver-
sary’s success probability under active attacks (especially Man-in-the-Middle
attacks). We show that the adversary’s success probability is a negligible func-
tion of the protocol parameters and thus can be driven to an arbitrary small
value.
• We carry out extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of the signal
cancellation detection mechanism and the pairing protocol. Our experiments
verify that device co-presence significantly hardens the adversary’s ability to
distinguish between the helper’s and the legitimate device’s transmissions. We
also implement the proposed protocol in our Universal Software Radio Periph-
eral (USRP) testbed and evaluate the adversary’s successful pairing probabil-
ity with and without the protection of our integrity verification primitive. The
experimental results are in line with our analytical findings.
Chapter Organization: The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.
We state the system and threat models in Section 3.2. We present the integrity
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verification primitive and the HELP pairing protocol in Section 3.3. The security of
the pairing primitive and of HELP are analyzed in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we
study the adversary’s capability in inferring the helper’s transmissions and injecting
modified messages by performing experiments on the USRP platform. We further
experimentally evaluate the HELP assisted key-agreement protocol. We conclude
the chapter in Section 3.6.
3.2 Model Assumptions
3.2.1 System Model
We consider a star network topology, where a wireless hub (A) services multiple per-
sonal devices, which is similar to an Internet-of-things (IoTs) scenario. For example,
the network can reside inside a home or an office space. Our goal is to securely pair
an unauthenticated device with the hub in the presence of an adversary and estab-
lish a common key between the device and the A. The adversary can either try to
hijack the uplink communication to pair with the A, or spoof a rogue A to pair with
a legitimate device. The device and A do not pre-share any common secrets (e.g.
secret cryptographic keys). We assume that a user initiates the pairing process by
powering the device and setting it to pairing mode. Figure 3.1 describes the system
model. Formally, the following entities are part of the system model.
Hub (A): The A serves all the legitimate devices and needs to establish a secure
communication link with each of them. The A connects with the legitimate devices
through a wireless channel. The A verifies and pairs with any legitimate device
requesting to join the network.
Helper Device (H): The helper is an auxiliary device such as a smartphone, that
assists the A in the pairing process. The helper has already established a secure
authenticated channel with the A, either by establishing a common key, using a
public/private key pair, or through some OOB channel [24, 92]. Using this secure
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Figure 3.1: Entities of the system model and basic setup.
channel, H can apply an authenticated encryption function AE(·) on a message mH
to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of mH , and the authenticity of the
source. Any such AE(·) can be utilized with the proposed protocol. For example,
if H and the A share a public/private key pair, H can encrypt/sign/encrypt (or
sign/encrypt/sign) its message to guarantee the necessary security properties. If H
and D share a common master symmetric key, an encrypt-then-MAC operation can
be followed to implement AE(·), after separate symmetric keys are generated from
the master key for the encryption and MAC operations. One of the examples is to
use encryption then message authentication code hashing with the shared key. We
refer the reader to [93] for more details on authenticated encryption. We leave the
exact specification of AE(·) open to allow for both symmetric and/or asymmetric
methods.
Note that pairing H to the A is a one-time effort and need not be repeated
with every device join. Moreover, only the helper is required to have an advanced
interface to pair with the A.
Legitimate Device (D): A legitimate device is a typical network-enabled device
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which does not share any secrets with the A or H. The device is usually small and
has simple user interfaces (such as a power button) and hardware capabilities. The
legitimate device, H, and the A are assumed to be co-present during the pairing
process. H and D are placed in close proximity such that they have a highly
correlated wireless channel.
3.2.2 Threat Model
Adversary: We consider the typical Dolev-Yao model [94]. The adversary (M),
can fully control the wireless channels of the network. For example, it can eaves-
drop, modify, remove, replay or inject messages (frames) transmitted on the wireless
channel. The adversary is also powerful enough to annihilate signals transmitted
from D and H over the wireless channel, such that they do not reach the A (and
vice versa). This can be accomplished by techniques proposed by Po¨pper et al. [14].
The pairing protocol itself is known to M , but the adversary does not have physical
access to any of the devices. The helper device is assumed to be trusted and its
secret key with the A is kept away from adversaries.
Note that we do not impose any location restriction for the attacker. Although
the devices are typically located in a physically bounded area such as a home, we do
not assume that this is a secure region. Instead, the attacker can be located inside
the physical space, as long as the attacker cannot physically control the device and
the A to be paired. That is, the attacker does not control the helper so that it
cannot initiate the pairing with the A when no legitimate device is present. The
user is aware of the presence of both the A and of the legitimate device (which are
powered on) when the pairing is initiated. This is the minimal assumption adopted
by the majority of the previous works in device pairing.
The goal of an attacker is to pair successfully with the A and/or D. Therefore, we
mainly consider a MitM attacker in our security analysis. However, in this chapter,
we do not focus on preventing denial-of-service (DoS) attacks such as jamming,
which is orthogonal to our studies. Similarly with all relevant literature, we assume
52
that the adversary is incapable of physically blocking signals (e.g., by adding a
Faraday cage) to the device, the helper, or the hub.
In addition, at any point in time, the attacker may try to find out who is transmit-
ting on the wireless channel. There could be several cases: device only, helper only,
A only, or device plus helper together. For example, the attacker can do so via en-
ergy detection or use physical layer identification/fingerprinting techniques [95–100].
Since we assume that D and H have a highly correlated channel due to their prox-
imity, it is generally difficult for the attacker to differentiate between the cases of
device only and helper only. Thus, the attacker can differentiate between the num-
ber of transmitters (i.e., D + H or D/H alone), but the attacker cannot perfectly
distinguish D and H (i.e., the probability of successful detection is less than 100%).
We propose specific power and slot synchronization randomization methods to en-
sure that D and H are not easily distinguishable. Note that any device distinction
method has to operate only to correspond to the online nature of a MitM attack.
3.3 HELP: Helper-enabled Pairing
In this section, we present HELP, an in-band Helper-enabled pairing protocol that
does not require secret preloading. HELP makes use of a new PHY-layer message
integrity protection primitive to detect signal cancellation attacks that are launched
to perform a MitM attack against a key agreement protocol. We first describe the
PHY-layer protection primitive and then use this primitive to construct HELP.
3.3.1 Message Integrity Protection Against Signal Cancellation
Consider the simple scenario depicted in Figure 3.1. A new legitimate device D
wants to pair with the A by transmitting a message mD over a wireless channel.
Message mD is not protected by any cryptographic message integrity mechanism
such as a MAC because D and the A do not share any prior security associa-
tion. Let xD denote the corresponding signal transmitted from D carrying mD.
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Let also an adversary M perform a signal cancellation attack on the received sig-
nal yD = hD,AxD at the A, where hD,A denotes the channel between D and the
A. Simultaneously, M injects his own signal xM carrying message mM . The main
challenge in providing message integrity is to detect that a cancellation/injection
has taken place.
To combat signal cancellations, we employ Manchester-coded ON-OFF (MC ON-
OFF) keying modulation to transmit mD from D to the A similar to [31, 33]. In
ON-OFF keying, a zero bit is mapped to (OFF, ON) slots pair, whereas a one bit
is mapped to (ON, OFF) slots pair. The receiver demodulates the ON-OFF keying
sequence by applying energy detection on every slot. The advantage of ON-OFF
keying is that it hardens signal cancellations, as the adversarial device, M has to
“erase” the received signal yD at the A by synchronizing its own signal transmission
xM and taking into account the channels hD,A and hM,A. Different from previous
approaches [31,33,101], we consider the worst case scenario where signal cancellation
is possible due to the stability and predictability of the respective channels, as it
was demonstrated in [14].
The MC ON-OFF keying facilitates several functions. First, the alteration be-
tween ON and OFF slots prevents the zero wandering problem, allowing the receiver
to keep a power reference for differentiating between ON and OFF slots, irrespec-
tive of the data sequence. More importantly, an MC ON-OFF message contains
an equal number of zeros and ones. Our integrity protection mechanism relies on
the detection of canceled ON slots and therefore, the guarantee of ON slots irre-
spective of the data sequence is critical to the protocol security. Finally, the use of
MC ON-OFF keying allows for the recovery of the device’s message when the latter
has been corrupted from the intentional transmissions of the helper. Revealing the
“time locations” of the helper’s ON slots enables the message recovery.
In the proposed integrity primitive, the helper is placed in close proximity to the
unauthenticated device D and synchronously transmits a message mH while mD is
being transmitted. A signal cancellation targeted at the A is bound to also cancel
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D3
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D4
Listen
Slot
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[h(s)] [h(s)r]
(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: (a) Truth table for recovering [h(mD)
′] from ([h(mD)] + mH)′, using s,
and (b) an example of recovering [h(mD)
′] from ([h(mD)] +mH)′.
the signal from H. With the completion of the mD transmission, the helper reveals
mH to the A, who verifies if any part of mH has been canceled.
If the message integrity verification test is passed, the A exploits the knowledge
of mH to recover mD. A key requirement for the successful detection of signal
cancellations is that the adversary M cannot swiftly identify the ON slots of the
helper. We achieve this requirement by placing the helper in close proximity to
D and by randomizing the transmit power and the starting time of each ON-OFF
slot at D and H. Placing H close to D makes it difficult to differentiate the two
devices using transmission directionality or the uniqueness of the wireless channel.
Note that the ON-OFF transmissions contain no preambles, so channel estimation
becomes difficult. The randomization of the power and ON slot firing times aim
at preventing the device distinction using RSS measurements or the possible time
misalignment between the two devices due to inaccurate synchronization or different
paths to the adversary. We emphasize that any device distinction mechanism must
operate online—the adversary has to decide to cancel an ON slot within the first
few samples—which renders existing sophisticated radio fingerprinting techniques
inadequate [95–100]. We now describe the PHY-layer message integrity verification
primitive in detail.
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3.3.2 HELP Integrity Verification
We propose a message integrity verification method called HELP that operates with
the assistance of a helper device H. The integrity of a message mD transmitted from
D to the A is verified via the following steps.
1. Device Placement: The helper H is placed in close proximity to the unau-
thenticated device D.
2. Initialization: The user presses a button on D or simply switches D on to
set it to pairing mode. The user then presses a button on H to initiate the
protocol. The helper sends an authenticated request-to-communicate message
to the A using the AE(·) function. This message attests that the legitimate
device D is present and H is placed near D.
3. Device Synchronization: The A sends a publicly known synchronization
frame SYNC to synchronize the clocks of D, H and itself1. The SYNC frame
is similar in function to the known preamble that is attached to wireless trans-
missions for synchronizing the receiver to the transmitter. In our protocol, all
three entities synchronize to the same time reference, using the known SYNC
message.
4. Transmission of mD: D transmits mD in the form [h(mD)],mD, where [·]
denotes an MC ON-OFF message and h is a cryptographically-secure hash
function. Note that no key input is used with h, as D and the A do not share
a common key.
5. Helper Signal Superposition: Synchronously with the transmission of
[h(mD)], the helper transmits a signal mH with ON slots in a random number
of slot locations determined by vector s. The ON slots in s are time-aligned
1The SYNC message doesn’t need to be secured since if it is canceled at both device and helper,
it becomes a DoS attack. If the device and helper are forced to be out of sync by an attacker, A
will fail to decode which is again a DoS.
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with the slots (ON or OFF) of [h(mD)]. Only one slot of mH can be ON per
MC ON-OFF bit of [h(mD)]. Sequence mH is not necessarily a proper MC
ON-OFF sequence (and hence, is not marked by [·]).
6. Reception at the A: The A receives ([h(mD)] +mH)
′ and m′D.
7. Revealing mH: The helper reveals AE(s, K) to the A.
8. Integrity Verification of s: The A decrypts s and verifies its integrity using
function VD(·), which is the corresponding decryption/verification function to
AE(·). If verification fails, the A aborts m′D.
9. Integrity Verification of mD: The A verifies that all slot locations indicated
by s are ON on the received ([h(mD)] + mH)
′. If not, a signal cancellation
attack is detected and m′D is rejected. Otherwise, the A recovers h(mD)
′,
by removing mH from ([h(mD)] + mH)
′ using the knowledge of s. For bits
where s was OFF in both corresponding slots, the MC ON-OFF sequence is
decoded using typical decoding. For an ON slot in s, a bit bD is decoded using
the truth table in Figure 3.2(a). Upon recovery of h(mD)
′, the A checks if
h(m′D)
?
= h(mD)
′. If the integrity verification fails at the A, either the A or
H display a FAILURE message, and all entities abort the protocol. The user
has to restart the pairing process from the initialization step. If the integrity
verification passes, then A or H display a SUCCESS message.
The steps for extracting [h(mD)
′] from ([h(mD)] + mH)′ at the A are shown
in Figure 3.2(b). After synchronization, D transmits h(mD) = 0110110101 in the
form of [h(mD)] (for illustration purposes, we have restricted the length of the
hash function to 10 bits). The helper synchronously transmits during slots s =
{4, 10, 13, 15, 18}. The A receives the superimposed signal ([h(mD)] + mH)′. Using
the truth table in Figure 3.2(a), the original MC ON-OFF sequence corresponding
to h(mD) is recovered.
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3.3.3 Device Pairing with HELP
In this section, we describe how the A and D can establish a secret key in the pres-
ence of a MitM adversary. We complement the DH key agreement protocol with the
HELP integrity verification primitive. The latter is used to detect the cancellation
portion of a MitM attack. Moreover, the helper provides the necessary authenti-
cation for the DH message exchange. The HELP-enabled DH message exchange is
shown in Figure 3.3.
To fix the ideas, the A (or D) publishes parameters (G, q, g) of the DH scheme,
where (G is a cyclic group of order q and g is a generator of G). If (G, q, g) are
already publicly known, they need not be sent by either party. Device D computes
zD = g
XD , where XD is chosen from Zq uniformly at random. After the initialization
and synchronization steps (omitted from Figure 3.3), D transmits the integrity-
protected form of mD : IDD, zD to the A, while the helper is injecting mH on slot
positions denoted by s. Here, we opt to protect both h(mD) and mD with the PHY-
layer primitive to conceal the value of mD from an adversary M , who cannot learn
the helper’s sequence mH . This prevents a rogue A from recovering mD, so that it
cannot pair with the device successfully. The helper then reveals s to the A through
the secret channel implemented by AE(·). The A uses s to verify the integrity of
mD and recover zD. A replies with zA = g
XA , where XA is chosen in Zq uniformly at
random. Each party independently calculates kD,A = g
XD·XA . Immediately following
the key-agreement, D and A engage in a key confirmation phase, initiated by D.
This can be done by executing a two-way challenge-response protocol [102], as shown
in Figure 3.4. If any of the verification steps fail, the corresponding party aborts
the pairing protocol.
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the HELP integrity verification primitive
and evaluate the security of the DH-based pairing protocol presented in Section 3.3.3.
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D A
Given IDD, Given IDA,
(G, q, g) (G, q, g)
Pick XD ∈U Zq XA ∈U Zq
zD ← gXD zA ← gXA
mD ← IDD, zD mA ← IDA, zA
(H active)
[h(mD),mD]+mH−−−−−−−−−−−→
(H active)
AE(s,K)−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify
& Extract zD
mA←−−−−−−−−−−
kD,A ← (zA)XD kD,A ← (zD)XA
Figure 3.3: Diffie-Hellman key-agreement on kD,A using the HELP PHY-layer in-
tegrity verification method.
D A
CD ∈U Zq
IDD,CD−−−−−−→
RA←hkD,A (IDA||CD||0)
Ver(RA)=true?
RA←−−−−−
CA ∈U Zq
IDA,CA←−−−−−−
RD←hkD,A (IDD||CA||1)
RD−−−−−→ Ver(RD) = true?
Figure 3.4: Key confirmation of kD,A using a challenge-response protocol.
3.4.1 Security of the HELP Primitive
Consider the transmission of [h(mD)],mD from D to the A, superimposed with the
transmission of mH . The goal of the adversary M is to replace mD with some desired
m′D and pass the verification at the A. In the absence of the helper, a straightforward
strategy for M is to annihilate [h(mD)],mD and inject [h(m
′
D)],m
′
D. However, when
mH is superimposed on [h(mD)], a cancellation of [h(mD)] +mH leads to the likely
detection of the cancellation attack due to the “erasure” of the helper’s ON slots.
Rather than blindly canceling the composite signal [h(mD)] + mH transmitted
by D and H, the adversary can attempt to detect the ON slots of the helper and
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leave those intact. He can then target only the OFF symbols of mH and modify
those to desired values so that the A decodes m′D. To pass the integrity verification
performed by the A, it must hold that (a) all the ON slots indicated in s are also
ON slots in [h(m′D)] +mH , and (b) the removal of mH during step 8 of HELP (see
Section 3.3.2), leads to the decoding of [h(m′D)]. As mD follows in plaintext, the
adversary can then replace mD with m
′
D.
We first show that if the adversary can identify the ON slots of the helper (this
is equivalent to knowing mH), then it can modify the transmitted signal such that
the desired value m′D is decoded at the A. Consider the transmission of one MC
ON-OFF bit bD and the superposition of an ON slot by H either during the ON
or the OFF slot of the coded bD. The possible outcomes of this superposition are
shown in the third column of Table 3.1. Moreover, we show the signal bM that
must be injected by M to cause the decoding of the desired value b′D at the A. For
illustration purposes, we show the signal cancellation as a negation of the ON value.
From Table 3.1, we observe that if bH is known, the adversary can always make
the A decode the desired bit b′D, irrespective of the value of bD. Moreover, since
the ON bits of mH stay intact, the modified signal will pass the PHY-layer in-
tegrity verification at the A. However, identifying the ON slots of the helper is
difficult due to the location proximity between D and H and also the strict reaction
time necessary to perform the cancellation attack in an online fashion. In the next
proposition, we prove the security of the integrity verification mechanism under the
realistic assumption that an ON slot for the helper is timely identified by M with
some probability. We experimentally evaluate this probability in Section 3.5. The
security of the integrity verification of HELP is given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The HELP integrity verification primitive is δ–secure with
δ =
(
1− 1− pI
4
)|s|
. (3.1)
Here δ is the probability that the A accepts a message forgery by M , |s| is the length
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Table 3.1: Injection of desired bit b′D, when the ON slots of the helper can be
detected.
bD bH bD + bH bM bD + bH b
′
D
+bM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
of the vector indicating the number of the helper’s ON slots, and pI is the probability
of inferring the helper’s activity during one MC ON-OFF bit when D and H do not
co-transmit. Here, δ is a negligible function of |s|. In eq. (3.1), it is assumed that a
strongly universal hash function is used as part of the HELP primitive.
Proof. Assume that the adversary M wants to modify the message mD sent from
D to the A to a message m′D 6= mD. To accept m′D, the A must correctly receive
[h(m′D)],m
′
D and all the slots indicated in s must be ON slots. The modification
of mD to m
′
D can be made by canceling mD and injecting m
′
D. However, to pass
verification, M has to modify [h(mD)] to [h(m
′
D)]. Since, mD is unknown to the
adversary while [h(mD)] is being transmitted due to the one-wayness of h(·), M
cannot predict the signal transmitted from D.
To modify [h(mD)], the adversary must launch a signal cancellation on [h(mD)]+
mH and inject [h(m
′
D)] at the same time. Moreover, all the ON slots denoted in the
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helper’s location vector s must remain as ON slots in [h(m′D)]. Also, the A must
decode [h(m′D)] after mH is removed. This can be achieved if M does not apply any
cancellation on the ON slots indicated in s and modifies the rest of the slots (OFF
slots in mH) to decode to the desired message. The signal injections of M are made
according to Table 3.1.
The derivation of the probability δ that the adversary’s modification is accepted
at the A is performed in two parts. In the first part, we derive the probability that
M ’s cancellation/injection is detected, when M modifies the transmission one bit.
We then compute the probability of detecting signal modifications by M over all
bits. Consider the ith bit of h(m′D) which corresponds to Manchester-coded slots
t2i−1 and t2i.
Here, we assume a probability pI , which is the probability of inference of detect-
ing the presence of H’s signal. This is discussed in details in the Section 3.5. Here
we state an assumption, that if H’s signal is detected the adversary does not cancel
the signal. The probability of cancel is (1− pI).
The adversary is detected for ith bit on which H is active, for two conditions
with wrong inference (1− pI). (a) First, the helper bit is zero i.e. H injects energy
on t2i slot, device bit is one slot and adversary bit is one. (b) Second, the helper bit
is one i.e. H injects energy on the t2i−1 slot, device bit is zero and the adversary
bit is zero.
Let Pr denote the probability that the A rejects the corresponding bit of [h(m
′
D)]
at bit bi due to cases (a) and (b). This probability can be calculated as:
pr = (Pr[b
H
i = 0, b
D
i = 1, b
A
i = 1]
+ Pr[bHi = 1, b
D
i = 0, b
A
i = 0])
Pr[wrong inference]
=
(
1
2
· 1
2
· 1
2
+
1
2
· 1
2
· 1
2
)
(1− pI)
=
1− pI
4
, (3.2)
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In (3.2), bXi denotes the transmitted value of device X at bit bi, and pI is the
probability of inference of helper’s activity by the M on a given bit. For (3.2), we
have used the fact that a strictly universal hash function is the part of HELP. For
a strictly universal hash function, output hashes for two different inputs differ on
each bit with probability 1/2.
The probability δ of accepting the modified message of M at the A is computed
by taking into account all |s| cardinality of the set of bits on which the helper was
active. The adversary’s modified message is accepted by the A if none of the bits in
|s| is rejected. Each bit bi is rejected with probability pr given by (3.2). As rejection
on each slot occurs independently, the overall probability of accepting [h(m′D)] is
computed via the Binomial distribution with parameter pr. That is,
δ = 1−
|s|∑
x=1
B (x, |s|, pr)
= 1−
|s|∑
x=0
B (x, |s|, pr) +B (0, |s|, pr)
= (1− pr)|s|
= (1− 1− pI
4
)|s|. (3.3)
where B(α, β, γ) is the Binomial probability density function.
We now show that δ is a negligible function of |s|.
In (3.3), δ is a negligible function if (1−pr)|s| is shown to be a negligible function.
To prove the latter, let µ(|s|) = a−|s| where a = 1
1−pr . For µ(|s|) to be a negligible
function, ∀ c ∈ N there exists a n0 ∈ N such that |s| > n0 and µ(|s|) < n−c. Let
n0 = c
a
a−1 . Then
a|s| = (aloga |s|)−
|s|
loga |s|
= (|s|)− |s|loga |s| ,
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Figure 3.5: Probability of accepting a forged message m′D at the A as a function of
|s|, for varying inference capabilities of helper activity.
Since |s| > n0, it follows that
|s|
loga |s|
>
n0
loga n0
>
n0
n
1
a
0
> c.
Therefore,
µ(|s|) = a−|s|
= (|s|)− |s|loga |s|
< n−c.
This proves that (1− pr)|s| is a negligible function for a 6= 1 or equivalently pr 6= 0,
thus concluding the proof on the negligibility of δ for pr 6= 0.
In our analysis, we set the inference probability of H’s activity to one when
either D and H co-transmit or none transmits. In the former case, the presence of
high power can be used to detect the superposition of D and H ON slots, and hence
infer H’s ON slot. In the latter case, the absence of power can be used to detect
a helper’s OFF slot. When either D or H are active, the inference probability is
set to pI < 1 due to the ambiguity in deciding which of the two devices is active.
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Summarizing,
Pr[Inference] =

1, D & H transmit
1, D & H do not transmit
pI , D or H transmits.
(3.4)
In Proposition 1, δ depends on two variables; the cardinality of s and pI . From
(3.1), it is evident that δ is a negligible function of |s|, and a monotonically increasing
function of pI . In Figure 3.5, we show δ as a function of |s| for various values of
pI . As expected, a higher pI yields a higher δ value for the adversary. For instance,
when pI = 0.9, δ = 0.0174, when |s| = 160, which may not be acceptable. However,
doubling the size of s lowers δ to 0.0003. Note that in a single use of the HELP
primitive, the attacker has only one chance to guess s and modify the value of mD in
an online fashion. Hence, a higher probability of forgery is acceptable here relative
to standard cryptographic security (similar security values are sought in previous
pairing protocols, which use short authentication strings [27]).
3.4.2 Security of the Device Pairing Protocol
We now analyze the security of the device pairing protocol proposed in Section 3.3.3.
Since the security of the DH key-agreement protocol under a passive adversary is
standard [103], we focus on the security under active attacks. We divide our analysis
into two parts. In the first part, we examine if the adversary can pair a rogue device
to a legitimate A. In the second part, we examine if a legitimate device can be
deceived to pair with a rogue hub. These two steps are part of a MitM attack.
Pairing a Rogue Device with a legitimate A
The pairing of a rogue device D′ with the A can occur under two different scenarios:
(a) D′ pairs in the absence of a legitimate device D, and (b) D′ pairs while D and
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the A execute a pairing session.
Pairing in the absence of a legitimate device: The pairing protocol described
in Section 3.3.3 is initiated with the placement of H in close proximity to the le-
gitimate device and the press of a button on H and D, respectively. The button
pressing sends a pairing initialization message to the A which is authenticated us-
ing the secure AE(·) function. Without access to the helper device, the adversary
cannot initiate the pairing process from a remote location.
Hijacking a legitimate pairing session: Since M cannot initiate the pairing
process with the A, he can only attempt to pair a rogue device with the A by
hijacking a pairing session involving a legitimate device D. To establish a secret key
with the A, the adversary must modify the DH public number zD of D into its own
DH public number z′D, where zD is contained in the first message mD sent from D
to the A (similar to a typical MitM attack against a DH key exchange).
However, mD is protected by our integrity verification primitive. Note that in
the HELP primitive, only h(mD) is encoded using MC ON-OFF keying while mH is
being superimposed. The actual value of mD follows in plaintext. In our proposed
modified DH protocol, both h(mD) and mD are encoded using HELP. According
to Proposition 1, the adversary’s success probability in forging mD in the HELP
primitive is δ. When both h(mD) and mD are encoded using HELP, we claim that
the adversary’s success probability in replacing mD is upper bounded by δ. This is
because in the primitive, the adversary can change mD into any m
′
D with probability
1, but his advantage is limited by the probability of changing h(mD) into h(m
′
D),
which is δ. In the pairing protocol, the adversary’s success probability of changing
mD into m
′
D is less or equal to 1. Thus overall, its success probability is less or
equal to δ, which is a negligible function of |s| (number of ON slots injected by
helper during [h(m′D)]). Therefore, the adversary will be unable to pair D
′ with the
legitimate A.
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D M A
Given IDD, (G, q, g) Given IDD′ , (G, q, g) Given IDA, (G, q, g)
Pick XD ∈U Zq XD′ ∈U Zq XA ∈U Zq
zD ← gXD zD′ ← gXD′ zA ← gXA
mD ← IDD, zD m′D ← IDD′ , zD′ mA ← IDA, zA
(H active)
[h(mD),mD ]+mH−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Cancel and inject [h(m
′
D),m
′
D ]−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(H active)
AE(s,K)−−−−−−−−−−−−→ AE(s,K)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify & Extract zD′
mA←−−−−−−−−−−−−
k′
D′,A ← (zA)XD′ k′D′,A ← (zD′ )XA
XA′ ∈U Zq
zA′ → gXA′
mA′ → IDD′ , zA′
mA′←−−−−−−−−−−−−
Recover z′D
kD,A′ ← (zA′ )XD k′D,A′ ← (z′D)XA′
Figure 3.6: MitM attack against the key-agreement phase of HELP-enabled pairing
protocol.
Pairing D with a Rogue Hub
We now examine whether the adversary acting as a rogue A can pair with a legiti-
mate device D. To do so, the adversary can perform a similar MitM attack as in the
uplink direction, by replacing the A’s DH public parameter zA with its own number
zA′ . This step of the MitM attack corresponding to the message sent by M to D
after the reception of mD is shown in Figure 3.6.
For this attack to be successful, the adversary must extract the DH public
value zD so that it can compute kD,A′ = (zD)
XA′ . The value of zD is carried in
[h(mD),mD] +mH , using the HELP primitive. To recover mD, the adversary must
be able to determine the location vector s that is used to generate mH for the por-
tion that corresponds to the transmission of mD. However, s is transmitted from
H to A using the authenticated encryption function AE(·), so M cannot obtain s
directly from the encrypted version of it.
Alternatively, M can collect and analyze the transmitted signal of [h(mD),mD]+
mH after receiving it and attempt to identify all the ON slots in mH using radio
fingerprinting methods [95–100]. However, none of the fingerprinting methods can
achieve 100% accuracy. As long as M infers H’s ON slots with some probabil-
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ity smaller than one, we can drive the probability of successfully extracting mD
arbitrarily low by increasing the number of slots carrying mD.
In the following proposition, we derive the probability of D successfully pairing
with a rogue A, when the ON slots of the helper are inferred with probability p′I .
Note that in general p′I is different than the pI of Proposition 1. The inference of the
helper’s ON slots in Proposition 1 must occur based on very few samples because
the adversary must quickly decide whether to perform signal cancellation. In the
rogue A case, the adversary can analyze [h(mD),mD]+mH based on all the samples,
so it is expected that p′I > pI .
Proposition 2. A legitimate device D pairs with a rogue A with probability δ + ,
where
δ = (p′I)
|s′|
, (3.5)
and  is a negligible function of the hash length. Here |s′| < |s| corresponds to the
number of helper’s ON slots only during the transmission of mD in the [h(mD),mD],
p′I is the probability of inferring the helper’s activity during one MC ON-OFF bit
when D and H do not co-transmit, and δ is a negligible function of |s′| when p′I < 1.
Proof. Assume that the adversary M wants to decode the mD which contains the
key public parameter zD from [h(mD),mD] +mH without the knowledge of set s.
For [h(mD),mD] a bit zero corresponds to (OFF, ON) whereas a bit one corre-
sponds to (ON, OFF). With superimposing H’s signal, the A will also receive slots
combinations of (ON, ON). The adversary can extract some information of mD from
the (OFF, ON) and (ON, OFF) slots in the [h(mD),mD] +mH . But to extract the
information from (ON, ON) slots without the knowledge of s. The adversary has to
make intelligent guesses for received (ON, ON) slots, which is parameterized as the
probability of inferring the helper’s activity by M .
Let p′I be the inference probability for detecting the presence of H’s signal. This
is discussed in details in Section 3.5. Note that, if H’s signal is wrongly inferred
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(with probability (1 − p′I)), M maps the received bit on which H was active to a
wrong outcome.
The adversary makes wrong mapping when it receives (ON, ON) slots on received
[h(mD),mD] +mH . It happens when M cannot detect the presence of the helper’s
signal on the slot where D has injected no energy.
pr = Pr[wrong inference] = (1− p′I). (3.6)
In (3.6), p′I is the probability that M detects the H’s signal correctly on a particular
bit.
The probability δ of extracting correctmD from received signal [h(mD),mD]+mH
by M . The adversary can decode correct mD if none of the bits are decoded wrong.
Each bit is wrongly mapped with probability pr, given by (3.6). As rejection on
each slot occurs independently, the overall probability of correctly decoding mD
from [h(mD),mD] +mH is computed via the Binomial distribution with parameter
pr. That is,
δ = 1−
|s′|∑
x=1
B (x, |s′|, pr)
= 1−
|s′|∑
x=0
B (x, |s′|, pr) +B (0, |s′|pr)
= (1− pr)|s′|
= (1− (1− p′I))|s
′|
= (p′I)
|s′|
. (3.7)
where B(α, β, γ) is the Binomial probability density function and |s′| ⊂ |s|, which
corresponds to the number of helper’s ON signals only during the transmission of
mD in the [h(mD),mD].
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We now show that δ is a negligible function of |s′|.
In (3.7), δ is a negligible function if (1−pr)|s′| is shown to be a negligible function.
To prove the latter, let µ(|s′|) = a−|s′| where a = 1
1−pr . For µ(|s′|) to be a negligible
function, ∀ c ∈ N there exists a n0 ∈ N such that |s′| > n0 and µ(|s′|) < n−c. Let
n0 = c
a
a−1 . Then
a|s
′| = (aloga |s
′|)−
|s′|
loga |s′|
= (|s′|)−
|s′|
loga |s′| ,
Since |s′| > n0, it follows that
|s′|
loga |s′|
>
n0
loga n0
>
n0
n
1
a
0
> c.
Therefore,
µ(|s′|) = a−|s′|
= (|s′|)−
|s′|
loga |s′|
< n−c.
This proves that (1− pr)|s′| is a negligible function for a 6= 1 or equivalently pr 6= 0.
After the attacker extracts mD, the rogue A needs to pass the challenge-response
authentication in the key confirmation phase. Assuming the use of a strongly uni-
versal hash function to compute the response hkD,A′ (IDA||CD||0), he can only pass
this authentication if he has the correct key kD,A′ . Otherwise, his successful prob-
ability  is negligible. But he can only obtain the correct key by extracting the
correct mD value. Therefore, the success probability of the rogue A to pair with the
device is upper bounded by δ + , where  is a negligible function (of the length of
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the hash function). Since δ is a negligible function of |s′| which can be the same as
the message length (and here the mD is a DH public number, whose bit length is
typically larger or equal to the hash length), the overall probability is a negligible
function. This concludes the proof.
3.5 Evaluation
3.5.1 Helper Activity Inference
In this section, we first analyze M ’s capability in timely identifying the helper’s ON
slot when the helper is transmitting the ON-OFF message mH . For this purpose, the
adversary could employ several PHY-layer characteristics of the helper’s transmis-
sion to pinpoint when H is active. These include (a) the received signal strength [95],
(b) the frequency offset [96], (c) the channel impulse response hH,A [97], (d) the I/Q
origin offset [98], (e) the transient radio state [99], and (f) the angle of arrival for
the incoming signal [100].
We first examine M ’s attempt to perform the signal cancellation and injection
required by the MitM attack of Figure 3.6. To avoid rejection of m′D by the A, the
adversary has to swiftly detect a helper’s ON slot and decide whether to perform
signal cancellation. Most existing radio fingerprinting methods are not suitable for
such quick online detection. The frequency offset and channel impulse response
are estimated using known preambles that are typically included in headers. Such
preambles do not precede the helper’s ON slots. The I/Q origin offset is not a
suitable method because we employ ON-OFF modulation for message transmission.
The methods that detect the transient state of a radio when it turns on can only
be used to identify the start of a transmission (although an ON-OFF modulation
implies a transition from an OFF to an ON state, the radio transmitter is powered
through the entire transmission of an ON-OFF signal and a transient state is not
observed with every slot). Differentiating between D and H using an AOA requires
a very narrow directional beam due to the proximity between H and D. Such
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Figure 3.7: (a) Experimental setup, (b) detection probability as a function of the
window of samples when the power at H and D is fixed, (c) detection probability
as a function of the window of samples when the power at H and D varies, and (d)
detection probability as a function of the distance between D and H, when H and
D remain equidistant from M .
narrow beamwidths can be achieved by using an antenna array [104] or a parabolic
antenna [105]. However, the hardware cost is prohibitive and the antenna would
be quite visible. For example, an adversary at 50ft from D and H requires two
50-element antenna arrays pointed to D and H respectively via the LoS path, to
differentiate between D and H when their distance is set to 4ft. This calculation
assumes a 2.4GHz operating frequency.
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Fast Helper Detection based on RSS
The simplest and most timely method for detecting the presence of the helper is
to measure the received signal strength over some small number of samples at the
beginning of every slot. Let bD and bH represent the bit simultaneously transmitted
by D and H respectively over two slots ti and ti+1. There are four possible bit
combinations that yield two candidate power profiles for bD + bH , as measured by
the adversary. When bD = bH , the helper and D overlap in one of the two slots
(either ti or ti+1), depending on the value of bD, bH . In this case, one of the slots is
OFF whereas the other slot is ON with a significantly higher power because the two
ON slots of H and D are superimposed (here, we have considered the worst-case
scenario and ignored the possibility of destructive interference). We expect that M
will be able to infer the ON slot of the helper with probability pI = 1, due to the
higher RSS value of the first few samples of the ON slot.
When bD 6= bH , both ti and ti+1 are ON and have similar power profiles if H and
D transmit with the same power and are placed in close proximity. In this case,
the adversary is expected to be unable to differentiate a helper’s ON slot from a
device’s ON slot with the probability much higher than a random guess. The four
possible cases for one slot observed by the adversary are: (a) P1 : both H and D
are ON, (b) P2 : H is ON and D is OFF, (c) P3 : D is ON and H is OFF, and (d)
P4 : both H and D are OFF. For each case, the adversary determines four threshold
values E[P1], E[P2], E[P3], and E[P4], that represent the average expected power, as
measured by the first few samples of a slot.
Without loss of generality, let E[P1] > E[P2] > E[P3] > E[P4].
2 Let also E[P (ti)]
denote the average power measured over slot ti using the first few samples. The
adversary classifies ti to one of four cases by mapping E[P (ti)] to the closest thresh-
old. That is, case P1 is inferred if E[P (ti)] >
E[P1]+E[P2]
2
, case P2 is inferred if
E[P1]+E[P2]
2
≤ E[P (ti)] < E[P2]+E[P3]2 , etc. A wrong inference is made when E[P (ti)]
2E[P2] and E[P3] can be similar but not exactly the same, so we can assume some ordering to
make a classification rule.
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that belongs to case Pi is mapped to a case Pj with Pi 6= Pj. In Proposition 1, we
have assumed that the probability pI for correctly inferring cases P1 and P4 is equal
to one. In P1, the RSS is expected to be relatively high due to the co-transmission
from D and H. In P4, the RSS is expected to be low because neither D nor H
are transmitting. However, the thresholds for cases P2 and P3 are expected to be
very close, thus leading to frequent wrong inferences. We experimentally verify this
claim.
Experimental Evaluation of pI :
Experimental setup: To evaluate pI , we setup three NI-USRP 2921 devices in an
indoor laboratory environment. Two USRP devices represented D and H, whereas
a third USRP device is placed at 24 feet away acting as an adversary. The transmit
power for an ON slot was set to 20dBm for both D and H with a symbol duration of
1ms. The devices were set to work at 2.4GHz and were synchronized. The sampling
frequency was set to 2MHz. We tested two scenarios: (1) H is stacked on top of
D, and (2) H is moved away from the legitimate device. The experiment setup is
shown in Figure 3.7(a).
We implemented amplitude shift keying (ASK) to transmit MC ON-OFF coded
messages and repeatedly transmitted message {1, 0, 1, 0} from D and message
{1, 1, 0, 0} from H simultaneously. The signals from H are MC-coded only when
the bit value is one. The superposition of the two signals implemented all four cases
P1-P4.
Results: Let PDH denote the probability of detecting that D and H transmit simul-
taneously, PNDH denote the probability of detecting that neither D nor H transmit,
and PH denote the probability of detecting that H is transmitting alone. These
correspond to pI for any of the candidate scenarios. In the first experiment, we
measured the detection probability as a function of the sampling window size used
for computing the average RSS value for a given slot. Intuitively, a longer sampling
window would lead to better inference but will delay the cancellation operation.
Figure 3.7(b) shows the resulting detection probabilities as a function of the sample
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window. We observe that the detection probabilities PDH and PNDH are relatively
low and are further reduced with the increase of the sample window. However,
the detection probability PH is close to 0.5 irrespective of the sample window size.
This indicates that differentiating between the ON slots of the helper and of the
legitimate device, when only one of the two transmits, is practically equivalent to
a random guess. Our results justify the selection of pI = 1 when the H and D are
simultaneously absent or present, and pI = 0.5 otherwise.
In the second experiment, we repeated the first experiments but configured H
and D to vary their transmission power on a per-slot basis. The power was varied to
reduce the inference capability of M . Specifically, H and D oscillated their power at
random between 10dBm and 20dBm. Figure 3.7(c) shows the detection probabilities
as a function of the window of samples used for inference.
Effect of proximity on pI: We further performed experiments to evaluate the
effect of the proximity between D and H on their distinguishability. We repeated the
first experiment and varied the distance between H and D. In the first part of the
experiment, H was moved away from D while keeping the D-M and H-M distances
similar (the helper’s motion was perpendicular to the D-M line. Figure 3.7(d) shows
that the detection probability for each case is similar to the case where H is stacked
on top of D. In the second part of the experiment, H was moved towards M , and
therefore, the distance between H and M was gradually reduced. Figure 3.8(a)
shows the respective detection probabilities. As expected, decreasing the distance
between M and H improves the adversary’s inference capability, but the inference
remains imperfect when D and H remain relatively close.
In the fourth experiment, we repeated the second part of the third experiment
but configured H and D to vary their transmission power on a per-slot basis. The
power was varied to reduce the inference capability of M . Specifically, H and D
oscillated their power at random between 10dBm and 20dBm. Figure 3.8(b) shows
the same results when the distance between D and H was also varied, with H
moving towards M . We observe that PH remains a random guess even when H is
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Figure 3.8: (a) Detection probability as a function of the distance between D and
H when H is moved towards M , and (b) detection probability as a function of
the distance between D and H when H is moved towards M , when D and H are
transmitting random powers.
moved away from D (comparison of PH in Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b)), indicating
that a power variation approach can account for situations where H is not placed
exactly on top of D. Distinguishing signals from D and H using RSS remains a
random guess even when H is 2ft away from D.
Fast Helper Detection Based on Time
In this section, we discuss an inference technique that exploits the possible time
misalignment between the transmissions of H and D due to clock drift and different
path delays to the receiver. There have been extensive studies on synchronization
of independent wireless nodes, but practically it is impossible to reach perfect syn-
chronization [90]. The adversary can exploit the synchronization offset between H
and D to infer the presence of helper’s ON signals. If H is faster (slower) than D,
the ON slots of H will appear slightly earlier (later) than the ON slots of D. An
example of a fast H is shown in Figure 3.9, where there is a synchronization offset
 between D and H. If M fixes his clock to H, it can infer the presence of helper’s
ON slots without having to resort to RSS estimation. It should be noted here, the
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Figure 3.9: Synchronization offset without and with randomized start time of each
bit.
A performs detection of ON slots by taking an average value of the power of all the
samples. Therefore, a perfect synchronization between D and H is not required for
the correctness of the proposed protocol.
To prevent the inference of the helper’s ON slots based on time misalignment,
we randomize the start times of each bit (first slot of the MC ON-OFF bit) both at
H and D. Specifically, a random time offset , positive or negative, is selected from
a uniform distribution U(l, h). The lower bound l is selected to be the maximum
synchronization error between D and H. This can be calculated as the expected
clock drift over the transmission time of H plus a maximum time difference between
path delays. The upper bound τh can be some reasonable value (e.g., 2l). Moreover
τ << t, where t is the slot duration. This will ensure the correct sequence decoding
at the A. The lower part of Figure 3.9 shows an example of applying the randomized
start time for each bit. We observe that no device is always faster (slower), thus
preventing M from fixing its clock to H.
Experimental Evaluation of pI : To verify the validity of our time random-
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Figure 3.10: Fraction of slots that one device is faster than the other as a function
of the delay offset .
ization approach and its impact on the inference probability pI , we setup three
NI-USRP 2921 devices in an indoor laboratory environment as D, H, and M , re-
spectively. As in previous experiments, H was stacked on top of D, whereas M
was placed 24 feet away from D,H. The transmit power for an ON slot was set to
20dBm with a symbol duration of 1ms. An artificial clock misalignment τ = 0.1msec
was set between H and D to emulate the maximum synchronization error. We then
varied the random time offset  selected by H and D. The experiment lasted for
the transmission of 106 sequences of 40 bits each.
Figure 3.10 shows the fraction of slots for which each device was detected to be
faster as a function of the maximum synchronization error . We observe that for
sufficiently high values of , H is almost 50% of the time faster than D. Practically,
using time misalignment to distinguish the helper becomes a random guess.
In Proposition 2, δ depends on two variables; the cardinality of set s′ which is
a subset of s corresponding to H’s ON signal only during the transmission of mD
in [h(mD),mD], and the inference probability of the helper’s activity during the
transmission of [h(mD),mD] + mH , which is p
′
I . From eq. (3.5), it is evident that
δ is a negligible function of |mD|, and a monotonically increasing function of p′I .
In Figure 3.12, we show δ as a function of |s′| for various values of p′I and fixed
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Figure 3.11: (a) Placement of D and H, (b) placement of the A (RX1) and RX2.
(c) probability of acceptance of a modified message at the A in the absence of H,
and (d) probability of acceptance of a modified message at the A in the presence of
H.
hash length of ` = 160. As expected, a higher p′I yields a higher δ value for the
adversary. For instance, when p′I = 0.9, δ = 0.0018, when |s′| = 80, which may
not be acceptable. However, doubling the size of s′ lowers δ to 5 × 10−8. Note
that, such an attack has to happen in an online manner. This is because the rogue
A must pass the challenge-response phase from the device in the key confirmation
phase, so the attacker only has one chance to guess s and derive a probable DH key
from the guessed zD, which is only successful with small probability δ (similar to
limited-guess online password attacks).
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Figure 3.12: Probability of pairing with a rogue A as a function of |s|, for varying
inference capabilities of helper activity.
3.6 Chapter Summary
We considered the problem of pairing two devices using in-band communications
in the absence of prior shared secrets. We proposed a new PHY-layer integrity
protection scheme called HELP that is resistant to signal cancellation attacks. Our
scheme operates with the assistance of a helper device that has an authenticated
channel to the A. The helper is placed in close proximity to the legitimate device
and simultaneously transmits at random times to allow the detection of cancellation
attacks at the A. We showed that a pairing protocol such as the DH key agreement
protocol using HELP as an integrity protection primitive can resist MitM attacks
without requiring an authenticated channel between D and the A. This was not
previously feasible by any of the pairing methods if signal cancellation is possible.
We studied various implementation details of HELP and analyzed its security. Our
protocol is aimed at alleviating the device pairing problem for IoT devices that
may not have the appropriate interfaces for entering or pre-loading cryptographic
primitives.
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CHAPTER 4
IN-BAND SECRET-FREE PAIRING PROTOCOL FOR
COTS WIRELESS DEVICES
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Motivation
HELP as well as most in-band pairing protocols [31–35], rely on Manchester coded
ON/OFF keying to thwart active attacks. The adoption of those methods may
require firmware/hardware modifications. To be compatible with Commercial-Off-
The-Shelf (COTS) devices, we proposed a novel message integrity and authenti-
cation primitive that does not rely on any special modulation. In this chapter,
we study the problem of secure in-band pairing for devices that do not share any
prior secrets. We develop a secret-free in-band trust establishment primitive, called
SFIRE for short, that draws security from hard-to-forge signal propagation laws.
The primary operational scenario for SFIRE is shown in Figure 4.1. A user exe-
cutes a pairing session between the legitimate device D and the hub A. During
pairing, M launches an MitM attack over the wireless channel to establish a key
with the hub and/or the device. In SFIRE, active attacks are detected by correlat-
ing RSS fluctuations measured simultaneously at A and a helper device H, while
the pairing device is active. RSS has been explored in several prior works for device
authentication [72, 76] however, these methods require firmware and/or hardware
alterations.
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Adversary
(M)
Figure 4.1: The basic system model depicting all the entities.
4.1.2 Main Contributions and Chapter Organization
Our contributions: Our main contributions are four-fold:
• We develop a novel PHY-layer primitive called SFIRE that prevents rogue
devices from joining the network. SFIRE is resistant to an MitM attacker,
capable of advanced signal manipulations. SFIRE’s security relies on a novel
“RSS authenticator” that exploits physical signal propagation laws to thwart
attackers.
• We use SFIRE to construct a secure in-band pairing protocol based on the
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement [49]. Our protocol allows a legitimate
device join a hub and establish a pairwise key. One notable feature of our
protocol is that it does not require any hardware/firmware modifications or
special transmission modes for the device. This makes SFIRE interoperable
with any commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) device that has a common wireless
link with the hub.
• We theoretically explore the security of the RSS authenticator under worst-
case scenarios. We analyze the ability of active adversaries with increasing
capabilities (antenna directionality, transmission power control, etc.) to defeat
SFIRE.
• We carry out extensive experimentation to establish the distinct RSS features
that can be used for message integrity verification. We analyze the security
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of SFIRE under active adversaries with increasing capabilities. We implement
SFIRE on COTS equipment and USRPs to validate the offered security. Our
experiments attest the theoretical findings and verify the resistance to active
signal manipulations, even if the adversary enjoys favorable channel conditions
to the hub and the helper.
Chapter Organization: The remainder of this chapter is organized as fol-
lows. In Section 4.2, we describe the system and adversary models. We present the
SFIRE primitive and secure pairing protocol in Section 4.3. We theoretically and
experimentally evaluate the PHY-layer features exploited in “RSS authenticators”
of SFIRE in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 respectively. We evaluate the security of
pairing protocol and various implementation details in Section 4.6 and conclude in
Section 4.7.
4.2 Model Assumptions
4.2.1 System Model
The following entities are part of the system model.
Hub (A): The hub coordinates the secure pairing process. It is responsible for
the authentication of the legitimate device and the coordination with the helper
device.
Legitimate Device (D): A COTS device which attempts to pair with A in-
band. Pairing results in the establishment of a secret key. D does not share secrets
with A before pairing. It is assumed to be under the user’s control.
Helper Device (H): The helper is a trusted device such as a smartphone that
is under the user’s control. It assists A with the pairing process and already shares
a secure authenticated channel with A. However, H does not share any secrets with
D. This channel is established via conventional means such as loading a common
key. Using this secure channel, H can apply an authenticated encryption function
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AE(·) on any transmission to guarantee the message confidentiality and integrity,
and the authenticity of the source. Any such AE(·) can be utilized with the proposed
protocol. For example, if H and A share a public/private key pair, H can encrypt–
sign–encrypt (or sign–encrypt–sign), or if they share a common master symmetric
key, an encrypt-then-MAC operation can be followed to implement AE(·), after
separate symmetric keys are generated from the master key for the encryption and
MAC operations. We refer the reader to [93] for more details on authenticated
encryption. Note that pairing H to A is a one-time effort and is not repeated with
every device join. We believe that this is an acceptable tradeoff for pairing many
COTS devices. Finally, H is assumed to be loosely synchronized to A using any
known method (e.g., [90]).
4.2.2 Threat Model
Adversary (M): We consider an active adversary that controls one or more ad-
versarial devices. We assume that M cannot get very close to the helper and the
legitimate device (e.g., within 1-2 meters) as it will become noticed by the user.
M ’s goal is to either pair with A as a legitimate device or spoof a rogue hub that
pairs with D. Because device pairing is initiated by the user, M attempts to realize
his goal by launching a MitM attack during a pairing session. The MitM attack is
performed by canceling/overshadowing signals at D, A and H and injecting rogue
messages. The adversary is aware of the protocol executed by the legitimate devices,
but does not have physical access to any of them. Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
such as jamming, are orthogonal to our studies. Moreover, as commonly assumed,
M is incapable of physically blocking signals (e.g., by adding a Faraday cage) around
D, A, or H. We consider three adversary types with increasing capabilities.
Type 1: A type 1 adversary can perform an overshadowing attack [54] to inject
his own message at H and A using omnidirectional transmsissions.
Type 2: A type 2 adversary is a type 1 adversary that additionally employs
coordinating devices with directional antennas that can target individual devices.
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Type 3: A type 3 adversary is a type 2 adversary that additionally applies fine-
grained power control to achieve any desired RSS profile.
4.3 The SFIRE Protocol
SFIRE is an in-band pairing protocol that does not require secret preloading. Au-
thentication is achieved via a novel PHY-layer protection primitive which we call as
an “RSS authenticator”. We first describe the RSS authenticator and then use it to
construct SFIRE.
4.3.1 Constructing an RSS Authenticator
Referring to the basic scenario of Figure ??, consider D attempting to pair with A.
Let D transmit mD in plaintext because D and A do not share any prior security
association. While mD is transmitted, H is swept over D in an oscillating motion,
with both H and A simultaneously measuring the RSS. H relays the received mes-
sage, say m′D and the associated RSS samples to A via their shared authenticated
channel. The hub compares m′D with its own received message m
′′
D and also com-
putes the RSS ratio between the samples sent from H and its own samples. The hub
uses the RSS ratio fluctuation patterns to verify that m′′D indeed originated from D.
Formally, the authentication steps are as follows.
1. Initialization: The user presses a button on D or simply switches D on to
set it to pairing mode. The user then presses a button or a virtual button on
H to initiate the protocol. H sends an authenticated request-to-communicate
message to A using the AE(·) function, which attests that D is present. The
hub starts a timer.
2. Transmission of mD: D broadcasts mD a total of k times in plaintext using
back-to-back frames. The repetition of mD bridges the time scales between
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message transmission and the user actions, as the latter are several orders of
magnitude slower.
3. Sweeping motions: While mD is transmitted, the user sweeps H over D (see
Figure 4.3(a)). A sweeping motion is defined as a continuous motion passing
over D. While in motion, H decodes messages m′D(1), . . . ,m
′
D(k) and samples
the RSS at a fixed rate. Let rH = {rH(1), . . . , rH(n)} by the RSS sequence
with tH(1) denoting the timestamp of the first sample.
4. Reception of mD at A: The hub decodes m
′′
D(1), . . . ,m
′′
D(k). The hub also
records rA = {rA(1), . . . , rA(n)}, and the reception time tA(1) of the first
sample.
5. Authentication at H: The helper checks if m′D(1)
?
= · · · ?= m′D(k). If not, H
sends an AE(ABORT) message to A via their shared authenticated channel.
If the decoded messages match, H compiles message mH = {rH ,m′D(1), tH(1)}
and sends AE(mH) to A.
6. Authentication of mH: The hub decrypts mH and verifies its integrity using
VD(·), which is the corresponding authentication/integrity verification func-
tion to AE(·). If verification fails, A aborts m′′D.
7. Authentication of mD: The hub first verifies that m
′′
D(1)
?
= · · · ?= m′′D(k).
If verification fails, it aborts the pairing process. If successful, the hub verifies
m′′D(1)
?
= m′D(1). If verification fails, the hub aborts the pairing process. Oth-
erwise, A proceeds to the RSS authentication. The hub uses the timestamps
tH(1) and tA(1) to align rH with rA. The hub computes the RSS ratio (Γ)
between rH and rA:
Γ = {γ(1), γ(2), . . . , γ(n)}, γ(i) = rH(i)
rA(i)
.
The hub performs a set of RSS authentication tests to verify the authenticity
of m′′D. If any of the tests fails, the pairing is aborted and the user has to
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D A
Given IDD, Given IDA,
(G, q, g) (G, q, g)
Pick XD ∈U Zq XA ∈U Zq
zD ← gXD zA ← gXA
mD ← IDD, zD [mD]−−−−−−−−−−−→ mA ← IDA, zA
(H active)
AE(mH,j ,K)−−−−−−−−−→ Verify
& Extract zD
Verify & Extract
AE(mA,K)←−−−−−−−−
mA at H
[mA]←−−−−−−−−−−− (H active)
kD,A ← (zA)XD kD,A ← (zD)XA
Figure 4.2: DH key agreement using SFIRE as a message authenticator.
restart the pairing process. If all test pass H displays SUCCESS. If a timer
at A expires, the pairing process fails.
4.3.2 SFIRE-enabled Device Pairing
Parties A and D can securely establish a pairwise key by integrating SFIRE to the
DH key-agreement protocol. The SFIRE-enabled DH message exchange is shown in
Figure 3.3. The hub (or D) use public parameters (G, q, g) of the DH scheme, where
(G is a cyclic group of order q and g is a generator of G). Device D computes zD =
gXD , where XD is chosen from Zq uniformly at random. After the initialization step
(omitted from Figure 3.3), D broadcasts mD : IDD, zD in plaintext to A. The hub
verifies this broadcast using SFIRE. In the protocol of Figure 3.3, messages protected
by SFIRE are denoted by [·]. The hub replies with zA = gXA , where XA is chosen
in Zq uniformly at random. Each party independently computes kD,A = gXD·XA .
Immediately following the key-agreement, D and A engage in a key confirmation
phase, initiated by D. This can be done by executing a two-way challenge-response
protocol [102]. If any of the parties fails verification, it sends an abort message.
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4.3.3 Securing the Downlink Direction
In the DH exchange of Figure 3.3, the authenticity of mA is not verified at D. A
MitM adversary acting as a rogue hub may attempt to pair with D by replacing mA
with its own message. However, this will result in an incomplete session at A. In
this case, A can notify H of the incomplete pairing that displays a failure message.
The user can then re-initiate the pairing protocol.
Message mA can be explicitly authenticated by increasing human effort. After
verifying and accepting mD, A transmits mA to H using AE(·). Then A sends mA in
plaintext to D. Device D records m′A and the corresponding RSS values as dictated
in step 4 of the SFIRE protocol. The helper repeats the transmission of mA while it
is being swiped over D several times. The device decodes m′′A and records the RSS
values. To deem mA authentic, it must hold that m
′
A
?
= m′′A and the first three RSS
authentication tests are passed at D. Note that the helper does not relay any RSS
measurements to D, but D directly measures RSS from the respective transmissions
of H and A. D does not need special hardware, as RSS measurements are readily
available in-band.
4.4 RSS Authentication Tests
We now describe four RSS authentication tests performed by A to verify mD. Tests
are introduced to mitigate adversaries with increasing capabilities. Three of our
tests rely on identifying the samples that belong to each sweep performed by the
user. The hub organizes the RSS samples Γ in sweeps as follows:
Definition 1. Sweep si: Let Γ be a set of RSS ratio samples ordered according
to time. Let F be the fitted smooth curve on Γ. A sweep si is a set of samples
{s(i, 1), s(i, 2), . . . , s(i, wi)}, where s(i, 1) and s(i, wi) are the samples closest to the
ith and i+ 1st local maximum of F , respectively.
We use a fitted smoothed curve [106] to address the temporal RSS ratio variation.
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Figure 4.3: (a) Various sweeping motions of H over D, (b) RSS ratio fluctuation as
a function of time for various motions.
Although the RSS ratio is expected to be proportional to distance (especially in the
presence of a strong LoS component), the RSS would vary with nearby movement.
The fitted smooth curve allows us to uniquely define local maxima. When a point
from Γ is assigned to a sweep si, it is removed from Γ such that sweeps form disjoint
sets. If the user does not initiate the device movement close to D where the peak
ratio is achieved, the first few samples are discarded until a peak is found. One RSS
ratio timeline indicating a sample set Γ based on our experiments (see Section ??
for the experimental setup description) for the three motion types of Figure 4.3(a)
is shown in Figure 4.3(b).
4.4.1 Test 1: Peak RSS Ratio
In the first test, the hub compares the largest sample value in every sweep si with
a threshold τpeak. The verification passes if there is at least one sample in every si
with a value greater than τpeak. This test exploits the short distance between H and
D during each sweep and the physical signal propagation laws. When the helper is
swept over D, he reaches within a few wavelengths from D, whereas A is expected
to be at a significantly longer distance. Due to the proximity of H and D, the peak
RSS at H can be several orders of magnitude higher than the RSS at A. The peak
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RSS ratio from a remote location M relative to D cannot achieve very high values
due to geometric constraints (the distance difference between the M -H and M -A
paths becomes smaller as M ’s location becomes more remote, unless the three are
co-linear). Formally, the steps of Test 1 are as follows:
1. Compile sweeps: Compile the sweep set s1, s2, . . . , s` from sample set Γ
according to Definition 1.
2. RSS ratio test: If
max
si
(s(i, j)) ≥ τpeak, ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , `
then D passes Test 1.
Determining τpeak: We now show how to select the threshold τpeak for Test 1.
Consider a transmission from D received by H and A simultaneously. Due to the
proximity between D and H during the sweeping motion, the D-to-H channel has
a strong LoS component. For this topology, the propagation loss can be modeled
after the free-space channel model with a path-loss exponent αH = 2 [91]. The
D-to-A channel, on the other hand, could adhere to different models depending on
the setting. Given that no single propagation model can capture all scenarios, we
consider a general pathloss model where signal attenuation is primarily captured via
the attenuation factor αA that can range from two to five [91]. Under this general
model, the RSS ratio γ at A when D transmits is given by:
γ =
rH
rA
=
GH
GA
· (dDA)
αA
(dDH)2
, (4.1)
where dDX is the distance between D and X, GX is the antenna gain of X, and
αA is the pathloss factor for the D-to-A channel. To ease our theoretical analysis,
we assume that the path loss exponents remain constant during the brief sweeping
process and focus on a single sweep. We simplify our notation by dropping the sweep
index and focus on sweep s with samples {s(1), s(2), . . . , s(w)}. The maximum RSS
ratio in a sweep s is given by:
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max
s
(s(j)) = max
rH
(
rH(j)
rA
)
= max
dDH
(
GH · (dDA)αA
GA · (dDH(j))2
)
=
GH · (dDA)αA
GA ·min
dDH
(dDH(j))2)
=
GH · (dDA)αA
GA · (dminDH)2
, (4.2)
where rH is the vector of all sampled RSS values at H during sweep s, dDH is
the vector of the the corresponding distances between D and H when D’s signal
is sampled during the sweep s, and dminDH is the minimum distance between D and
H during the sweep s (recall that only H is moving during a sweep). When the
legitimate device D is transmitting, at least one value in s must be greater than
τpeak. The benign case determines the threshold τpeak that must be used for detecting
a Test 1 violation.
τpeak ≤ max
s
(s(j)) =
GH · dαADA
GA · (dminDH)2
. (4.3)
The value of τpeak is further used to analyze the security of Test 1. Here, we
observe that the τpeak depends on the distances between the legitimate entities and
the user’s movement. The threshold value is calibrated for legitimate entities and
the user is given instructions on the suggested movement patterns (e.g., sweep the
helper across D and pass within a few centimeters from D).
One challenge with determining τpeak is that the pathloss αA between D and A
depends on the setting. To make our method applicable to any setting, we consider
the worst-case scenario where αA = 2., i.e., the D-to-A channel is a LoS channel. It
is fairly straightforward to observe that τpeak is a monotonically increasing function
of αA. Therefore, τpeak is minimized for αA = 2. Even if the D-to-A channel conforms
to a model with higher αA, a legitimate device will pass Test 1, when τpeak is selected
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with αA = 2. Finally, selecting τpeak with αA = 2 is the best case for the adversary.
Security Analysis: In an attempt to defeat Test 1, the signal injected by
M during sweep sM has to achieve a maximum RSS ratio that exceeds τpeak. As
discussed earlier, the best case for the adversary is when τpeak is minimized, which
is achieved when αA = 2. We analyze the security of Test 1 when
τpeak = GH ·(dDA)
2/GA·(dminDH)2.
Type 1 adversary: To succeed in pairing with the hub, a Type 1 adversary
launches an overshadowing attack [54] by transmitting at a desired power using an
omnidirectional antenna. Let M attempt to replace D’s message mD with mM at
A from a location LM . To succeed in injecting mM at A, the signal from M must
arrive at A with power at least higher than rA. Given the distance between M and
A, the transmit power of M must be at least,
P ′M > PD ·
GD
GM
·
(
dMA
dDA
)2
, (4.4)
where PD is the transmit power of D and a LoS model is assumed for the channels
between M and A to minimize PM (least power requirement for the adversary).
Similarly, to inject mM at H, the transmit power of M must be at least,
P ′′M > PD ·
GD
GM
·
(
dMH
dDH
)2
. (4.5)
From (4.4) and (4.5), to inject mM simultaneously at A and H, the transmit
power of M must be at least,
PM > max(P
′
M , P
′′
M). (4.6)
Let M perform an overshadowing attack during sweep s by transmitting at power
PM . The peak RSS ratio between the received signal at H and A is,
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Figure 4.4: The adversary placed at LM1 (co-linear with H-to-A line) is the optimal
position is outside the insecure area with fixed M -to-D distance for maximizing the
RSS peak ratio.
max
sM
(sM(j)) = max
rH
(
rH(j)
rA
)
=
GH
GA
max
dMH
(
dMA
dMH(j)
)2
=
GH
GA
 dMA
min
dMH
(dMH(j))
2 , (4.7)
where sM is the sweep s affected by M ’s injection.
We investigate the optimal position of M that maximizes maxsM (sM(j)). From
(4.7), maxsM (sM(j)) is maximized when dMA is maximum while dMD is minimum.
Let us fix the distance dMD to the smallest distance that M can maintain from D
without being visually detected by the user. The position of M that maximizes
maxsM (sM(j)) is achieved when M , H, D, and A are all co-linear in this particular
order. This reflected in position LM1 (denoted by L
∗
M from now) of Figure 4.4. At
L∗M the distance to A is maximized for a fixed distance to D, thus maximizing the
achievable RSS ratio of M . The security analysis from here on assumes that M is
at L∗M . Fixing the position of M at L
∗
M , we investigate the RSS ratio achieved at
H under different helper motions. From Figure 4.6,
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dMA = dMD + dDA, dMH = (dMD + dDH cos θ) sec θ
′,
where θ corresponds to the angle between the D-to-H and D-to-A lines and θ′
corresponds to the angle between the M -to-H and M -to-A lines. In addition, M
achieves the maximum RSS ratio when H is closest to M . This corresponds to
θ = 180◦, θ′ = 0◦. In this case, (4.7) can be rewritten as,
max
sM
(sM(j)) =
GH
GA
max
dDH
(
dMD + dDA
(dMD + dDH(j) cos θ) sec θ′
)2
=
GH
GA
 dMD + dDA
dMD −max
dDH
(dDH(j))
2
=
GH
GA
(
dMD + dDA
dMD − dmaxDH
)2
, (4.8)
where maxdDH (dDH(j)) = d
max
DH which is the maximum distance between D and H
during sweep sM . Using the value of τpeak from (4.3) and (4.8), we evaluate the
D-to-M distance outside which Test 1 detects a Type 1 adversary.
Proposition 3. Test 1 detects any Type 1 adversary which is at distance dMD from
D, satisfying (dMD+dDA)αA/(dMD−dmaxDH )2 < (dDA/dminDH)
2. Parameter αA is the attenuation
factor of the M-to-A channel.
Proof. We first consider a single sweep of H over D. The threshold for detecting
an invalid transmission using Test 1 is given by (??). This minimizes the τpeak that
needs to be met by the adversary to pass Test 1. Let the adversary be located at
distance dMH from H and dMA from A. The RSS ratio achieved by a Type 1 adver-
sary transmitting with power PM is given by (4.1). As H is swept over D, the RSS
ratios computed by A when M is active form a set sM = {sM(1), sM(2), . . . , sM(n)},
where sM(i) corresponds to the i
th RSS ratio sample collected by A while H moves
over D. To detect a Type 1 adversary, it must follow that the maximum RSS ratio
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H AD
Figure 4.5: The optimal position L∗M for defeating Test 1 when the distance dMD is
fixed, lies co-linearly with D and A.
obtained during the motion of H does not exceed τpeak.
max
sM
(sM(i)) < τpeak
max
dMA,dMH
GH
GA
· (dMA)
αA
(dMH)2
< τpeak (4.9a)
GH
GA
· (dMD + dDA)
αA
max
dDH
(dMD − dDH(j))2 < τpeak (4.9b)
GH
GA
· (dMD + dDA)
αA
(dMD − dmaxDH )2
<
GH
GA
· (dDA)
2
(dminDH)
2
(4.9c)
(dMD + dDA)
αA
(dMD − dmaxDH )2
<
(dDA)
2
(dminDH)
2
. (4.9d)
In (4.9a), we replaced the expression of sM(i) from (4.7). In (4.9b), we considered
the distances of M to H and A that maximize the RSS ratio. We further fixed the
distance between M and D and considered all possible locations of M relative to H
and A that maximize the RSS ratio achieved by M . This occurs when M , D, H,
and A to be co-linear as shown in Figure 4.5. In (4.9c), we further minimized the
denominator by considering the location of H closest to M .
The sweeping motion of H over D is repeated multiple times. The maximum
RSS ratio must exceed τpeak for every motion of H. Given that the sweeps are of
approximately equal length, the same inequality as in (4.9d) must be satisfied for
all sweeps. This concludes the proof.
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Figure 4.6: Various motions for the helper.
When αA = 2, there is only one positive solution for dMD condition stated in
Proposition 1. The adversary has to get closer to H than D is to defeat Test 1. When
αA > 2 there are two solutions to the condition of Proposition 1. For instance, let us
consider αA = 4. By solving for dMD, we find that a Type 1 adversary is successful
in two regions
dMD < dDA−2dDAd
min
DH+
√
dDA(dDA−4dDAdminDH−4dminDHdmaxDH )/2dminDH,
dMD > 2dDAd
min
DH−dDA+
√
dDA(dDA−4dDAdminDH−4dminDHdmaxDH )/2dminDH.
The first inequality is similar to the case of αA = 2. The adversary has to get close
enough to H and D to defeat Test 1. The second inequality however, reveals the
interesting case where if M moves far away from H and A, he will eventually achieve
an RSS ratio higher than τpeak. This is intuitive because the signal attenuates faster
to A than to H due to the higher path loss exponent for the M -to-A channel.
However, moving away from the legitimate devices poses a high power requirement
for succeeding in the overshadowing attack. According to (4.6), the power required
for a successful overshadowing attack grows as a function of (dMA)
αA . For example,
for dDA = 8m, d
min
DH = 4cm, d
max
DH = 8cm, PD = 1mW and GD = GM = 1, the
D-to-M distances dMD < 4.1cm, or dMD > 174m for αA = 3, and dMD < 4.12cm,
or dMD > 230m for αA = 4. For the longer dMD solutions, the transmission power
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to successfully launch overshadowing attacks is PM = 18.9KW for αA = 3 and
PM = 33KW for αA = 4, which are prohibitive.
Type 2 adversary: A Type 2 adversary can independently control the received
power at H and A using directional antennas. To defeat Test 1, an adversary has
to achieve maxsM (sM(j)) ≥ τpeak when
max
sM
(sM(j)) = max
rH
(
rH(j)
rA
)
(4.10a)
=
PHGHGMH
PAGAGMA
(
dMA
dMD − dmaxDH
)2
, (4.10b)
where PX is the power transmitted from M to X, GMX is the directional antenna
gain of M transmitting to X. Without loss of generality in (4.10b), we assume
LoS channels from M to any other device (our goal is to show some scenario for
which a Type 2 adversary defeats Test 2). From (4.10b), an adversary achieves
maxsM (sM(j)) ≥ τpeak when,
PH
PA
≥ τpeak GAGMA
GHGMH
·
(
dMD − dmaxDH
dMA
)2
. (4.11)
The condition of (4.11), dictates the adversary’s strategy for defeating Test 1.
By controlling the powers of directional transmissions PH and PA, he can achieve
an RSS ratio that exceeds τpeak. One trivial strategy is to choose a low PA such
that (4.11) is satisfied. However note that PA must be sufficiently large to carry out
an overshadowing attack at A, as given by (4.5). To detect a Type 2 adversary, we
introduce Test 2 that checks the dynamic RSS ratio range.
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4.4.2 Test 2: RSS Ratio Dynamic Range
In the second test, the hub computes the dynamic range of the RSS ratio for each
sweep si as:
∆i =
max
si
s(i, j)
min
si
s(i, j)
.
The device passes Test 2 if ∆i ≥ τrange, for every si. This test exploits the higher roll-
off rate of the signal power at short distances relative to longer ones. An adversary
transmitting a few meters away from H invokes a smaller dynamic range than that
of D. Formally, Test 2 has following steps:
1. Dynamic range computation: For a sweep set s1, s2, . . . , s`, A computes
∆i as,
∆i =
max
si
s(i, j)
min
si
s(i, j)
, ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , `.
2. Dynamic range test: If ∆i ≥ τrange, ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , `, then D passes Test 2.
Determining τrange: Similar to Test 1 and without loss of generality, we focus
on a single sweep s. The RSS ratio range measured when a legitimate device D
transmits is:
∆ =
max
s
s(j)
min
s
s(j)
=
max
rH
(rH(j)/rA)
min
rH
(rH(j)/rA)
=
max
rH
rH(j)
min
rH
rH(j)
=
maxdDH (dDH(j))
min
dDH
(dDH(j))
2 = (dmaxDH
dminDH
)2
, (4.12)
where dmaxDH and d
min
DH are the maximum and minimum distances between D and H
during sweep s. In (4.12), the channel from D-to-A was assumed to be constant
during the sweep s (and hence rA at the nominator and the denominator is cancelled)
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and a LoS channel was assumed for the D-to-H channel (αH = 2) due to the
proximity between D and H (within a few cm). The value of τrange is selected to
be equal to ∆, given conservative estimates for the user’s range of motion during
sweeps.
τrange ≤ ∆ = dmaxDH/dminDH2. (4.13)
Note that considering a pathloss exponent equal to αH = 2 for the D-to-H
channel yields the most conservative value for τrange. A legitimate device with αH >
2, will pass Test 2 when τrange is set according to αH = 2, as shown in (4.13). We
evaluate the real-world threshold values for various parameters and user motions in
Section 4.5.2. We use the value of τrange in (4.13) to evaluate the capability of Type
2 and Type 3 adversaries in defeating Test 2.
Security Analysis:
Type 2 adversary: A Type 2 adversary can control the received powers at H and
A independently via directional transmissions. To defeat Test 2, the adversary has
to achieve ∆M ≥ τrange. The RSS ratio dynamic range depends on the motion of H
given that A is static:
∆M =
max
sM
sM(j)
min
sM
sM(j)
=
max
rH
(rH(j)/rA)
min
rH
(rH(j)/rA)
(4.14a)
=
maxdDH ((dMD + dDH(j) cos θ) sec θ′)
min
dDH
((dMD + dDH(j) cos θ) sec θ′)
αH (4.14b)
=
(
dMD + d
max
DH
dMD − dmaxDH
)αH
, (4.14c)
where αH is the attenuation factor of the M -to-H channel which is constant during
the sweep. In (4.14a), the largest and smallest RSS ratio samples over all sweep
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samples were considered. In (4.14b), the min and max relative distance between M
and H was considered in the general channel model with a pathloss exponent αH ,
and in (4.14c), the maximum ∆M was derived assumed an optimal orientation for
M where θ = θ′ = 0◦ (farthest from M) for the numerator and θ = 180◦, θ′ = 0◦
(closest to M) for the denominator.
Although the attenuation factor αH could vary in different settings, a directional
attack targeting both H and A should have LoS to H and A, so that the adversary
can aim at the two devices. In the next proposition, we compute the D-to-M
distance for a Type 2 adversary when (αH = 2).
Proposition 4. A Type 2 adversary is detected by Test 2 when dMD >
dmaxDH (d
max
DH +d
min
DH)/dmaxDH−dminDH.
Proof. Without loss of generality due to the similar nature of every sweep, consider
a single sweep s of H over D. The true RSS ratio range (∆) for a legitimate device D
is given by (4.12). The value of τrange is selected to be equal to ∆, given conservative
estimates for the user’s range of motion during sweeps.
The RSS ratio range (∆M) for a Type 2 adversary that is active during a sweep
sM is given by (4.14c).
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To pass Test 2,
∆M < τrange (4.15a)(
dMD + d
max
DH
dMD − dmaxDH
)2
<
(
dmaxDH
dminDH
)2
(4.15b)(
dMD + d
max
DH
dMD − dmaxDH
)
<
(
dmaxDH
dminDH
)
(4.15c)
(dMD + d
max
DH ) d
min
DH < (dMD − dmaxDH ) dmaxDH (4.15d)
dMDd
min
DH + d
max
DH d
min
DH < dMDd
max
DH − (dmaxDH )2 (4.15e)
dMDd
max
DH − dMDdminDH > dmaxDH (dmaxDH + dminDH) (4.15f)
dMD(d
max
DH − dminDH) > dmaxDH (dmaxDH + dminDH) (4.15g)
dMD >
dmaxDH (d
max
DH + d
min
DH)
dmaxDH − dminDH
(4.15h)
In (4.15c), it is assumed that dMD > d
max
DH . The inequality in (4.15h) yields
the distance of M from D after which a Type 2 adversary is detectable by Test
2. Note that for nominal user motions it holds that dmaxDH >> d
min
DH) in which case
dMD > d
max
DH . That is the adversary, becomes detectable if it is at a distance longer
than the boundary of H’s motion. This concludes the proof.
For αH > 2 the D-to-M distance decreases. For example, if αH = 4, then
dMD ≤ (dmaxDH )2 − (dminDHdmaxDH−2(dminDH)2
√
(dmaxDH/dminDH)
3)/(dminDH+dmaxDH )
or approximately dMD < (d
max
DH )
2. However, under such a multipath environment,
it is difficult to direct the power of a directional transmission to a single target.
Some power is inevitably received by A thus decreasing the RSS ratio dynamic
range. Moreover, a higher pathloss exponent increases by several orders of mag-
nitude the power necessary to launch a successful overshadowing attack. Even if
dMD < (d
max
DH )
2, the D-to-M distance remains relatively large given the short dis-
tance between H and D (20 cm in our experiments).
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Type 3 adversary: A Type 3 adversary can apply fine-grained power control
during a sweep. To defeat Test 2, the adversary has to achieve ∆M ≥ τrange. To do
so, the adversary can manipulate the maxrH (rH(j)/rA) and minrH (rH(j)/rA) within a
sweep sM by regulating the power received by A and H, respectively. The maximum
RSS ratio in sM is given by
max
sM
sM(j) = max
rH
rH(j)
rA
=
PHGHGMH
PAGAGMA
 dMA
min
dDH
(dMD + dDH(j) cos θ) sec θ′
2 (4.16a)
=
PHGHGMH
PHGAGMA
(
dMA
dMD − dmaxDH
)2
, (4.16b)
where PH , PA are the transmission powers from M to H and from M to A re-
spectively and GMH , GMA are the directional antenna gains from M to H and M
to A, respectively. In (4.16a), we have used a LoS channel to maximize the RSS
ratio assuming a fixed channel to A. In (4.16b), we further set the orientation of
M to θ = 180◦, θ′ = 0◦ to minimize the denominator. Using similar arguments, the
minimum RSS ratio is achieved when:
min
sM
sM(j) = min
rH
rH(j)
rA
=
P ′HGHGMH
P ′AGAGMA
 dMA
max
dDH
(dMD + dDH(j) cos θ) sec θ′
2 (4.17a)
=
P ′HGHGMH
P ′AGAGMA
(
dMA
dMD + dmaxDH
)2
, (4.17b)
where P ′H , P
′
A are the transmission powers of M to H and A respectively, which can
differ from the powers used when the max RSS ratio is achieved. In (4.17a), we
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have used α = 2 for the respective channels from M to H and M to A without loss
of generality, as we only need to demonstrate that under certain conditions, a Type
3 adversary can defeat Test 2. We further set the orientation of M to θ = θ′ = 0◦
to maximize the denominator. From (4.16b) and (4.17b), the RSS ratio range for
sweep sM is given by:
∆M =
PHP
′
A
P ′HPA
(
dMD + d
max
DH
dMD − dmaxDH
)2
≈ PHP
′
A
P ′HPA
, (4.18)
where for sufficiently large dMD we have approximated dMD−dmaxDH ≈ dMD +dmaxDH ≈
dMD.
From (4.13) and (4.18) we derive the condition under which the adversary defeats
Test 2 from any location as
PHP
′
A
P ′HPA
≥ τrange. (4.19)
The condition in (4.19), dictates the adversary’s strategy for defeating Test 2.
By controlling the ratios PH/P ′H and P
′
A/PA, he can achieve a desirable dynamic range
that exceeds τrange. The latter is defined by the distance ratio (d
max
DH/dminDH)
2. For an
effective attack, it is expected that PH > P
′
H whereas P
′
A > PA such that the
product of the ratios becomes large. One may trivially assume that choosing very
low values for P ′H and PA is sufficient to exceed τrange. However, the powers selected
by M for each directional transmission are lower-bounded by the minimum power
required to carry out overshadowing attack at A and H, as dictated by (4.5) and
(4.4), respectively. To detect a Type 3 adversary, we introduce Test 3 that checks
the time period of every sweep.
4.4.3 Test 3: Sweep Period
In the third test, the hub measures the period T (i) of each sweep si to verify the
sweep consistency. The main idea here is that the user takes approximately the
same time to complete a sweep. We fist define the sweep period T (i).
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Definition 2. Sweep period T (i): The sweep period T (i) of sweep si is defined as
the time difference between the occurring times of the first and last sweep sample.
Sweep Consistency is verified by checking if the ratio T (i)/T (j) ≤ τperiod, ∀ i, j; i 6= j
where the longer period is always placed at the nominator. Formally, Test 3 has
following steps:
1. Sweep period computation: For a sweep set s1, s2, . . . , s`, the sweep period
T (i) corresponding to the sweep si is computed according to Definition 2.
2. Sweep period test: If
T (i)/T (j) ≤ τperiod ∀ i, j; i 6= j
then D passes Test 3.
Figure 4.7(a) shows the helper’s locations where RSS ratio peaks and valleys are
observed during a sweep si for two motions, when D is transmitting. It is expected
that these periods would be fairly consistent given that H passes over D with every
motion and the speed of motion is relatively constant. On the other hand, the sweep
periods when a transmission originates from a remote location do not present the
same consistency. For a subset of helper motions, the sweep period takes twice as
long because the helper does not pass over the remote device. This is demonstrated
in Figure 4.7(b) where a Type 3 adversary is performing an overshadowing attack at
H from a remote location L∗M . We have divided the area where the helper moves into
two areas X and Y. These areas are defined by the intersection of two circles. The
circle C1 is centered at D and has a radius d
max
DH . The circle C2 is centered at L
∗
M and
has a radius dMD. Assuming a straight line movement, when the helper’s motion
ends in the boundaries of Y (e.g., horizontal motion), the distance between two
helper locations where two consecutive peaks occur is two times the disk diameter
(when the helper reaches the disk boundary closest to L∗M). For a motion that ends
in the boundaries of X (e.g., vertical motion), two consecutive peaks occur after a
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Figure 4.7: (a) Peaks and valleys of Γ for various movement of H when D is trans-
mitting, and (b) a sweep in area Y takes at least twice as much as a sweep in area
X when M is transmitting from a remote location.
distance of at most one diameter. The third test exploits this irregularity in the
sweep periods to detect a remote attack.
Determining τperiod: For a legitimate device D, the time to complete sweep si
is given by,
T (i) =
2dmaxDH (i)
v
, (4.20)
where v is the average sweep speed and dmaxDH (i) is the maximum distance between
D and H in the ith sweep. The ratio of the sweep periods (si and sj) when D is
transmitting is given by,
T (i)
T (j)
=
(
2dmaxDH (i)
v
)(
v
2dmaxDH (j)
)
=
dmaxDH (i)
dmaxDH (j)
, (4.21)
where the average sweep speed is assumed to be relatively the same between sweeps.
To pass the Test 3, we can select
τperiod ≤ T (i)/T (j) = dmaxDH (i)/dmaxDH (j). (4.22)
105
The threshold depends on the helper motion. The user is given instructions to
perform consistent sweeps in range and speed so that T (i)/T (j) ≈ 1. However, to
allow for a margin of error in the user’s motions the threshold τperiod can be set to
a value between 1 and 2. In Section 4.5.3, we experimentally show that a selection
of τperiod = 1.4 provides a sufficient error margin for motion variation.
Security Analysis: We now analyze the ability of a Type 3 adversary in de-
feating Test 3. Note that a Type 3 adversary incorporates the Type 1 and Type 2
capabilities and therefore a successful test will defend against all three adversaries.
To defeat Test 2, a Type 3 adversary applies power control to achieve the desired
RSS ratio dynamic range τrange. This is achieved by injecting a maximum power PH
when H is the closest to M and a minimum power P ′H when H is farthest from M
thus maximizing the range achieved measured by H. The sweep period recorded by
H when M is active depends on the trajectory of H relative to M ’s location L∗M .
This period is defined as the time between two successive RSS ratio peaks, which
are achieved when the M -to-H distance dMH(i) becomes minimum. Analyzing the
geometry of Figure 4.7(b), minimum of dMH(i) is achieved either on the perimeter
of area Y (when H’s motion terminates in Y ) or inside the area of Y closest to L∗M .
In the first case, the sweep period is the time required to traverse a distance equal
to twice the range of H’s motion, whereas in the latter case the sweep period is the
time required to traverse a distance at most one time H’s range of motion. Using
the threshold τperiod from (4.22) and the adversary’s sweep period, the success of
Test 3 is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. A Type 3 adversary is always detected by Test 3 if (a) the user
performs at least two sweeps s1 and s2, (b) sweep s1 starts and ends in area X,
whereas sweep s2 starts and ends in area Y , and (c) dMD > mini(d
max
DH (i)) ∀ i =
1, . . . , `.
Proof. To defeat Test 2, a Type 3 adversary applies power control to achieve the
desired RSS ratio dynamic range τrange. This is achieved by injecting a maximum
power PH when H is the closest to M and a minimum power P
′
H when H is farthest
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Figure 4.8: (a) Sweep with H starting and ending in area X, (b) Sweep with H
starting and ending in area Y .
from M thus maximizing the range achieved measured by H. However, we show
that this approach leads to a violation of Test 3.
Consider two sweeps s1 and s2 performed by the user. The ratio of the sweep
periods is given by
T (i)
T (j)
=
dmaxDH (i)
dmaxDH (j)
, (4.23)
where we have assumed a constant average speed for both s1 and s2. Let the threshold
for passing Test 3 be set to τperiod = d
max
DH (i)/dmaxDH (j). Under equal sweep lengths, this
ratio is equal to one1. Let the area where H moves around D be divided into
two sub-areas X and Y , as shown Figure 4.8. The sub-areas are defined by the
intersection of two circles. Sub-area Y consists of the sector S1 formed by the
intersection between C1 and C2 and the sector of C1 that is symmetric to S1 over
the y-axis. Sub-area X is the complement of sub-area Y within C1.
Let the adversary perform its power control attack during sweeps s1 and s2. Let
also s1 ∈ X and s2 ∈ Y. From the sub-area geometry, it follows that any sweep
(sweeps are assumed to form a straight line) that originates in X ends in X and any
sweep that originates in Y ends in Y . Moreover, for any point R ∈ X, it follows
that dMR ≥ dMD. Therefore, when a sweep is performed in X, the D is the closest
point to L∗M (also the point where M transmits with PH .) In this case, the sweep
period, i.e., time between two successive peaks, equals the time until two successive
1In reality, the sweep lengths are unequal but approximately the same. Based on the exper-
iments presented in the evaluation section, we have found the τperiod = 1.4. That is, the sweep
period can vary as much as 40%.
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visits of H over D. Equivalently, this is equal to the time required to travel the
diameter of circle C1, denoted by d
max
DH .
On the other hand. for any sweep in Y , it is straightforward to show from the
sub-area geometry that the minimum separation between M and H is achieved when
H is the farthest from D (i.e., at a point in C1). In this case, the sweep period,
equals the time until two successive visits of H at maximum separation from D.
Equivalently, this is equal to the time required to travel two times the diameter of
circle C1, denoted by 2d
max
DH . Assuming a constant average speed of motion for H,
the ratio T (i)/T (j) = 2 > τperiod. Therefore, a violation of Test 3 will be recorded. If
the two sweeps s1 and s2 belong to the same sub-area, the same sweep period will
be recorded for both of them and a Type 3 adversary will pass Test 3.
Note that a Type 3 adversary incorporates the Type 1 and Type 2 capabilities
and therefore a successful test will defend against all three adversaries.
This concludes the proof.
In the proposition, we perform the evaluation for D-to-M distance as assumed
in the other tests. For the secure region, the sweep period achieved by the adversary
is TM (i)/TM (j) ≥ 2. However, for outside the secure region dmaxDH ≤ dMD < 0, the sweep
period ratio is 2 < TM (i)/TM (j) < 1, which can give ambiguous detection as the sweep
period of the device varies between 1.4 and 1.
Test 3 relies on the user to perform specific motions, which may not always be
performed. To disassociate the security of the RSS authenticator from the sweep
motion orientation, we introduce Test 4.
4.4.4 Test 4: RSS Ratio and Motion Correlation
In the fourth test, the hub correlates the helper motion with the RSS ratio fluctua-
tion. This test requires acceleration data from H to identify the beginning and end
of a sweep, independent of Γ. During the sweeping motion over the legitimate device
D, the helper changes direction at its maximum separation from D. This change in
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direction causes a peak in the acceleration of H and a valley in Γ. For this test, we
define the minimum RSS ratio instances as:
Definition 3. Minimum RSS ratio instances tRSS: Let F be the fitted smooth
curve on the RSS ratio sample set Γ. The set of minimum RSS ratio instances
tRSS = {tRSS(1), tRSS(2), . . . , tRSS(`)} is a set of times corresponding to the local
RSS ratio minima in F .
In addition, we define the motion change instances as:
Definition 4. Motion change instances tacc: Let a be the set of acceleration values
of H during the sweeping motion ordered according to time. Let Fa be the fitted
smooth curve on a. The motion change instances tacc = {tacc(1), tacc(2), . . . , tacc(`)}
is the set of times corresponding to the local minima in Fa.
A device passes Test 4 if the root mean square error (RMSE) between tRSS and
tacc is below a threshold τcorr. This test particularly targets a Type 3 adversary who
may defeat Tests 1 and 2 via fine-grained power control or if Test 3 does not include
the necessary helper motions that yield different motion periods. If the adversary
cannot synchronize the power fluctuation with the helper motion, which is difficult
to achieve in real time, the fourth test is violated. Formally, Test 4 has following
steps:
1. Acceleration data transmission: The helper sends the minimum RSS ratio
and motion change instances tRSS, tacc to the hub, using AE(·) (authenticated
encryption),
2. RMSE calculation The hub A computes the root mean square error
(RMSE) between tRSS and tacc as
RMSE =
√∑`
i=1(tRSS(i)− tacc(i))2
`
3. RSS ratio–motion correlation test: If RMSE ≤ τcorr, D passes Test 4.
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Determining τcorr: Because the helper has a LoS channel to D and the distance
between D and A is fixed, the RSS ratio is proportional to the distance between
H and D. Therefore, the minimum RSS ratio is achieved at the largest separation
between H and D, which is also the point of maximum acceleration as the legiti-
mate device is changing direction. However, variation in RSS and the perturbations
introduced by the user motion can lead to a time misalignment between tacc and
tRSS. Let the mean time misalignment between any two samples tacc(i) and tRSS(i)
be bounded by |tacc(i)− tRSS(i)| ≤ . The RMSE can then be bounded to
RMSE =
√∑`
i=1(tRSS(i)− tacc(i))2
`
≤
√
`2
`
= . (4.24)
We can set τcorr for passing Test 4 to a value slightly larger than . We have
experimentally evaluated the mean time misalignment error  in Section 4.6.
Security Analysis: To defeat Test 4, a Type 3 adversary has to achieve
RMSE ≤ τcorr, for all the sweeps. This can be done by applying power control
and synchronizing the power variation with the motion of H in real time. That
is, M must predict the acceleration peaks (at the edges of the user’s motion) and
force RSS valleys at those locations. One can consider that this condition can be
satisfied without power control if the adversary selects his location such that the
M -D line is perpendicular to the helper motion. However, the helper is moved over
D in more than one orientations so there is no one location (other then D’s location)
that satisfies this criterion. Therefore, the adversary has to apply power control in
real time to match the RSS valleys with the acceleration peaks.
Assuming that the helper motion cannot be directly observed and analyzed in
real time (via a camera system), the adversary can attempt to synchronize the power
control by guessing the average motion period T and the motion start time. Consider
the series tacc recorded by the helper as a time reference. Let the adversary vary
the RSS power at H using a period T . The error between any two samples tacc(i)
and t
(M)
RSS(i) be bounded by |tacc(i) − t(M)RSS(i)| ≤ i∆ + M . Where ∆ is the random
110
variable depicting error induced in estimating sweep period by the adversary and
M is a random variable depicting the misalignment between the acceleration peaks
and RSS valleys due to the unknown motion start time. Note that the value of ∆
is not affecting the RMSE for the legitimate device because the peaks and values
are recorded at the edge of the motion, even if the motion period changes. For an
adversary varying the RSS with a fixed period, on the other hand, the error caused
by ∆ accumulates with the number of sweeps. Moreover, the misalignment error
M is expected to be much larger than , because the start time of the user’s motion
is unknown. In the next proposition, we explore the number of minimum sweeps `∗
required to detect a Type 3 adversary using Test 4.
Proposition 6. Test 4 detects a Type 3 adversary with probability no smaller than
p0, when the user performs at least
`∗ ≥ max
[
1,
⌈√
1 + 482/δ2(1−p0)2 − 3
4
⌉]
sweeps, the sweep period estimation error is uniformly distributed in [−δ, δ], and the
threshold for passing Test 4 is set to .
Proof. To pass Test 4, a Type 3 adversary must synchronize the RSS ratio
minima measured by the helper with the acceleration maxima. Let tacc =
{tacc(1), tacc(2), . . . , tacc(`)} be the times where H records its maximum acceleration
(at the ends of each sweep motion) and let tMRSS = {tMRSS(1), tMRSS(2), . . . , tMRSS(`)}
by the times where M induces the RSS ratio minima at H via directional transmis-
sions and power control. The adversary M must select tMRSS such that it matches the
periodicity of tacc. However, there are two sources of error that make this matching
difficult. First, the period of the helper’s motion is not fixed due to the variation
induced by the user’s hand motion. Second, the start time of the motion is not
known unless it is directly observed with a high accuracy camera system. The latter
is a very strong requirement that would reveal the presence of an adversary. We
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capture the two sources of error between tacc and t
M
RSS in the following relationship:
|tacc(i)− t(M)RSS(i)| = i∆ + EM
where ∆ is a random variable denoting the estimation error for the period of each
sweep and EM is a random variable denoting the misalignment between the acceler-
ation peaks and RSS ratio valleys due to the unknown motion start time. Note that
the error for the sweep period is cumulative with every sweep, whereas the start
time error is only at the beginning of the motion. For Test 4, the RMSE achieved
by the adversary becomes,
RMSEM =
√∑`
i=1(tacc(i)− t(M)RSS(i))2
`
=
√∑`
i=1(i∆ + EM)
2
`
, (4.25)
where ` is the number of sweeps. We now show that even if the the adversary
knows the motion starting time (EM = 0), the error in the sweep period estimation
will make him fail the test, given sufficient number of sweeps. For this worst case
(EM = 0),
RMSEM =
√∑`
i=1(i∆)
2
`
= |∆|
√∑`
i=1 i
2
`
= |∆|
√
(`+ 1)(2`+ 1)
6
. (4.26)
Without loss of generality, let ∆ by uniformly distributed in [−δ, δ]. We analyze
this case here because of the simple form of the distribution for |∆|, but the latter
is computable for any distribution. For a uniformly distributed ∆, the PDF of
the RMSEM is uniformly distributed in [0, δ
√
(`+1)(2`+1)
6
]. This easily follows from
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eq. (4.26) and the fact the |∆| is uniformly distributed in [0, δ]. Test 4 detects
an adversary if RMSEM exceeds . Given that RMSEM is a random variable, we
calculate the probability that it exceeds  using the CDF.
Pr[RMSEM > ] = 1− 
δ
√
(`+1)(2`+1)
6
. (4.27)
We calculate the minimum number of sweeps `∗ required such that RMSEM exceeds
 with probability at least p0.
Pr[RMSEM > ] ≥ p0, (4.28a)
1− 
δ
√
(`+1)(2`+1)
6
≥ p0, (4.28b)
2`2 + 3`+ 1 ≥ 6
2
δ2(1− p0)2 , (4.28c)
2`2 + 3`+ 1− 6
2
δ2(1− p0)2 ≥ 0, (4.28d)
` ≥
√
1 + 48
2
δ2(1−p0)2 − 3
4
, (4.28e)
`∗ ≥ max
1,⌈
√
1 + 48
2
δ2(1−p0)2 − 3
4
⌉ . (4.28f)
In (4.28e), we have kept the root of the quadratic equation that can be positive.
In (4.28f), we have ensured that at least one sweep is needed for the test, because
the root ` in (4.28e) can still be negative for large δ. Finally, we have taken the
ceiling function on ` because the number of sweeps is an integer. This concludes the
proof.
The proposition allows us to set the required number of sweeps such that the
adversary fails Test 4 with overwhelming probability, even if he correctly guesses
the start time of the motion.
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Table 4.1: Summary of abilities of various adversaries against various RSS authen-
ticator Tests of SFIRE.
Adversary Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Requirement
Test 1 Fail Pass Pass RSS data at H & A
Test 2 Fail Fail Pass RSS data at H & A
Test 3 Fail Fail Might Pass RSS data at H & A
Test 4 Fail Fail Fail RSS data at H & A,
accelerometer at H
Table 4.1 summarizes the success of each test against each adversary type and
the data requirement for each test.
4.5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the security of the RSS authenticator and
validate our theoretical analysis. We used two setups in our evaluation. In setup
1, we implemented the RSS authenticator in COTS devices to verify correctness,
whereas in setup 2 we used USRP devices to implement the different attacker types
and verify soundness. We describe each in detail.
Setup 1–SFIRE with COTS devices: In Setup 1, a Lenovo Y-480 IdeaPad
laptop and a Dell XPS desktop, equipped with Intel R© Centrino R© Wireless N-200
wireless cards were used to implement D and A, respectively. Both cards trans-
mit at 20dBm. The helper H was implemented on a Samsung Galaxy S6 edge+
running Android 7.0 smartphone equipped with an 802.11 a/b/g/n/ac 2.4G+5GHz
compatible chipset. The clocks of A and H were synchronized via an Internet server.
During the pairing of D with A, we manually performed the three sweeping motions
shown in Figure 4.3. A sweeping motion was characterized by three parameters: (a)
the minimum distance (dminDH) from D to H, (b) the sweep orientation, and (c) the
maximum distance dmaxDH from D to H. Minimum and maximum separations were
adhered by placing markers on top of D and at the two ends of the motion, although
such markers are not necessary for a real protocol execution. During the sweeping
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Figure 4.9: (a) Peak RSS ratio as a function of the minimum D-to-H distances in
each sweep for various sweeping motions, (b) peak RSS ratio as a function of the
minimum D-to-H distances in each sweep for various RSS at A, (c) peak RSS ratio
as a function of the maximum D-to-H distances in each sweep for various dMD for
a Type 1 adversary, and (d) maximum transmit power of a Type 2 adversary to
achieve τpeak as a function of dMD for various d
min
DH .
motions, We sampled the RSS at a rate of 10 samples/sec at both H and A and
repeated each sweeping motion 1,000 times (35 min approximately).
Setup 2–SFIRE on USRPs: Setup 2 was used to implement the attacks
carried out by M on the RSS authenticator tests. The roles of D, A, and M were
implemented by three NI-USRP 2921 radios operating at 2.4GHz. The helper radio
had a smartphone attached to the top to collect accelerometer data for Test 4. The
clocks of all the entities were synchronized via the same computer.
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4.5.1 Test 1: Peak RSS Ratio
To evaluate the peak RSS ratio maxsi s(i, j) achieved during a benign scenario, two
experiments were performed using Setup 1. In the first experiment, D was placed
at 5m from A such that the average RSS at A was -40dBm and H was swept over
D. In Figure 4.9(a), we show the peak RSS ratio as a function of dminDH for all
the sweeping motions. We observe that the peak RSS obtains very similar values,
irrespective of the motion orientation. These values exceed 103 for all minimum
separations. The theoretical values computed from eq. (4.2) are also shown and
match the experimental ones.
In the second experiment, we varied the distance dDA, such that the RSS at A
also varied. In Figure 4.9(b), we show the peak RSS as a function of dminDH . The
theoretical values computed from eq. (4.8) are also shown. As expected, the peak
RSS decreases as D gets closer to A (higher RSS at A), but still maintains large
values. This is because the RSS is primarily dominated by dminDH . The plots in
Figure 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) can be used to select the threshold τpeak for Test 1.
Detecting a Type 1 adversary: To demonstrate the detection of a Type 1
adversary, we performed an experiment using Setup 2. We fixed the D-to-A distance
to 5m and chose the corresponding threshold as τpeak = 2,000, based on Figure 4.9(b).
We measured the peak RSS ratio when the adversary M was placed at dMD = 1m,
2m, and 5m from D and H, respectively. The adversary was set to transmit at
1W. Figure 4.9(c) shows the peak RSS ratio achieved by the Type 1 adversary
for different values of the maximum distance between D and H for the horizontal
motion. We observe that the peak RSS ratio achieved by the transmission of M
is significantly lower than the threshold τpeak. This is because a Type 1 adversary
transmitted using an omnidirectional antenna affecting the received power both at
H and A thus maintaining a relatively low ratio.
Defeating Test 1 with a Type 2 adversary: Now, we evaluate the transmit
power required by a Type 2 adversary to defeat Test 1. We compute the transmit
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Figure 4.10: (a) RSS ratio range of si as a function of the maximumD-to-H distances
in each sweep for various sweeping motions, (b) RSS ratio range of si as a function
of the maximum D-to-H distances in each sweep for various RSS at A, (c) RSS ratio
range of si as a function of the maximum D-to-H distances in each sweep for various
dminDH , and (d) RSS ratio range as a function of the sweeps for a Type 2 adversary
for dMD = 2m with τrange selected for d
max
DH = 50cm and PA = 0.1W.
power according to (4.11). We set the threshold for Test 1 to τpeak = 2,000 according
to the previous experiments using Setup 1. We set the values for all the antenna
gains to one. We set the signal strength required to perform an overshadowing
attack at A to -50dBm, In Figure 4.9(d), we show the required transmit power of a
Type 2 adversary to defeat Test 1 as a function of the device-to-adversary distance
(dMD in meters). We consider various minimum D-to-H distances during the sweep.
We observe that the required transmit power that satisfies the peak RSS ratio and
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Figure 4.11: (a) RSS ratio range as a function of the sweeps for Type 2 adversary
with τrange selected for d
max
DH = 50cm and PA = 0.1W, (b) maximum transmit power
of a Type 3 adversary to H as a function of dMD when transmitting with P
′
A = 10W
for achieving τrange for various d
min
DH , (c) maximum transmit power of a Type 3
adversary to H as a function of dMD when transmitting with P
′
A = 10W for achieving
τrange for various τA, and (d) max (T (i)/T (j)) as a function of the maximum D-to-H
distances for each motion for various RSS at A.
achieves an overshadowing attack becomes prohibitive with the increase of the D-
to-M distance. At 10m from D, the adversary must transmit at hundreds of watts
to the helper for achieving the required ratio.
118
4.5.2 Test 2: RSS Ratio Dynamic Range
We performed three experiments to evaluate the dynamic range ∆i for all sweeping
motions using Setup 1. In the first experiment, we placed A at 10m from D so that
the average received RSS at A was -40dBm, Moreover, we fixed dminDH = 4cm and
performed horizontal, vertical, and diagonal sweeping motions. For each motion we
recorded the dynamic RSS ratio range. Figure 4.10(a) shows the RSS ratio range
as a function of the maximum separation between D and H. The theoretical values
computed using eq. (4.12) are also shown. In the second experiment, we varied the
distance between A and D and repeated the measurements. Figure 4.10(b) shows
the RSS ratio range for the different RSS thresholds at A. For both experiments,
it can be observed that the range does not vary significantly with the motion ori-
entation. Moreover, the theoretical values match track the measured values. The
recorded differences are due to the free-space model considered in the theoretical
calculation, however, they can serve as a lower bound on the expected ∆. Longer
sweeps significantly increase the RSS ratio range. Figure 4.10(c) shows the results
of our third experiment where we varied dminDH for a horizontal sweeping motion. As
expected, the maximum range is achieved when H is swept at 2cm from D and the
range of H’s motion is maximized (50cm). Based on these results, we set τrange = 10
3
which captures any motion over 30cm with dminDH = 4cm.
Detecting a Type 2 adversary: We now evaluate the ability of a Type 2
adversary in defeating Test 2 using Setup 2. We equipped two USRP devices with
directional antennas pointing to H and A, respectively. One USRP antenna was
pointed to the hub and transmitted at PA = 0.01W, the minimum required value
to successfully perform an overshadowing attack. The other USRP antenna was
pointed to the helper and transmitted at PH = 1W to achieve an overshadow attack
but also achieve the maximum RSS ratio threshold required in Test 1. Figure 4.10(d)
shows ∆Mi achieved by the adversary for various motions when the distance between
H and M is as low as 2m. The adversary’s RSS ratio range is below τrange for most
motions and reaches the required range only for one horizontal sweep. The adversary
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failed Test 2, as it needed to pass the test for all sweeps. The horizontal motion
exhibited the highest RSS ratio range because we positioned M at the optimal
position L∗M shown in Figure 4.4. However, other motions failed to achieve a similar
range. We further repeated our experiments for multiple sweeps and for different
distances between M and D. The results in Figure 4.11(a) show that even if M
is very close to D (within 0.5m), it cannot achieve the required dynamic range
consistently, without employing power control.
Defeating Test 2 with a Type 3 adversary: We further calculated the
required transmit powers of M to defeat Test 2 according to the conditions of (4.19).
A Type 3 adversary varies the transmission power to the helper between P ′H and
PH , and to the hub between PA and P
′
A. The strategy of M for achieving τrange is to
maximize the ratios P ′A/PA and PH/P ′H. The minimum transmission powers P
′
H and PA
of M are governed by (4.6), which expresses the power required for overshadowing.
We set these to P ′H = 0.1W and PA = 0.1W corresponding to fixed D-to-H and
D-to-A distances. According to (4.18), P ′A and PH have the same effect on ∆M . To
see the trend of PH , we fix the value of P
′
A = 10W. In Figure 4.11(b), we plot the
maximum transmit power to H as a function of the D-to-M distances for different
minimum D-to-H distances 2cm, 4cm, and 8cm.
We also varied the minimum transmit power to A to values PA = 1W, PA =
0.1W, and PA = 0.01W, while keeping P
′
H = 0.1W constant (varying P
′
H has the
same effect on ∆M). Figure 4.11(c) shows the required maximum transmit power for
a Type 3 adversary as a function of dMD for defeating Test 2. From Figure 4.11(b)
and Figure 4.11(c) we observe that the required transmit power becomes quickly
prohibitive as the adversary moves further away. At 10m from D, the adversary
must transmit at hundreds of watts to achieve the required dynamic range. It
should be noted here, if the adversary fixes PH , the variation of P
′
A follows similar
patterns. The adversary may be able to achieve the required peak ratio if he employs
highly directional antennas and manages to be in close distance to H during the
pairing.
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Figure 4.12: (a) RSS ratio fluctuation for a Type 2 adversary as function of the time
at 2m from D, (b) TM (i)/TM (j) as a function of the maximum D-to-H distances for
a Type 3 adversary mimicking transmit power for vertical sweeping motion of H,
(c) RMSE as a function of the maximum D-to-H distances for various sweeping
motions, and (d) RMSE as a function of the number of sweeps (`) for various
sweeping motions.
4.5.3 Test 3: Sweep Period
For Test 3, we performed two experiments using Setup 1 to evaluate the consistency
of the sweeping periods across different motion orientations. In the first experiment,
we moved the helper on top of the device D and measured the ratio of the sweep
periods between pairs of motions; horizontal-vertical (H-V ), horizontal-diagonal
(H-D) and vertical-diagonal (V -D). Figure 4.11(d) shows the period ratio for all
the motion combinations as a function of dmaxDH . We observe that the sweep period
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is relatively constant with period ratios not exceeding 1.32. Moreover, the periods
did not vary much with the motion range. Based on these experiments, we set
τperiod = 1.4.
Detecting a Type 3 adversary: Since a Type 3 adversary is the only model
tht can defeats Tests 1 and 2, we evaluated if a Type 3 adversary can defeat Test 3.
We considered that M is aware of the average period of H’s sweeps and regulated
its power control accordingly. We employed Setup 2 to allow for power control and
antenna directionality, fixed the distance between dMD = 1m, d
max
DH = 50cm, and
dminDH = 4cm. M oscillated its transmitting power between 0.01W and 1W to meet
both the τpeak and τrange thresholds and defeat Tests 1 and 2. For the experiments,
M attempted to synchronize with D’s transmission for the vertical motion, with an
average period of 2sec, corresponding to an average hand moving speed of 0.5m/s.
The user randomized the motion direction. In Figure 4.12(a), we show the RSS
ratio fluctuation achieved by the power-controlled transmission of M over time. It
can be observed that the sweep period of the vertical sweep is around 2 sec, but
the periods of other sweeps are twice as long because only one peak occurs on every
sweep (when H is closest to M). Figure 4.12(b) shows the sweep period ratios for
different dmaxDH . When the vertical motion is compared to other motions, the sweep
period ratio is over 2. The adversary can pass this test only when the user restricts
the helper motion to one orientation (vertical motion in our experiments).
4.5.4 Test 4: RSS Ratio and Motion Correlation
To remedy a possible failure of Test 3 due to using just one orientation, we fur-
ther considered the correlation of the accelerometer data with the RSS ratio data
as dictated by Test 4. We used Setup 1 to evaluate the root mean square error
(RMSE) between the set of time instances tRSS when the RSS ratio minimum is
measured and the time instances tacc when an acceleration peak is achieved. The
acceleration values were recorded by accessing the accelerometer data on the mobile
phone (helper). Figure 4.12(c) shows the average RMSE as a function of the max-
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imum D-to-H distance for various sweeping motions. We observe that the RMSE
is quite small indicating the the RSS ratio valleys and acceleration peaks remain
synchronized throughout the different motions. Figure 4.12(d) shows the RMSE
as a function of number of sweeps (`) for various sweeping motions. We observe no
particular correlation between the number of sweeps and the RMSE. This is consis-
tent of our intuition for a benign scenario where the RMSE is not cumulative with
the number of sweeps, but it rather varies in a random fashion. Based on the results
of this experiment, we set τcorr = 9× 10−5.
Detecting a Type 3 adversary: We considered a Type 3 adversary attempt-
ing to defeat Test 4 by employing Setup 2. In this experiment, the adversary applied
power control and attempted to synchronize to the user motion. We evaluated the
best case scenario for the adversary where he had knowledge of motion start time
(EM = 0) and of the average sweep period, which was T = 2sec. The synchroniza-
tion of the adversary’s power control with the helper’s motion was performed oﬄine
by offsetting the first RSS ratio minima to match the first acceleration maxima.
Figure 4.13(a) shows the achieved RMSEM for various sweeping motions of H as
a function of the number of sweeps, when the adversary mimicked the horizontal
sweep motion. We observe that the error induced in the sweep period when the user
moves M accumulates with ` leading to the eventual failure of Test 4. Moreover,
when the motion mimicked by the adversary is different than that performed by H,
even one sweep is sufficient to lead to high RMSE values.
4.6 Evaluation of SFIRE-enabled Device Pairing
We now analyze the security of the device pairing protocol proposed in Section 4.3.2.
We first examine if the adversary can pair a rogue device with A. We then examine
if D can be deceived to pair with a rogue hub.
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Figure 4.13: (a) RMSEM as a function of the number of sweeps for a Type 3
adversary, mimicking a horizontal sweeping motion, and (b) ROC curve for the
performance of verification tests of SFIRE against various types of adversaries.
4.6.1 Pairing a Rogue Device with A
The pairing of a rogue device D′ with A can occur under two different scenarios:
Pairing in the absence of a legitimate device: The pairing protocol described
in Section 4.3.2 is initiated with the press of a button on H and D. The button
pressing sends a pairing initialization message to the A which is authenticated using
the secure AE(·) function. Without access to the helper, the adversary cannot
initiate the pairing from a remote location.
Hijacking a legitimate pairing session: Since M cannot initiate the pairing pro-
cess with the A, he can only attempt to pair a rogue device with the A by hijacking
a pairing session involving a legitimate device (D). To establish a secret key with
the A, the adversary must modify the DH public number zD of D into its own DH
public number z′D, where zD is contained in the first message mD sent from D to
the A (similar to a typical MitM attack against a DH key exchange). However, mD
is protected by our integrity verification primitive of SFIRE.
As discussed in this Section earlier, the adversaries with different capabilities are
not able to pass the RSS authentication to forge mD. Therefore, the adversary will
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be unable to pair D′ with the legitimate A.
4.6.2 Pairing D with a Rogue Base Station
We now examine if M acting as a rogue A can pair with D. To do so, M can
perform a similar MitM attack as in the uplink direction, by replacing the A’s DH
public parameter zA with its own z
′
A. The mA is protected by downlink SFIRE
primitive [·]Dw as discussed in Section 4.3.3. In the downlink SFIRE, D computes
Γ, during the transmission of mA from RSS values of frames received from A and
H. D performs the RSS authentication that prevents pairing with A′.
4.6.3 ROC Curves
We evaluated the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for the SFIRE-
enabled pairing protocol. We evaluated the performance of each adversary types
against the four tests on Setup 2. The distance between M and D was set to 1m.
The value for τpeak was chosen as 2,000 for PA = 0.1W, τrange = 10
3 for the same
transmit power to A, τperiod = 1.4 and τcorr = 9 × 10−6. The sweeping motions for
each experiment were repeated 1, 000 times. The D to A and D to M distance were
fixed to 1m and 0.5m respectively, with M positioned at L∗M as shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.13(b) shows the ROC curve for all the tests in the RSS authenticator.
Test 1 is evaluated against a Type 1 adversary, Test 2 is evaluated against a Type 2
adversary, and Tests 3 and 4 are evaluated against a Type 3 adversary. The various
points of the ROC curve are obtained for a different number of sweeps to complete
the protocol. The rightmost point is obtained for one sweep, whereas the leftmost
point is obtained for five sweeps. We observe that as the number of sweeps increases,
the TPR increases whereas the FPR decreases indicating that the SFIRE protocols
achieve both correctness and security.
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4.6.4 Timing Performance
The timing performance is dictated by the time to complete the number of sweeps.
This time dominates the computation of DH key, transmission delays, etc. From
Figure 4.13(b), three sweeps give zero false positive rates for all Types of M . The
time to complete the protocol requires six sweeps (three for uplink and three for
downlink), translating to 6sec.
4.7 Chapter Summary
We addressed the problem of secure device pairing without prior associations. We
proposed SFIRE, a secret-free protocol that achieves the secure pairing of COTS
wireless devices with a hub. Compared to the state-of-the-art, SFIRE does not
require any out-of-band channels, special hardware, or firmware modification, thus
it is applicable to any COTS device. We showed that SFIRE is resistant to the
most advanced active signal manipulations that include recently demonstrated signal
nullification at an intended receiver. These security properties are achieved in-band
with the assistance of a helper device and by using the RSS fluctuation patterns to
build a robust RSS authenticator. We performed extensive theoretical analysis and
attested the finding with experiments using COTS devices and USRP radios and
validated the security and performance of the proposed protocol.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURE DEVICE BOOTSTRAPPING WITHOUT
SECRETS RESISTANT TO SIGNAL MANIPULATION
ATTACKS
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Motivation
In a number of scenarios, such as a body area network, home IoT, a battlefield
ad-hoc network, etc. a group of devices as shown in Figure 5.1 may be required
to bootstrap in a short amount of time. HELP presented in Chapter 3, SFIRE
presented in Chapter 4, and other secure device pairing methods [20–32, 34, 35, 92]
do not scale with the number of devices. In a group setting, the user would have
to be manually execute the protocol at multiple locations and device pairing must
occur sequentially. There are two major issues with such extensions. First, the
user effort becomes significant with OOB channel pairing, if it has to be repeated
Adversary 
(M)
D1
Hub (A)
D3
D2
Figure 5.1: Multiple devices D1, D2, and D3 bootstrapping with the hub (A) in
presence of an MitM adversary (M).
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Figure 5.2: System model depicting all entities.
multiple times. Second, as it was shown by Mirzadeh et al. [107], suppose the
success probability of an adversary pairing with the system to be pS. With N
pairing repetitions, the adversary’s success probability of pairing one device becomes
1 − (1 − pS)N which approaches one with N , graphically shown in Figure 5.2. In
our work VERSE, we leverage the existence of multiple devices to actually reduce
the probability of a successful attack. Moreover, orthogonal to these works, our
method requires the least user interaction (powering of devices and initialization of
pairing from the hub). The message integrity verification is done in-band for all the
participating devices without requiring any other interface (led lighting, microphone,
speaker) other than the common RF interface. Also, most prior works do not
address the possibility of MitM attacks, where the adversary can hijack the session
of a legitimate entity by performing signal cancellation and injection. Compared
to HELP, the only other work that addresses an MitM over wireless without pre-
shared secrets, VERSE does not require a helper with an authenticated channel
to the hub that also needs to be manually moved by the user. Moreover, VERSE
improves security with a group of devices. Finally, the security of VERSE does not
hinge on the close proximity of some devices, the randomness of the channel, nor
the placement of the adversary outside a protected zone. Rather, it is derived from
the fundamental constraints posed by the geometry and basic signal propagation
properties.
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In this chapter, we address the problem of securely bootstrapping multiple de-
vices with a single entity such as a hub or a base station. Our goal is not to
differentiate between legitimate and malicious devices. Such a proposition is in-
feasible in the absence of any prior trust and without the existence of out-of-band
channels for verification, or some unique advantage of the legitimate devices (prox-
imity, superior channel conditions, unique contextual information, etc.). Rather,
we aim to guarantee protocol soundness in the absence of an adversary, and abort
the bootstrapping process if any active protocol manipulation is detected. More-
over, we investigate if the presence of multiple legitimate devices can be leveraged
to strengthen resistance to signal cancellation and therefore improve the security of
the pairing process. We theoretically and experimentally characterize the limits of
the adversary’s capability based on geometric constraints and exploit those limits
to construct a secure bootstrapping protocol for multiple devices.
5.1.2 Main Contributions and Chapter Organization
Our main contributions are four-fold:
• We develop a scalable PHY-layer group message integrity verification primitive
called VERSE that achieves bootstrapping in-band (using only a common RF
interface) and does not rely on pre-shared secrets. The key idea is to simul-
taneously verify the integrity of a transmitted message at multiple receivers,
thus forcing the adversary to perform signal cancellation/injection at multiple
locations simultaneously. This requirement dramatically degrades the success
of MitM over wireless.
• We use VERSE to construct a secure in-band bootstrapping protocol for mul-
tiple devices based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement. Our protocol
securely pairs and then establishes pairwise keys with the hub. Such keys can
then be used to establish group keys, if necessary.
• We analyze the security of VERSE and theoretically establish that a successful
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Figure 5.3: System model depicting all entities.
attack becomes infeasible if three or more verifiers are present when a single
malicious device launches the attack. Moreover, the effort of a multi-device
adversary must scale linearly with the group size.
• We carry out extensive USRP experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of
our PHY-layer integrity verification against signal manipulations. First, we
demonstrate the effectiveness of cancellation and injection attacks over a single
channel. We then evaluate signal manipulations when multiple devices are
used as receivers and/or transmitters and validate our theoretical findings.
We then evaluate the adversary’s ability to defeat VERSE.
Chapter Organization: In Section 5.2, we describe the system and adversary
models. We present the VERSE primitive and the secure bootstrapping protocol for
multiple devices in Section 5.3. We analyze the protocol’s security in Section 5.4.
The experimental evaluation of MitM attacks over wireless and of the security of
our protocol are detailed in Section 5.5. We conclude the chapter in Section 5.6.
5.2 Model Assumptions
5.2.1 System Model
We consider the system model shown in Figure 5.3. The system consists of the
following entities:
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Hub (A): The hub coordinates and verifies the bootstrapping process. It is
assumed to be under user control.
Legitimate Devices (D): We consider a set of legitimate devices D =
{D1, D2, . . . , DN−1} that are newly introduced into the network. The devices at-
tempt to pair with A, but do not share any prior secrets. They are assumed to
be under user control. The devices and A are synchronized to a common slotted
system with a bounded synchronization error . Synchronization is achieved with
any known method such as [90], and it is already a necessary requirement for many
standardized MAC protocols that follow a time slotted system [108–111].
Adversary (M): We consider an active adversary that aims at (a) pairing with
A as a legitimate device and (b) spoofing a rogue hub that is joined by at least one
legitimate device. We do not address DoS attacks such as jamming, simply aiming
at preventing the pairing of legitimate devices without gaining access to the system.
All entities are located within the same collision domain and can overhear broadcast
transmissions.
5.2.2 Threat Model
We consider an adversary that is aware of the protocol executed by the legitimate
parties but does not have physical access to any of the devices. Because the boot-
strapping process is initiated by the user, the adversary can only hijack an ongoing
session. This can be achieved by launching an MitM attack and modifying the wire-
less transmissions during the bootstrapping session. We analyze the feasibility of
the MitM attack when the adversary deploys a single device. We further discuss the
feasibility and complexity of a multi-device MitM attack.
MitM attack by a single device
Let a legitimate device D transmit a message m to the hub A. To perform an MitM
attack, the adversary has to replace m with m′. Let x = {x(1), x(2), . . . , x(k)}
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Figure 5.4: (a) A signal injection attack and (b) a signal cancellation attack.
denote the transmitted symbols modulating m and y = {y(1), y(2), . . . , y(k)} the
received symbols at A. Then,
y = hDAx, (5.1)
where hDA = αDA · ejφDA is the impulse response of the D-A channel, αDA is the
channel attenuation factor, and φDA is the channel’s phase shift. Here, we have
assumed that the entire transmission of x completes within the channel’s coherence
time, so the channel remains constant. To modify y, the adversary M must transmit
x′, modified by the M -A channel to y′ = hMAx′ such that the superposition yM =
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y + y′ decodes to m′. In other words, M must compute
x′ =
1
hMA
(yM − hDAx), (5.2)
and transmit x′ in a timely fashion such that y and y′ are superimposed as shown
in Figure 5.4(a). According to equation (5.2), the computation of x′ requires the
knowledge of the signal x transmitted by D and of the channels hDA and hMA.
Moreover, the reception of y′ must be synchronized with the reception of y such
that y′ arrives at A within an acceptable delay spread τA for correct symbol su-
perposition [89]. Synchronization can be achieved using the preambles or the pilot
symbols from the device; such methods are discussed in detail in [90]. The delay
spread requirement imposes an important physical constraint on M ’s locations. The
difference between the adversary’s path, and the direct path must satisfy
dDM + dMA − dDA ≤ τA · c, (5.3)
where dXY denotes the distance between X and Y and c is the speed of light.
When the signal x is MC ON-OFF encoded, denoted by [x], modification of
the received signal to yM requires some ON slots of [x] to be annihilated, i.e., the
amplitude of yM must be below the signal detection threshold (typically 10s of dBms
below zero) in some slots. Hence, the adversary must be capable of carrying out a
signal cancellation attack. We primarily focus on the cancellation scenario, because
it is more challenging to achieve than shifting the original constellation point closer
to another point in the I-Q plane. The latter can be achieved by launching an
overshadowing attack [54].
Practically, obtaining x in advance to compute x′ is not possible. This is because
D can transmit random symbols to implement an ON slot when ON-OFF keying is
used. These symbols do not need to belong to a particular modulation mode such
as BPSK, QPSK, etc. Alternatively, the adversary can avoid the requirement of
knowing x, by performing a relay attack. In this attack, the adversary’s position is
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strategically selected such that the path difference between the direct path and the
adversary’s path satisfies:
dDM + dMA − dDA = (2w + 1)λ
2
, w = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5.4)
where λ denotes the wavelength. This guarantees that the inverse of y will be
received at A when the incoming signal at M is compensated for the respective
channel attenuation factors. Because the path difference is an odd multiple of λ/2, y
and y′ arrive at A with opposite phases, thus canceling each other (yM = 0). The
signal superposition at A for a cancellation attack is shown in Figure 5.4(b). To
enable a fast and error-free relay operation, the adversary may be equipped with
directional antennas, one for receiving the transmission of D and one for relaying
x′. (5.4) can be generalized for the adversary who is capable of modifying the phase
(φMA) of the relayed signal in real time. From a geometric standpoint, modifying the
phase of the incoming signal only changes the set of ellipses that yield cancellation.
The new set of ellipses must satisfy,
dDM + dMA − dDA = (2w + 1)λ
2
+
φMA
pi
, w = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5.5)
We note that the phase calculations in (5.5) assume a strong Line-of-Sight (LoS)
environment between all three entities. This is the best-case scenario for M , as
it allows the calculation of a location from where cancellation via relaying becomes
possible, without knowing x and by modeling hDA, since the latter cannot be directly
measured. In the general case, x arrives at A via multiple paths which hardens
channel modeling. In our model, we consider this best-case scenario for the attacker,
where the channel is predictable with a strong LoS.
When M ’s placement satisfies (5.4) or (5.5) and assuming stable LoS channels,
the symbols traveling over the relay path are copies of the symbols received via the
LoS path but shifted by (2w+1)pi and attenuated differently. Therefore, M does not
need to know the transmitted symbols a priori. To compensate for the attenuation
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Figure 5.5: To perform signal cancellation, the adversary is placed on an ellipse,
centered at D and A that satisfies a path difference of (2w + 1)λ/2 and does not
violate the maximum delay spread τA.
difference, M must only know the attenuation factors αDA, αDM , and αMA in the
impulse responses hDA, hDM , and hMA, respectively. Some of these channels (hDM ,
and hMA) can be measured, whereas the hDA channel can be modeled after a path
loss model.
We now examine the candidate set of M ’s locations that lead to successful can-
cellation via relaying. The adversary’s location `M must satisfy the phase difference
equation in (5.5) and the delay spread constraints in (5.3). For (5.4) or (5.5), can-
didate `M form a series of ellipses with D and the A placed at the two focal points.
The set of such ellipses is shown in Figure 5.5 and is computed by considering all
odd integer values of w in (5.4) or (5.5). Finally, the delay spread constraint (5.3)
upper bounds w.
MitM attack by multiple coordinated devices
When the adversary has multiple devices at his disposal, he can deploy them at
multiple locations to perform simultaneous signal cancellation at more than one
receivers. For instance, each adversarial device may target a single legitimate de-
vice. However, this attack requires online coordination among the different devices
(timely channel sensing, time synchronization, power coordination, etc.) and the
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Figure 5.6: D1, D2, D3 and D4 synchronously transmit [h(s)]. The devices sense the
channel during the OFF slots.
use of highly-directional transmissions to avoid unintended interference. For IoT
scenarios, pairing devices are relatively close, which requires the use of very narrow
beams. Antennas that can achieve such narrow beams are bulky with many an-
tenna elements and therefore easily discernible in an IoT environment. Moreover,
the attacker’s cost increases linearly with the number of legitimate devices that are
deployed. We primarily focus on the single device scenario and comment on the
security and limitations of our scheme under a multi-device adversary.
5.3 The Secure Bootstrapping Protocol
In this section, we present an in-band secure bootstrapping protocol for a group of
devices. We first describe VERSE, a PHY-layer message integrity protection prim-
itive that exploits multiple verifiers to detect signal manipulation attacks launched
by an MitM adversary. We then use VERSE to construct an authenticated pairwise
key establishment protocol between a group of devices and the hub, based on DH
key agreement.
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5.3.1 The VERSE Primitive
Consider a general group protocol in which multiple legitimate devices sequentially
exchange a set of messages. Let s denote the protocol transcript. In VERSE, all
legitimate devices operate as verifiers by recording the over-the-air messages. Each
device compiles s and contributes in the integrity verification process by broad-
casting a transcript digest h(s), where h(·) is a non-cryptographic hash function.
Specifically, all verifiers synchronously transmit the MC ON-OFF modulated mes-
sage [h(s) || h(s)r] where h(s)r is a repetition of the last r bits of [h(s)]. The
synchronous transmission [h(s) || h(s)r] is shown in Figure 5.6. During the OFF
slots of the [h(s)] transmission, verifiers sense the wireless channel. If any device Di
compiled an s′ 6= s, there will be at least one OFF slot for which Di will sense an ON
slot, as h(s′) 6= h(s) with overwhelming probability. Upon sensing this discrepancy,
Di will raise an alarm by sending only ON slots, essentially jamming the remainder
of the [h(s) || h(s)r] transmission, leading to further alarms being raised by the rest
of the verifiers. The addition of h(s)r guarantees that an alarm will be raised, even
if an integrity violation is detected at the last bit in h(s).
Formally, the VERSE primitive involves the following steps:
1. Compilation of the protocol transcript: Each Di broadcasts a message
mi using its default modulation mode. These messages are recorded by all
Dis. Every Di compiles the protocol transcript as s = m1||m2|| . . . ||mN .
2. Device Synchronization: A lead device (e.g., the hub) sends a delimiter to
synchronize the clocks of all Dis. We set the delimiter to be an ON-ON-OFF-
OFF-ON-ON sequence, which is not a valid MC-coded sequence.
3. Transcript digest transmission: Following synchronization, Dis transmit
[h(s) || h(s)r] synchronously using MC ON-OFF keying, where h(·) is a non-
cryptographic uniform hash function and h(s)r are the last r bits of h(s).
4. Transcript verification: While [h(s) || h(s)r] is being transmitted, each Di
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Figure 5.7: (a) Transmission of m1, (b) synchronous transmission of [h(s) || h(s)r]
during the integrity verification phase, (c) M replaces m1 with m
′
1 by launching an
overshadowing attack, and (d) M attempts a signal cancellation at D1, D2 and D3
while D1 transmits [h(s) || h(s)r].
plays the role of a verifier. During the OFF slots of [h(s) || h(s)r] Dis senses
the wireless channel. If any OFF slot is sensed as ON by Di, then Di raises
an alarm by transmitting ON slots for rest of the slots in [h(s) || h(s)r]. The
[h(s)]r is appended to [h(s)] to ensure there are sufficient slots to raise an
alarm even if a mismatch is detected at the last ON-OFF bit of [h(s)]. The
minimum value of r is two.
An example of VERSE for four devices is shown in Figure 5.7. Initially, the
devices exchange messages sequentially, creating a protocol transcript s. The trans-
mission of m1 is shown in Figure 5.7(a). In the transcript verification step shown in
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Figure 5.7(b), all devices synchronously broadcast [h(s) || h(s)r] and use the OFF
slots to verify the integrity of h(s).
We provide a sketch of VERSE’s security (a detailed analysis is presented in
Section 5.4). To successfully launch an MitM attack against VERSE, the adversary
must ensure that no alarm is raised. Consider M modifying the protocol transcript
from s to sM by modifying mi. In Figure 5.7(c), we show M replacing m1 with
m′1. Even if M launches an overshadowing attack against all devices and success-
fully replaces mi, the device Di that originated mi compiles s. Because s 6= sM ,
it follows with overwhelming probability that [h(s) || h(s)r] 6= [h(sM) || h(sM)r],
due to the collision resistance property of h(·). In fact, for a uniform hash func-
tion, the two hashes will differ in approximately half the bits. For the bits where
[h(s) || h(s)r] 6= [h(sM) || h(sM)r], Di transmits (receives) when the rest of the
devices are sensing (transmitting). To avoid the detection of s by the devices that
compiled sM , the adversary must perform signal cancellation from one TX to many
RXs, which becomes increasingly difficult with the number of RXs. Similarly, to
avoid detection of [h(sM) || h(sM)r], at Di, the adversary must perform signal can-
cellation from many TXs to one RX, which also becomes increasingly difficult with
the number of simultaneous TXs.
5.3.2 Secure Bootstrapping using VERSE
To bootstrap a set of new devices with the hub, we execute a DH key exchange [49]
for establishing pairwise keys over the public channel and use VERSE to protect
the integrity of the protocol execution. The bootstrapping protocol consists of the
following steps, which are also outlined in Figure 3.3.
1. Initialization: A total of N − 1 legitimate devices D1, D2, . . . , DN−1 partic-
ipate in the group. The protocol is initialized when the user sets the hub (A)
to pairing mode and loads the total number of devices N (including A) to A.
For a period τ (e.g., two mins), the hub broadcasts a random MC ON-OFF se-
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Figure 5.8: Protocol initialization. The hub broadcasts an MC ON-OFF sequence
during device activation. This sequence terminates with a known delimiter.
quence that ends in delimiter ON-ON-OFF-OFF-ON-ON. During that period,
the user turns on each Di to set it to pairing mode, and all Di’s synchronize
to the MC ON-OFF sequence. Initialization terminates with the delimiter, al-
lowing each device to note the beginning of the DH message exchange phase.
Figure 5.8 shows the initialization step for four legitimate devices.
2. DH message exchange: All devices use public DH parameters (G, q, g),
where G is a cyclic group of order q and g is a generator of G. Each Di
broadcasts a message mi = IDi||zi containing ID of Di and the DH primitive
zi = g
Xi , where Xi is chosen from Zq uniformly at random. The hub also
broadcasts mA = IDA||zA.
3. Integrity Verification: The integrity verification phase is initiated by the
transmission of the delimiter by the hub, which serves as a SYNC message for
all Dis. The Dis use VERSE to verify the integrity of the protocol transcript
s = m1||m2|| . . . ||mN−1||mA. The hub records the total number of public DH
primitives N ′ exchanged during the protocol execution. The hub verifies that
N
?
= N ′ to ensure that the correct number of devices participated in the proto-
col. If verifications is passed, Dis and A participate in VERSE by transmitting
[h(s) || h(s)r]. Otherwise, Dis and A raises an alarm by transmitting all ON
slots in the remaining of the sequence. The devices stay in pairing mode for a
period τ ′ > τ even if the integrity verification is completed. This is to ensure
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Given IDi, Given IDA,
(G, q, g) (G, q, g)
Pick Xi ∈U Zq XA ∈U Zq
zi ← gXi zA ← gXA
mi ← IDi, zi mi−−−−−−→ mA ← IDA, zA
mA←−−−−−−−
Compute: Compute:
s←
(
m1||···||
mi||...||
mN−1||mA
)
s′ ←
(
m1||···||
mi||...||
mN′−1||mA
)
Verify; N
?
= N ′
Verify OFF slots in
[h(s) || h(s)r ]−−−−−−−−−−→
[h(s) || h(s)r]←−−−−−−−−−− Verify OFF slots in
[h(s) || h(s)r]i [h(s) || h(s)r]i
are OFF while sensing. are OFF while sensing.
Generate, Generate,
kDi,A ← (zA)Xi kDi,A ← (zi)XA
Figure 5.9: Diffie-Hellman key agreement using VERSE after the initialization step.
that they paired with the legitimate hub and no other pairing operation takes
place. If a second MC ON-OFF sequence is overheard by a device Di, the
device raises an alarm.
4. Confirmation: Upon successful verification, each device calculates a pairwise
key kDi,A = g
Xi·XA . Moreover, A displays a “SUCCESS” message. Else, A
displays “FAILURE” and broadcasts a “RESTART” message.
We emphasize that the message integrity verification can be integrated with any
group association protocol, such as the group Diffie-Hellman key exchange [112]. For
this work, we establish pairwise keys with A. Once pairwise keys are established, A
can securely distribute a group key to each device.
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5.4 Security Analysis
We first analyze the security of VERSE by demonstrating the infeasibility of signal
cancellation when multiple verifiers are used to verify the integrity of the proto-
col digest. We then evaluate the security of the DH-based protocol presented in
Section 5.3.2.
5.4.1 Signal Cancellation from One TX to Multiple RXs
In this section, we analyze the signal cancellation attack for the adversary introduced
in Section 5.2. We consider the transmission of an MC ON-OFF sequence from one
TX to multiple RXs and show that when at least three RXs act as verifiers, signal
cancellation becomes infeasible.
Consider the scenario of Figure 5.11(a), where a transmitter TX broadcasts an
MC ON-OFF coded message m1, which is received by RX1, RX2, and RX3. Let
x denote the symbols of the transmitted message, and y1, y2 and y3 denote the
received symbols at RX1, RX2, and RX3, respectively. The ON slots of m1 are
realized by a series of random symbols from the constellation plane, whereas the
OFF slots are realized by no transmission. To cancel any ON slot at all three
receivers, an adversary M must find a location `M such that it can simultaneously
annihilate y1, y2 and y3, at the respective RXs. This is because x contains random
selected symbols that do not allow the prediction of y1, y2 and y3. Therefore,
M must perform a relay attack by being positioned at a location that cancels the
received signal at each RX, independently of x.
Let M transmit x′ and RX1, RX2, and RX3 receive y′1, y
′
2, and y
′
3. The can-
cellation attack is successful if y′1 = −y1, y′2 = −y2 and y′3 = −y3. That is, M ’s
transmission arrives at each RX location with an inverse phase and the same ampli-
tude as y1, y2 and y3. For each RX, M ’s location must satisfy the phase difference
equation (5.4). The solution to (5.4) is an ellipse with TX and RX located at the
focal points. For three RXs, `M must lie in the intersection of three ellipses, as
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Figure 5.10: Three eclipses sharing one focus point. The lines join the intersection
points between pairs of ellipses are concurrent, with the common intersection point
inside all three ellipses.
shown in Figure 5.11(a). However, the following proposition shows that no such
location exists.
Proposition 7. Three distinct ellipses sharing one focal point irrespective of the
plane they lie in, do not have a common point of intersection.
Proof. Let A,B, and C be three ellipses sharing a focal point, with the three ellipses
being distinct. Each pair of ellipses will have a minimum of two intersection points.
Let AB1, AB2, BC1, BC2, AC1, and AC2 be the respective intersection points
between A,B, B,C, and A,C. These points are shown in Figure 5.10. According
to Theorems 1 and 2 in [113], the lines connecting the intersection points between
each pair of ellipses are concurrent at a common intersection that lies inside all three
ellipses, irrespective of the planes the ellipses lie in. Assume now that there is a
common intersection point between all three ellipses. Without loss of generality,
assume that AB1 is the same as AC1. Then the lines AB1-AB2 and AC1-AC2 will
have a common origin point. The only way that the two lines AB1-AB2 and AC1-
AC2 are concurrent with the BC1-BC2 line is if also AB2 is the same point as AC2.
In the latter case, B and C become the same ellipse or A and B become the same
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ellipse, and there are no longer three distinct ellipses. Hence, A,B, and C sharing
a focal point cannot have a common point of intersection.
The proof states that three ellipses sharing a common focus point cannot have a
common intersection point, regardless of the plane that the lie in. This is sufficient
for our purposes. Without attempting a formal proof, it is natural to conjecture
that the proof does extend to the case of ellipsoids. Ellipsoids consist of an infinite
number of ellipses on different planes that have common foci. If three of these
ellipsoids share a single focal point, then we can treat their intersection as the
intersection of an infinite number of combinations between three ellipses sharing the
focal point on different planes. Applying the proof on those ellipses shows that three
ellipsoids sharing one focal point do not have a common intersection point.
Based on Proposition 7, there is no location such that M can perform simultane-
ous cancellation of the TX’s signal at three RXs with a single transmission. There
are some degenerate RX arrangements that make cancellation from a single location
possible. This is when two of the RXs are at the same location, in which case only
the intersection of two ellipses needs to be considered. We consider such cases to be
point-specific, which could be avoided by requesting distinct RX locations or includ-
ing additional verifiers. Moreover, cancellation becomes possible if M is positioned
at the common focal point, i.e., at the same location as the TX, which is detectable
by the user.
Extending Proposition 7, no common intersection point exists for n > 3 if such
point cannot be found for n = 3. Furthermore, common intersection points between
two ellipses exist as shown in Fig 5.11(b), and any point over a set of ellipses can
be selected when n = 1 (see Section 5.2.2). This sets the minimum requirement
to thwart signal cancellation to three. For the proposed bootstrapping protocol,
it is expected that at least three verifiers (e.g., the hub plus two other legitimate
devices) will be available, as our work targets a group setting. If not, auxiliary
devices can be added for verification purposes. We emphasize that there is no need
for an authenticated channel between any auxiliary device and legitimate device.
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Figure 5.11: (a) TX placed on the shared focus of three ellipses which have RX1,
RX2 and RX3 on the other foci respectively. An adversary positioned on one ellipse
can cancel the TX signal at the RX positioned at the ellipse’s other focal point. No
common intersection point exist among three ellipses, and (b) M is placed on the
intersection point between two ellipses to simultaneously cancel the signal at RX1
and RX2.
Signal cancellation by a multi-device adversary: A multi-device adversary may
be capable of canceling a transmission at more than two RXs. To scale this attack to
more RXs, the adversary can deploy additional devices that lie on the intersection of
the respective ellipses defined by TX-RX pairs. For instance, Figure 5.12(a) shows
the deployment of two devices to perform cancellation at RX1, RX2 and RX3. The
device at location A targets at RX1 and RX2, whereas from B to RX3.
However, such a coordinated attack poses significant challenges. First, the trans-
mission of the cancellation signal at location A contaminates the reception of the
TX’s signal at location B. The latter is necessary to compute the cancellation signal
for RX3. Second, the cancellation signal at locations A and B superimpose at RX1
and RX2, thus significantly degrading the cancellation capability. This multi-device
attack can be successful only if the interference caused by multiple cancellers is
minimal, which is only possible with close placement to the respective RXs when
omnidirectional antennas are used. Such a close placement may be apparent to the
user.
A higher-cost approach for performing cancellation to multiple RXs without
causing unintended interference is to deploy devices with highly directional antennas.
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Figure 5.12: (a) The adversary place two colluding devices one at A with omnidirec-
tional transmission antenna and highly directional receiving antenna and other at
B with highly directional antenna, the attack fails due to self-interference, and (b)
the adversary places three colluding devices at A, B and C with highly directional
antenna.
This scenario is depicted in Figure 5.12(b). Three devices are deployed at locations
A, B, and C. Each device is equipped with two directional antennas. One is pointed
to the TX to receive the transmitted signal and the other is pointed to the RX to
perform cancellation. For a group of n verifiers, 2n directional antennas are needed.
For a typical device separation of 10-30 ft. with an adversary located at a distance
of 60 ft. he is required to achieve 9◦-26◦ beamwidth. Such narrow beamwidths can
be created by an antenna array [104] or a parabolic antenna [105]. A 9◦ beamwidth
or a 26◦ beamwidth antenna array requires approximately 30 antenna elements or
17 antenna elements, respectively.
Our scheme does not provide protection against a multi-device adversary that
can perfectly cancel MC ON-OFF sequences with highly-directional non-interfering
transmissions from devices located at ideal locations. For all practical purposes,
such a potent adversary is in full control of multiple wireless channels and can
erase/inject any message at will.
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Figure 5.13: Superimposition of signals received from TX1, TX2 and M at RX. M
must be able to relay −y1 − y2 form a single location.
5.4.2 Signal Cancellation from Multiple TXs to One RX
We now consider the inverse scenario where an MC ON-OFF message m is syn-
chronously transmitted by n TXs and is received at a single RX. For this scenario,
we examine whether signal cancellation at the RX is possible. A key observation
for this case is that although the n TXs convey the same ON-OFF message m,
ON slots are realized using different and randomly selected symbols at each TX.
Therefore, Let xi = {xi(1), xi(2), . . . , xi(k)} denote the transmitted symbols from
one TXi modulating m and yi = {yi(1), yi(2), . . . , yi(k)} the received symbols at
RX. To cancel the incoming signal at RX, M has to transmit the inverse signal,
x′ = −
∑n
i=1 hTXiRXxi
hMRX
= −
∑n
i=1 yi
hMRX
. (5.6)
The superposition of
∑n
i=1 yi and y
′ for two TXs is shown in Figure 5.13. Ac-
cording to (5.6), the computation of x′ requires the knowledge of the transmitted
signals xi from all the TXs and of the channels hTXiRX and hMRX. However, the
adversary does not have knowledge of the randomly transmitted symbols by each
TX in advance. Moreover, it receives the superposition of the xis, modified by the
individual channels. For successful cancellation irrespective of the values of the xis,
the adversary must be positioned such that it cancels each individual xi.
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Figure 5.14: RX placed on the shared focus of three ellipses which have TX1, TX2
and TX3 on the other foci respectively. An adversary positioned on one ellipse can
cancel the TX signal at the RX positioned at the ellipse’s other focal point. No
common intersection point exist among three ellipses.
For example, consider the scenario of Figure 5.14, where TX1, TX2, and TX3
transmit x1, x2, and x3 respectively and RX receives y as the superposition of y1,
y2 and y3. As this superposition randomly changes with each transmitted symbol,
to cancel any ON slot at RX, the adversary must find a location `M such that it can
simultaneously annihilate y1, y2, and y3 by relaying the received signal.
Similarly to the case of one TX and multiple RXs, the adversary must attempt
to cancel the symbols from each individual transmission, such that the aggregated
symbol is canceled at RX. For each TX, M ’s location must satisfy the phase dif-
ference equation (5.4). The solution to each individual equation is an ellipse with
the respective TX and RX located at the focal points of the ellipse. Therefore, `M
must lie in the intersection of three ellipses, as shown in Figure 5.14. These ellipses
have RX as a common focal point, with TX1, TX2, and TX3 being the other three
focal points. However, Proposition 7 states that no such common intersection point
exists. Hence, an adversary cannot find a valid location to perform cancellation
from three TXs to one RX. Similarly to the case of one TX and multiple RXs, there
are some degenerate TX arrangements that make cancellation from a single loca-
tion possible. For the case of signal cancellation from multiple TXs to one RX the
same complexity arguments as in the previous section. The best approach for the
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Figure 5.15: (a) M replacing m1 with m
′
1 during overshadowing attack, (b) M
attempting to perform signal cancellation on D1’s transmission to D2, D3 and D4
during the verification phase of the VERSE primitive (c) D2 raises the alarm after
detecting error during the verification phase of the VERSE primitive, and (d) legends
for the figure.
adversary is to cancel the signal of each TX individually using highly directional
antennas to avoid unintended interference. The number of devices that need to be
deployed grows linearly to the number of legitimate devices.
5.4.3 Security Analysis of the VERSE Primitive
The security of the VERSE primitive is derived from the difficulty in canceling a
signal of one TX at multiple verifiers when the number of verifiers is greater than two
and canceling the signal from more than two TXs at one verifier. We discuss a basic
scenario with three verifiers for each transmission (four devices in total). In this
example, M attempts to inject m′1 while D1 transmits m1 and pass the verification
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Figure 5.16: M performing signal manipulation attack on D2’s transmission to flip
bits where [h(s) || h(s)r] 6= [h(sM) || h(sM)r] to pass the verification. D2 followed
by D1, D3 and D4 transmits “Alarm” or error bits by sending all ON slots after
detection of energy during its OFF slot.
at the other three devices D2, D3, and D4. The adversary must be capable of
injecting m′1 at D2, D3, and D4 simultaneously. This can be achieved by launching
an overshadowing attack [54], as shown in Figure 5.15(a). Because m1 is not ON-
OFF modulated and a signal cancellation is not necessary, the adversary can inject a
signal with large enough energy that causes demodulation to a desired constellation
point. This is plausible for low order constellations (e.g., BPSK, QPSK), where the
received constellation point needs to fall within a specific plane or quadrant. Note
mis are not protected with MC ON-OFF keying to improve the time efficiency of
the bootstrapping process.
According to the VERSE primitive, D2, D3, and D4 compile sM =
m′1||m2||m3||m4, whereas D1 compiles s = m1||m2||m3||m4. During the integrity
verification phase of VERSE, D1 transmits [h(s) || h(s)r], while D2, D3, and D4
transmit [h(sM) || h(sM)r]. To prevent an alarm at D2, D3, and D4, the adversary
has to perform signal cancellation on D1’s transmission to replace [h(s) || h(s)r] with
[h(sM) || h(sM)r] at all the three verifiers. This attack is shown in Figure 5.15(b).
However, in Section 5.4.1, we showed that it is infeasible to perform such signal
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cancellation at more than three verifiers.
Since the adversary is unable to perform signal cancellation on D1’s signal,
at least one of D2, D3, and D4, will detect the error when [h(s) || h(s)r] 6=
[h(sM) || h(sM)r] and raise an alarm. In Figure 5.15(c), we show D2 raising an
alarm during the verification phase. This alarm will be now heard by the rest of the
devices because the adversary is not positioned to cancel the signal from D2 to the
remaining three devices. The sequential raising of an alarm by each of the devices is
shown in Figure 5.16. We note that even if the adversary is positioned such that it
can achieve cancellation to a subset of devices, it cannot cancel the raised alarms as
the number of TXs raising alarms increase because it is infeasible to perform signal
cancellation from more than two TXs to one RX. There might be other attack vec-
tors where the adversary chooses to overshadow a different combination of messages
during the protocol execution phase. For instance, for the scenario of four devises,
it could choose to inject m′1 only at D3 and D4. In this case, D1 and D2 compile s,
whereas D3, and D4 compile sM . Hence, to pass the verification the adversary has
to perform signal cancellation on the transmissions from D1 and D2 to D3 and D4
and replace [h(s) || h(s)r] with [h(sM) || h(sM)r].
To guarantee the secure operation of VERSE under any possible attack vector
we need to have at least three verifiers for any direction. This can be achieved
by requiring at least four legitimate devices and the hub participate in the group
(a total of five devices). Then, irrespective of the set of devices selected by M
to perform the overshadowing attack, M will have to perform signal cancellation
attack from at least one TXs to at least three RXs, or from at least three TXs to
at least one RX. We have shown that neither of these attacks is feasible, due to the
impossibility of finding a location to concurrently perform successful cancellation at
multiple verifiers.
Even though we have that cancellation attacks to multiple RXs or from multiple
TXs are theoretically infeasible, in practice, such attacks could have some limited
success probability. This is because the adversary does not have to completely
151
annihilate the incoming signal at a given verifier, but has to reduce it below the
detection threshold for an ON slot. This threshold is typically larger than the
receiver sensitivity, to account for ambient noise from other devices. Therefore,
there could be some location for which M has a cancellation probability pn for each
slot. To guarantee the security of VERSE, we use the length of the hash value used
for integrity verification to drive the overall success probability for M to negligible
values. This is formalized in the following proposition, where we show that the
probability of M successfully modifying any (or multiple) message(s) without being
detected by all the legitimate devices is bounded by δ.
Proposition 8. For a group of size N , the VERSE is δ–secure against message
modifications with
δ ≤ (pH + (1− pH)pn)` , (5.7)
where δ is the probability that M can replace any mi sent by Di with m
′
i at any subset
of remaining devices without being detected at every Di′ ∈ D (where D is the set of
all legitimate devices), pH is the probability for a bit of h(s) to equal a bit of h(sM),
and pn is the probability of successfully flipping one bit in [·] during transmissions
from n TXs to one RX or from one TX to n RXs where n = dN/2e, and ` is the
length of the hash function h(·) || h(·)r. We show that δ is a negligible function of
`.
Proof. Let’s consider an adversary that targets to modify one message mi sent by
Di
1. In the simplest case, the adversary replaces mi with m
′
i at all other legitimate
devices D \Di = D−i{Di′ |i′ 6= i}, where D denotes the set of all legitimate devices
in the group. During the VERSE verification phase, all the Di′ compiles sM =
m1|| . . . ||m′i|| . . . ||mn, whereas Di compiles s = m1|| . . . ||mi|| . . . ||mn. Then to pass
the transcript verification M has to replace [h(s) || h(s)r] with [h(sM) || h(sm)r] at all
the Di′ on transmission from Di, so that none of the verifiers raise an alarm. If any
1Modifying multiple messages is more difficult, in which case the success probability is upper
bounded by that of modifying a single message.
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one other verifier Di′ raises an alarm, then all the others will detect the MitM attack
and raise an alarm, since a single M can only be set to cancel the transmissions from
one TX (Di) to other RXs at one time, but not from Di′ to those RXs. Hence, the
adversary has to perform signal cancellation on transmission of one TX to multiple
(all other) RXs in this case.
In general, M might choose to replace mi with m
′
i, at a subset of other legitimate
devices, DM = {Di′|, i′ ∈ 1, 2, ...N, i′ 6= i} ⊂ D−i, such that during the VERSE
verification phase Di and all the Di′′ ∈ D−i \ DM compile the same communication
transcript as s, whereas every Di′ ∈ DM compiles sM . Then to pass the transcript
verification M has to replace (cancel and inject) [h(s) || h(s)r] with [h(sM) || h(sm)r]
at all the Di′ ∈ DM on transmissions from Di and every Di′′ ∈ D−i \ DM , and vice
versa, to replace the ON-OFF signals from Di′ ∈ DM to all devices in Di′′ ∈ D−i\DM
and Di, such that none of the verifiers raise the alarm. Hence, the adversary has
to perform signal cancellation on transmissions of multiple TXs to multiple RXs
simultaneously.
In any of the above cases, the success of the adversary is upper-bounded by
the capability to replace [h(s) || h(s)r] with [h(sM) || h(sm)r] on transmission from
one TX to multiple RXs, or from multiple TXs to one RX. Next, we compute the
probability of replacing [h(s) || h(s)r] with [h(sM) || h(sm)r]. First, we compute the
probability that the kth bit is received as h(sM) || h(sM)kr at all Di′ ∈ DM (say, from
Di). This occurs if one of the following two conditions is met: either the k
th bit is
the same in h(s) ||h(s)r and h(sM) || h(sM)r or M is able to perform cancellation
and injection of kth at all Di′ ∈ DM :
Pr[kth = h(sM)
k] = Pr[h(s)k = h(sM)
k] +
Pr[h(s)k 6= h(sM)k] Pr[Cancel]
= pH + (1− pH)pn, (5.8)
where pH is the probability for a bit of h(s) || h(s)r to equal a bit of h(sM) || h(sM)r,
153
and pn is the probability upper bound of successfully flipping one bit in [·] during
transmissions from multiple TXs to one RX or from one TX to multiple RXs (it is
reasonable to assume the same pn applies to both scenarios).
For a strictly universal hash function, the hashes for two different inputs differ at
each bit with probability 1/2. The probability δ of accepting the modified message of
M at A is computed by taking into account the total number of bits (`) generated
by the hash function h(·) || h(·)r. The adversary’s modified message is accepted
by all the Di′ if M has replaced mi with m′i and [h(sM) || h(sM)r] is received at
all Di′ instead of [h(s) || h(s)r]. We argue that successful cancellation of every
ON-slot occurs independently, as each ON slot symbol transmitted by each device
is randomly generated (i.i.d). This is because, if the attacker is located at a fixed
location, the resulted aggregated signal relayed by the attacker will be randomly
distributed (and independent across symbols), so the probability of each aggregated
received symbol’s power being less than a threshold is also independent from each
other. Thus, δ is the product of the probability of successfully manipulating each
bit:
δ ≤ Π`k=1 Pr[kth = h(sM)k]
≤ Π`k=1(pH + (1− pH)pn)
≤ (pH + (1− pH)pn)`. (5.9)
where pH is the probability for a bit of h(s) || h(s)r to equal a bit of h(sM) || h(sM)r,
and pn is the probability of a successfully flipping one bit in [·] during transmissions
from multiple TXs to one RX or from one TX to multiple RXs, and ` is the length
of the hash function h(·) || h(·)r. It is easy to show that δ is a negligible function
of `, since pH + (1 − pH)pn < 1 (as long as pn < 1 in general, for any number of
verifiers). Since for each possible sub-case (of adversary choosing to modify one
message from any device to any subset of remaining devices), we have the same
success probability bound δ, we can conclude that the adversary’s overall success
probability is also upper bounded by δ, meaning with probability at least 1− δ, all
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Figure 5.17: The probability that M can replace mi with m
′
i without being detected
at Di′ ∀ i′ 6= i.
the devices in the group will detect the MitM attack.
Note that the above proposition is general and applies to any group size N > 1.
However, for different values of N , we have different concrete guarantees since pn
depends on the minimum number of devices n (number of transmitters for many-to-
one, or receivers for one-to-many) that the adversary needs to launch a cancellation
attack against, among all possible cases of group partitioning. For example, when
N = 2, the minimum number of cancellation targets is 1; in general, for N ≥ 5,
n = dN/2e. In addition, according to our experiments in Section VI, we show that
for n = 1, 2, pn can be as large as 0.9. However, pn dramatically drops to a very
small value when n = 3. Thus, the security guarantee of the VERSE primitive is
stronger with an increasing n and also the group size N .
Figure 5.17 shows δ as a function of the hash length ` for various values of pn
when pH = 0.5 (i.e., the bits of the h(s) and h(sM) are random). As expected, a
higher pn yields higher δ values for the adversary. For instance, when pn = 0.9 we
have δ = 0.00027 for ` = 160. But when the cancellation probability is significantly
low, for instance when n = 3, pn = 8.7 × 10−5, we have δ = 6.9 × 10−49 for
` = 160. We note that this is an online attack that has to be performed while the
pairing session is ongoing security. Similar standards are used for other existing
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pairing protocols [27]. Moreover, a pn = 0.9 is difficult to achieve in the presence of
multiple Di’s. δ is a negligible function of `, the adversary’s success probability can
always be driven to any desired value by choosing a long enough `.
5.4.4 Security of the Bootstrapping Protocol using VERSE
We now analyze the security of the bootstrapping protocol shown in Figure 3.3
against MitM attacks, which can be reduced to the security of VERSE (Corollary 1).
Basically, we need to show that the adversary can neither join the group as an
additional device and pair with any existing legitimate device nor can the adversary
carry out an MitM attack against any legitimate device(s) to pair itself with the
hub A or any Di.
Corollary 1. The bootstrapping protocol protected by the VERSE primitive is δ–
secure against active attacks with
δ ≤ (pH + (1− pH)pn)` . (5.10)
Here, δ is the probability that M can replace any DH public number mi (sent by any
device or A) with m′i at any subset of remaining devices, without being detected at
every device Di′ ∈ D (including the hub). Notations are defined in the same way as
in Proposition 8.
Proof. The only differences between our bootstrapping protocol and the VERSE
primitive are: (a) the addition of an initialization phase, where the devices are
synchronized and the group count is pre-loaded to A, and (b) the messages being
exchanged are the DH public numbers. The message content does not affect the
security because of hash function’s collision-resistance property. We analyze the
security of the bootstrapping protocol in two parts. First, we address the case of
a malicious device attempting to pair with the legitimate hub. We then analyze
the case where a rogue hub attempts to pair with a legitimate device. Note that,
an adversary targeting the synchronization phases of the protocol will fail to pair
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with either the legitimate hub or devices, as we will show in Proposition 9 later. In
the following we assume that the adversary does not attempt a desynchronization
attack.
Malicious device pairing with the legitimate hub: Any malicious device that sim-
ply participates in the protocol will appear as an additional device beyond the N−1
legitimate devices indicated by the user. The extra device count leads to the abor-
tion of the protocol according to Step 3. The legitimate hub raises an alarm by
broadcasting all ON slots during the MC ON-OFF transmission of the protocol
transcript digest. As we showed in Proposition 7, this broadcast cannot be canceled
and eventually propagates to all legitimate devices.
An alternative approach for the adversary would be to hijack the pairing session
of a legitimate device so that the total number of participating devices is not vio-
lated. The integrity verification phase prevents this hijacking because the transmis-
sion of the protocol transcript digest is protected by the VERSE primitive. Accord-
ing to Proposition 8, as long as any subset of devices computes different transcripts,
all devices will detect the attack with probability no less than 1− δ.
Rogue hub pairing with a legitimate device: The adversary can attempt to pair
with a legitimate device by posing as the hub and hijacking the pairing session with
the legitimate hub. To carry out this attack against a device Di, the adversary has
to perform a signal overshadowing attack and replace the legitimate DH primitive
mA with mM at Di. Moreover, the adversary has to replace the protocol transcript
digest [h(s) || h(s)r] transmitted by the remaining legitimate devices and A to Di,
with [h(s′) || h(s′)r]. Proposition 8, states that as long as any subset of devices
computes different transcripts, all devices will detect the attack with probability no
less than 1− δ. Hence, the adversary will fail to pose as a legitimate hub.
Moreover, in Proposition 9, we show that an adversary targeting the initialization
phase to either desynchronize the legitimate devices or make them synchronize with
a rogue hub leads to a protocol failure. Therefore, we do not need to introduce a
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secure synchronization mechanism.
Proposition 9. The bootstrapping protocol protected by VERSE fails under a desyn-
chronization attack during the initialization phase.
Proof. The attack on the synchronization between the legitimate entities during
the simultaneous MC ON-OFF transmission can be mitigated by initiating VERSE
simultaneously at all the legitimate entities. We first discuss the initialization step,
followed by the security analysis of it. Finally, we discuss the security analysis on
the attack on synchronization.
According to Step 1 of the pairing protocol, the protocol is initiated by the user
by powering ON all the legitimate devices and setting the hub to pairing mode.
This step is followed by the transmission of the DH primitives. To inform each
device when all other devices are powered ON and ready to pair, we have added the
coordination process.
Initially, the user sets the hub to pairing mode by pressing a button on the hub
device. When in this mode, the hub broadcasts a random MC ON-OFF sequence
while waiting for other devices to be turned ON. This mode lasts for a pre-specified
time period τ sufficient for pairing all other devices, or until the users press the
pairing button again. This phase terminates by transmitting a known delimiter
(ON-ON-OFF-OFF-ON-ON). When legitimate devices are powered ON, they listen
to the ON-OFF sequence broadcasted by the hub and wait for the known delimiter
to synchronously initiate Step 2. Note that the known delimiter further allows the
devices to time synchronize with the clock of the hub.
To combat possible active attacks on initialization and/or time synchronization,
each device remains in pairing mode for a period τ ′ which is slightly longer than τ ,
even if it has already paired with the hub.
We now demonstrate that an adversary targeting the initialization and/or syn-
chronization of the protocol will fail to pair with the legitimate hub or a legitimate
device. Consider the device activation sequence shown in Figure 5.18. Because the
158
A
D1
D2
D3
D4
Step 2’
Step 2’
Step 2
Step 2
Step 2
VERSE 
initialized
τ' 
τ'
τ'
τ'
τ 
Alarm
Delimiter
Delimiter
Figure 5.18: Attack on the initialization step of VERSE.
delimiter used to denote the end of the initialization phase is public, an adversary
can attempt to pair with a legitimate device by performing a signal cancellation and
injection attack. In this attack, the adversary cancels the ON-OFF sequence of the
hub and injects a delimiter sequence to cause the initiation of the pairing process
sooner than the time intended by the legitimate hub. According to Proposition 7,
the adversary is able to cancel the ON-OFF sequence at most at two devices, say
D1 and D2. These two devices may complete the pairing process with the malicious
hub before other legitimate devices are activated or execute the protocol with the
legitimate hub. However, they remain in pairing mode for a period τ ′ > τ .
When devices D3 and D4 execute the VERSE protocol with the legitimate hub,
the adversary has to replace the expected messages from D1 and D2 with his own
messages to satisfy the group count. This can be done by a simple message injec-
tion. However, during the confirmation stage, all devices synchronously transmit
the ON-OFF sequence of the protocol transcript digest. In our example, at least
A, D3, and D4 will transmit that sequence. As a result, D1 and D2 will overhear a
second integrity verification phase (Step 3) within their pairing period τ ′. Based on
Proposition 7, the adversary cannot perform cancellation from three transmitters
to one receiver to prevent the overhearing of the legitimate confirmation phase at
D1 and D2. The two latter devices will raise an alarm by transmitting all ON slots
during the integrity verification phase and the protocol will terminate in FAILURE.
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This delimiter is sent by the hub before the synchronous transmission of the
protocol digest is initiated (Step 3). We clarify that we have not assumed a se-
cure synchronization protocol between the hub and the legitimate devices. We have
simply stated that under a benign setting, the devices are capable of achieving
synchronization with a bounded error . This error has been assumed to be fairly
large in our experimentations relative to typical clock drifts of wireless devices and
topology scenarios considered in this work (we set  between 1µs to 30µs). Such
a value demonstrates that VERSE operates correctly even in worst-case time mis-
alignment scenarios. If the adversary attacks the second SYNC message to misalign
the legitimate transmitters, the ON-OFF sequence transmitted during the integrity
verification phase will be misaligned leading to the sounding of the alarm by trans-
mitting all ON slots. Therefore, the adversary cannot successfully join the group,
by causing time misalignment between legitimate devices.
Now we will present the security analysis on the attack of synchronization be-
tween legitimate entities. Two attack scenarios can weaken the security of the
proposed group pairing protocol: (a) a malicious device pairs with the legitimate
hub, or (b) a legitimate devices pairs with a rogue hub.
Malicious device pairing with the legitimate hub: The device synchronization is
initiated by the hub, by sending the delimiter message in Step 3, when the VERSE
primitive is used to secure the transmission of [h(s) || h(s)r]. To pair with hub A,
the malicious device must follow the timing set by the end of the delimiter sent
from A. Any message received by A at a different timeline will be aborted. The
adversary can attempt to cancel the delimiter message sent by A at a target device
Di, so as to prevent Di from broadcasting the protocol digest with other devices.
The goal is to reduce the number of devices where cancellation should take place
when [h(s) || h(s)r] is transmitted using ON-OFF mode by the remaining devices.
However, device Di will overhear the MC ON-OFF sequence transmitted by the
remaining of devices, without having received the delimiter. This sequence from
many simultaneous transmitters to one receiver cannot be canceled by the adversary.
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Device Di will raise an alarm by transmitting continuous ON slots, leading to the
protocol failure. So attacking the synchronization protocol can only lead to a DoS
and does not provide the adversary with an additional capability to compromise the
protocol.
Malicious device posing as a legitimate hub: The adversary can also attempt to
synchronize the legitimate device to his own delimiter message rather than the legit-
imate hub. If the desynchronized device transmits when the MC ON-OFF sequence
of the protocol transcript is transmitted by legitimate devices, the legitimate devices
and the hub will detect energy during the OFF slots and abort the protocol.
This proves that the VERSE is protected against any attack on the synchroniza-
tion between the legitimate entities.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of signal cancellation
under different number of verifiers. We also discuss practical implementation details.
Experimental Setup: We performed all the experiments using NI-USRP 2921
devices. Each device and the hub was realized by one USRP device. The adversary
was implemented using two USRP devices one for listening and one for relaying.
The listening adversarial device was equipped with a directional antenna (LP0965
Log Periodic PCB Antenna, 850MHz to 6.5GHz) aimed at the TX, whereas the ad-
versarial transmitting device was equipped with either a directional antenna aiming
at one RX, or an omnidirectional antenna targeting multiple RXs. All devices were
synchronized (with the clock of the same computer) and transmitted at 2.4GHz with
22MHz bandwidth. The slot duration was fixed to 1ms. An ON slot was realized
with the transmission of 250 random symbols with 4µs duration, whereas an OFF
slot was realized with silence. Experiments were performed at night to minimize Wi-
Fi interference although Wi-Fi beacon signals were present during the experiments.
The threshold for determining an ON slot was set to -50dBm, which is significantly
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Figure 5.19: (a) Experimental setup for signal cancellation from one TX to one
RX, (b) experimental setup for signal cancellation from one TX to two RXs, (c)
cancellation probability as a function of the distance difference between the direct
and the relay paths when M is placed at an ellipse satisfying eq. (5.4), and (d)
cancellation probability as a function of the distance difference between the direct
and the relay paths, when M is perturbed from the location with path difference
equal to 3λ/2.
higher than the receiver sensitivity (typically at or less than -70dBm). This higher
value was selected to minimize false positives due to ambient wireless activities at
the 2.4GHz band. Each experiment was repeated 106 times.
5.5.1 Effectiveness of the Signal Cancellation
Signal cancellation when n = 1, 2. In the first set of experiments, we evaluated
the probability pn (used in Proposition 8 and Corollary 1) of successful signal can-
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cellation via a relay attack for n = 1 and n = 2. For n = 1, we used the experimental
setup shown in Figure 5.19(a). A device D1 sent 10
6 MC ON-OFF modulated bits
to a hub A in the presence of M who performed a relay cancellation. The two US-
RPs implementing M were stacked on top of each other at a location on one ellipse
that satisfied (5.3) and (5.4). For n = 2, we used the experimental setup shown
in Figure 5.19(b). The adversary was placed at the intersection of the two ellipses
that satisfied (5.3) and (5.4). The transmitting antenna of M was replaced with an
omnidirectional one to allow the simultaneous cancellation at two locations.
The receiver at M played three roles: (a) estimate the respective channels, (b)
quickly detect ON slots using energy detection, and (c) determine the symbols being
transmitted from D1 during ON slots in an online fashion as M is not aware of the
pseudo-random symbols transmitted by D1. The estimated channel was used to
craft the amplitude of the symbol relayed by M ’s transmitter to cancel D1’s signal
at the receivers (the phase was matched based on M ’s location). The transmitting
signal at M was crafted using two approaches. In the first approach, M estimated
the hD1M and hMA channels based on the transmissions of D1 and A, respectively.
The hD1A channel was modeled after a Rician model with a K factor equal to two,
which represents an indoor environment with a strong LoS component. In the second
approach, no channel estimation took place at M . All channels were modeled after
a free-space path loss model with an attenuation exponent α = 2.
Figure 5.19(c) shows the cancellation probability (p) as a function of the differ-
ence between the direct and relay paths. The adversary was placed at the different
ellipses dictated by eq. (5.4), and for w =1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. We observe that when
the adversary is close and therefore, has a dominant LoS channel to D1 and H,
the cancellation probability is quite high (94.56% and 91.17% for estimated channel
and modeled channel attenuation, respectively for n = 1 and 90.57% and 84.42%
for estimated channel and modeled channel attenuation, respectively for n = 2).
Even at several wavelengths away, signal cancellation remains possible with non-
negligible probability. The cancellation performance is worse for n = 2 because M
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Figure 5.20: (a) Experimental topology for the evaluation of security primitive of
VERSE, and (b) cancellation probability for the experimental setup of (a).
has to perform simultaneous cancellation at both A and D2 and more channels need
to be estimated. Moreover, the channel estimation yields a stronger cancellation
capability compared to channel modeling for both n = 1 and n = 2.
Sensitivity to location placement: In the next set of experiments, we studied
the sensitivity of the cancellation attack to M ’s location. The adversary was placed
at a set of ellipses with a path difference between λ to 2λ and incremented by a step of
λ/8. Figure 5.19(d) shows the cancellation probability as a function of the difference
between the direct and relay path. As expected, the cancellation probability is
maximized when the path difference equals (3λ/2), which satisfies eq. (5.4). The
cancellation probability drops significantly when M ’s location deviates more than
λ/2 from the optimal location for both n = 1 and n = 2. From this experiment, we
verify that signal cancellation attacks are sensitive to the adversary’s location due
to the short wavelength of the carrier frequency. A location perturbation of just a
few centimeters is sufficient to reduce the effectiveness of the attack, as M ’s signal
no longer arrives at the targeted RXs with the opposite phase.
Signal cancellation when n = 3: We also evaluated the signal cancellation
capability for the one TX/three RX scenario and the three TX/one RX scenario.
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These two cases serve as the basis for the security of VERSE. We used the topology
shown in Figure 5.20(a). In the first scenario, D1 broadcasted MC ON-OFF signals
that were simultaneously received by three RXs. According to Proposition 7, there
is no single location that allows M perform signal cancellation to all three RXs.
Therefore, we selected a set of locations that could likely succeed in canceling some
of the received signals. Specifically, the adversary is placed in all locations marked
by dots. Locations (A,B,C,E, F,H) correspond to the intersection of two ellipses
whereas locations (D,G, I) are the centroids of the areas created by the three closest
intersection points. In the second scenario, A, D2, and D3 synchronously transmit-
ted an MC ON-OFF signal that was received by D1.
Figure 5.20(b) shows the cancellation probability for the two different scenarios
and for each location. We observe that for any scenario, the cancellation probabil-
ity is below 10−4. Moreover, the cancellation probability was non-zero in all cases
due to the relatively high threshold value (-50dBm) that was used to detect ON
slots. Although the adversary’s signal was not the exact inverse to annihilate le-
gitimate transmissions, on certain occasions, there was sufficient alignment to drop
the received power below -50dBm for the respective RX(s). It should be noted
here that this experiment is not the proof of the adversary’s inability in performing
cancellation when n > 2, but the proof is derived from Proposition 7.
Alarm raising probability: We further evaluated the security of VERSE in
terms of raising an alarm. We replicated the experimental setup of Figure 5.20 and
implemented the verification phase where every device transmits the hash of the
protocol transcript using MC ON-OFF modulation. We considered an adversary
that successfully replaced m1 of D1 with m
′
1 leading to the compilation of sM at
D2, D3, A and the compilation of s at D1. To account for a varying number of bits
that must be canceled by M , we varied the Hamming distance between h(sM) and
h(s) from 0.1 of the hash length (160 bits) to 0.8 of the hash length. This is done by
randomly generating two 160-bit strings with the desired Hamming distances. An
alarm was raised by any device that detected a transmitted sequence different than
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Figure 5.21: An example of superimposed received signals from D1, D2 and D3
which are misaligned by an offset of .
the one it was transmitting. In all scenarios tested and for all adversary locations,
all verifiers detected the message manipulation and raised an alarm. The attack
was detected with probability one for all 106 hash transmissions.
5.5.2 Practical Considerations
We now analyze the time synchronization requirement, interference effect for the
VERSE protocol and its timing overhead.
Synchronization: During the verification phase of VERSE, multiple devices
must simultaneously transmit an ON-OFF sequence. Possible misalignment between
the clocks of each device may lead to false alarms. To address the possible time
misalignment, the hub broadcasts a delimiter just before the start of the verification
phase, to synchronize The clock of each device. Despite this synchronization, there
is still possible time misalignment between the devices due to clock drift and the
different path delays caused by multipath or NLoS channels to each receiver. There
have been extensive studies on synchronization of independent wireless nodes [90],
but practically it is impossible to reach perfect synchronization.
Figure 5.21 shows an example, where D1, D2, and D3 transmit simultaneously,
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with the transmissions being misaligned by a time offset . Misalignment causes
some energy from ON slots “bleed” into OFF slots and some silent period of the
OFF slot “bleed” into ON slots. However, the offset  is much smaller (a few µsec)
than the slot duration for the ON-OFF sequence which is set to 1ms. The state s(j)
of the jth slot is decided according to the following rule:
s(j) =
OFF, if p(j) ≤ γD,ON, if p(j) > γD. (5.11)
where γD is the detection threshold (set to -50dBm in our experiments), and p(j)
is the average received power over the jth slot. To resolve the time misalignment
problem, a solution similar to [114] can be adopted. Rather than averaging the
power of all the samples in slot j, an RX eliminates the samples corresponding to
an interval max from the beginning and the end of each j
th slot, where the slot
boundaries are computed according to the RX’s own clock. This strategy leaves a
time interval of T − 2max for estimating the received power, where T is the slot
duration, and, max is the maximum time offset between any of the devices.
Experimental evaluation of synchronization: We set up three USRP devices to
transmit ON-OFF messages simultaneously, while a fourth USRP was acting as the
intender RX. We placed the TXs that simultaneously transmitted the random MC
ON-OFF sequence at different locations in the laboratory with both LoS and NLoS
channels to the RX. TX1 was placed behind a bookshelf inside the room, TX2 was
placed outside the room to ensure an NLoS channel, whereas TX3 was placed at a
LoS to the RX. The transmit power for an ON slot was set to 20dBm with a symbol
duration of 1ms. An artificial clock misalignment from  = 1µs to  = 30µs was
induced between D1, D2, and D3 to emulate the maximum time offset error. The
experiment lasted for the transmission of 106 sequences of 40 bits each.
The first experiment was performed to select the detection threshold γD. Fig-
ure 5.22(a) shows that average received power during an ON slot varied from -42dBm
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Figure 5.22: (a) Average received power of superimposed signal from D1, D2, and
D3 on ON and OFF slots as a function of synchronization offset (), and (b) bit
error rate as a function of synchronization offset () in µs.
to -38dBm. The received power during an OFF slot varied from -72dBm to -55dBm
indicating the presence of some ambient noise. The detection threshold was set to
γD = −50dBm.
In the second experiment, we used the same setup with experiment one and
evaluated the slot detection error rate as a function of the synchronization offset. To
cope with the time misalignment, the RX excluded the first 30µs from the beginning
and end of each slot. The results for the ON slot error rate and the OFF slot error
rate are shown in Figure 5.22(b). We observe that ON slots are always correctly
detected for any time offset. For the OFF slots, a very small number (seven slots out
of 106) were wrongly estimated. This indicates that excluding the samples at the
beginning and end of each slot effectively addresses the synchronization problem.
Interference Effect: To make VERSE robust to interference from co-existing
wireless systems, we set the detection threshold for ON slots significantly higher
than the typical receiver sensitivity. In the experiments, we selected the detection
threshold for ON slots to be -50dBm, which is orders of magnitude higher than
the average noise level (typically at -120dBm). The security of VERSE could be
impacted because the adversary no longer has to cancel a transmission to the noise
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floor, but achieving cancellation below the detection threshold is sufficient. To ac-
count for this tradeoff, the system security, as expressed by Proposition 8 and
Corollary 1, incorporate the probability pn of successfully flipping a bit during can-
cellation. This probability parametrizes the success of the adversary in performing
cancellation due to considering a higher than the noise floor detection threshold.
Timing Analysis: The timing overhead of VERSE includes the following com-
ponents (a) the initialization step, (b) exchanging the public DH parameters, and
(c) transmitting in MC ON-OFF mode the digest of the protocol transcript. The
initialization step can be maximum of τ for powering of all the group devices by the
user so they can be set to pairing mode, which can be set to 120s [115]. From the
remaining two components, the verification phase dominates the protocol’s timing
performance, since the ON-OFF mode is significantly slower than nominal transmis-
sion speeds. However, the ON-OFF keying time is constant to the group size. For a
hash with length `, a total of 2(`+ r) slots of duration T are necessary to complete
the verification phase. Assuming typical values of ` = 256, r = 256 (in the worst
case) and T = 1ms [31], the verification phase requires 1.024s to complete which is
acceptable for all practical uses and it is independent of the number of participating
devices.
5.6 Chapter Summary
We addressed the problem of securely bootstrapping a group of devices to a hub
when none of the devices share any prior security associations. We propose VERSE,
a new PHY-layer group message integrity verification primitive resistant to MitM
attacks over the wireless channel. We exploit the existence of multiple devices that
act as verifiers of the protocol transcript for integrity protection. When three or
more devices perform an integrity check, it is infeasible for the adversary to si-
multaneously manipulate the wireless signal at all devices, based on geometrical
constraints. We presented a DH-based device bootstrapping protocol that utilized
VERSE, which only requires in-band communications with minimal human effort
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during initialization. We formally prove the security of both VERSE and the boot-
strapping protocol against active attacks. With a real-world USRP testbed, we ex-
perimentally validated our theoretical results by showing that an increasing number
of devices significantly weakens the adversary’s ability to successfully manipulate
wireless signals. This is in contrast to prior state-of-the-art where the attacker’s
success probability increases with the number of devices.
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CHAPTER 6
VERIFYING ADS-B NAVIGATION INFORMATION
THROUGH DOPPLER SPREAD MEASUREMENTS
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Motivation
The International Air Transport Association has forecasted that over 7.8 billion
passengers will use air transport annually by 2036 [42]. To cope with the antici-
pated increase in air traffic, the relevant governing bodies around the world have
agreed to a novel air traffic control technology that shifts traffic surveillance from
the uncooperative and independent radar system to a cooperative and dependent
digital one. At the heart of this new technology lies the Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) standard [43]. In ADS-B, aircraft independently
determine their navigation information (location, airspeed, heading, etc.) using
onboard satellite equipment (GPS) [13]. To facilitate air traffic management, this
navigation information is broadcasted to nearby aircraft and ground air traffic con-
trol (ATC) centers.
ADS-B is expected to significantly reduce the cost of traffic control, as radar
systems are expensive to deploy and maintain. Moreover, it will improve aviation
safety by delivering fine-grained navigation information in a timely fashion. Due
to its profound advantages, many aviation carriers have already introduced ADS-B
equipment into their air fleet [116–119]. Despite its critical function, ADS-B does not
integrate strong security mechanisms. The aircraft’s location is verified by ground
stations using a multilateration technique. In this technique, three or more ground
stations compute the time difference of arrival from an ADS-B broadcast to validate
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the claimed aircraft’s position [13]. However, an aircraft has no way of verifying the
ADS-B broadcast of another aircraft.
Researchers have highlighted and even implemented numerous attacks that can
be launched with COTS equipment and rudimentary knowledge [11–13, 120–122].
Costin et al. [13] have experimentally demonstrated the feasibility of replay/injection
attacks on the ADS-B using USRPs and COTS equipment. Sampigethaya et al. [11]
have enumerated various threats in ADS-B such as eavesdropping, radio-frequency
jamming, aircraft impersonation, active manipulation of data, etc. In fact, none of
the fundamental security properties, namely source authentication, data integrity,
data confidentiality and resistance to jamming can be guaranteed under the present
standard. Consequently, ADS-B transmissions can be eavesdropped, spoofed, re-
played, modified, deleted, and jammed [12,13,120,122].
The ADS-B security vulnerabilities can be abstracted to classical cryptography
problems for which solutions are readily available [122]. These solutions require
the introduction of cryptographic primitives. However, implementing cryptographic
solutions at a global scale requires coordination between multiple governing agen-
cies, administrators and operators. Key management operations including key es-
tablishment, key refresh, key revocation, certificate management, etc. introduce
a substantial layer of complexity and cost to the ADS-B standard [123]. More-
over, any recommended changes to the current ADS-B standards, require extensive
retrofitting and upgrade efforts for the already deployed ADS-B equipment. Such
changes involve universal software updates for introducing security modules or even
hardware updated if the deployed solutions require secure hardware.
To cope with these challenges, we examine non-cryptographic solutions for ver-
ifying the navigation information broadcasted in ADS-B. We make the following
contributions.
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6.1.2 Main Contributions and Chapter Organization
We address the problem of verifying the integrity of ADS-B navigation information
without modifying the ADS-B standard. We develop a PHY-layer based method for
verifying the aircraft position and velocity advertised in unencrypted ADS-B frames,
by exploiting the Doppler spread phenomenon. We show that a malicious ground
station cannot spoof a “ghost” aircraft by transmitting ADS-B frames containing
rogue navigation vectors. Defeating our verification method is equivalent to forging
signatures in unbalanced oil and vinegar signature schemes [124].
Chapter Organization: The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.
In section 6.2 gives a brief overview of ADS-B architecture. In Section 6.3, we state
the problem. The method for verifying the integrity of aircraft velocity and position
is presented in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, we evaluate our method via simulations.
Related work is described in Section 6.6 and in Section 6.6.1, we conclude.
6.2 ADS-B Architecture Overview
The ADS-B standard regulates the exchange of broadcast messages between aircraft
and ATC ground stations. An entity can operate as a transmitter, referred to as
ADS-B OUT, or as a receiver, referred to as ADS-B IN (see Figure 6.1). At the
PHY layer, periodic navigation broadcasts are transmitted using either the 978 MHz
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) data link or the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter
(1090ES) data link [125]. The suggested range for ADS-B transmissions reaches
the 90 nautical miles for aircraft-to-aircraft communication and 150 nautical miles
for aircraft-to-ATC communication [125]. It is suggested that ADS-B frames are
transmitted every 0.5 sec.
ADS-B frames are modulated with pulse-position modulation (PPM), with a
pulse length of 1µs. Therefore, ADS-B achieves a data rate of 1 Mbps. ADS-
B frames consist of an 8.0µs long preamble used for frame synchronization and a
56/112 bit payload. The various fields of the payload are shown in Figure 6.2. DF
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Figure 6.1: The ADS-B architecture.
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Figure 6.2: The ADS-B frame format.
refers to the downlink format used to encode broadcast messages. CA indicates if
capability 17 is set for 1090ES. The AA field contains the 24-bit globally unique
ICAO aircraft address. The aircraft navigation information is contained within the
56 bit-long ME field. Finally, the last 24 bits contain a CRC for detecting and
correcting errors.
The ME field consists of the following subfields: (a) flight identification (flight
number call sign)(FI), (c) position (latitude/longitude)(POS), (d) position in-
tegrity/accuracy (GPS horizontal protection limit)(PI), (e) barometric and geomet-
ric altitudes (BGA), (f) vertical rate (rate of climb/descent) (VR), (g) track angle
and ground speed (velocity), (TAGS) (h) emergency indication when the emergency
code is selected (EI), and (i) special position identification when IDENT is selected
(SPI).
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nB = {ℓB, vB}
spoofed trajectory
Figure 6.3: Spoofing aircraft B at A by transmitting ADS-B messages from G.
6.3 Problem Statement and Assumptions
We consider the scenario depicted in Figure 6.3. An aircraft A with navigation
information nA={`A,vA} is within the range of a rogue ground station G. For
simplicity, the navigation information of A contained in the ME field of an ADS-B
frame is abstracted to a position vector `A with Cartesian coordinates {xA, yA, zA}
and a velocity vector vA. The rogue ground station attempts to spoof the existence
of a ghost aircraft B with navigation information nclB, by transmitting a crafted ADS-
B compliant signal from a static location1 `G. Spoofing of B is targeted specifically
at A, whose navigation information is known at G. We address the problem of
enabling A, who acts as the verifier, to reject the nclB transmitted by G, who acts
as the prover. We only consider solutions that do not require modifications to
the ADS-B standard. As a result, cryptographic mechanisms that verify source
authenticity and message integrity cannot be employed. Such mechanisms would
require the re-standardization of the ADS-B protocol, costly redeployment efforts,
and the establishment of a worldwide key management system.
6.4 Velocity and Position Verification
In this section, we propose a verification method for validating the velocity and
position claims included in ADS-B frames. The central idea of our method is to
1We do not consider possible spoofing attacks from airborne adversaries.
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exploit the Doppler spread phenomenon for measuring the relative radial velocity
between the verifier and the prover. We show that it is difficult to manipulate
the maximum Doppler spread measurements performed by the verifier. Using the
relative radial velocity, a verifier aircraft A can check both the velocity and position
claims of a prover aircraft B, which are connected through well-defined kinematic
equations. Figure 6.4 shows the relationship of the position and relative radial
velocity between two aircrafts A and B at k distinct locations. Specifically, let the
magnitude of the relative radial velocity |vB|A| between A and B be:
|vB|A| = |vA − vB| cos θ, (6.1)
where |x| is the magnitude of vector x, and
cos θ =
`A · `B
|`A||`B| , (6.2)
is the angle of the line connecting A and B. The maximum Doppler spread ωD
measured at A is proportional to |vB|A|.
ωD =
2pi|vB|A|fc
c
, (6.3)
where fc is the carrier frequency and c is the signal propagation speed. Hence,
given fc, c, `A, `B, and vA, estimating vB is equivalent to estimating ωD. Doppler
spread estimation has been extensively used in wireless communications for improv-
ing functions at the PHY layer (adaptive coding, modulation, antenna diversity,
power control, handoff [126–128]).
6.4.1 Maximum Doppler Spread Estimation
Several methods have been proposed for estimating the maximum Doppler spread
[129–131]. For our purposes, we have selected the method proposed by Tepede-
lenliog˘lu et al. [131] because (a) it is shown to be more accurate for high-velocity
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Figure 6.4: Position and relative radial velocity at k distinct locations.
vehicles, (b) it is robust to additive white noise, and (c) it relies on channel measure-
ments that are difficult to manipulate and predict. We briefly describe the estimator
in [131], which uses the I/Q components of the channel response h(t) to measure
ωD through
ωD =
√
−2r′′h(0)
rh(0)
, (6.4)
where rh(τ) = E[h(t) ∗ h(t+ τ)] is the autocorrelation function for the channel h(t)
and r′′h(0) is the second derivative of rh at zero. These values are obtained by the
following steps.
Step 1: Compute M + 1 channel correlation estimates
{rˆh(iT )}Mi=0 , (6.5)
by sample averaging the channel h(t) with a sampling period T . That is,
rˆh(iT ) =
∑
j h(jT )h((j + i)T )
αNs − i ,
j = 0, . . . , (αNs − i) (6.6)
The channel samples h(jT ) are computed by sampling Ns symbols of a known signal
(e.g., frame preamble). The value α = Ts
T
denotes the number of samples collected
per sampled symbol, when the symbol duration is Ts. Note that the values of M
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and T are selected such that MT << 1.
Step 2: Compute matrix
A = (LTL)−1LTRH , (6.7)
where
A =

a0
a1
a2
 , L =

00 01 02
10 11 12
...
...
...
M0 M1 M2
 ,
RH =

rˆh(0)
rˆh(T )
...
rˆh(MT )
 .
Step 3: Estimate rh(0) and r
′′
h(0) from:{
r
(n)
h (0) = n!an/T
n
}
, n = 0, 2, (6.8)
where a0 and a2 are obtained from Step 2.
Step 4: Substitute r′′h(0) and rh(0) in (6.4) to estimate ωD.
6.4.2 Verification Process
Using the estimated ωD, the verifier A computes the magnitude of its relative radial
velocity to the prover B. The relative radial velocity is used to verify the claims of
the prover. The verification steps executed by A are as follows.
Step 1: Verifier A receives k ADS-B frames from prover B and records the claimed
positions and velocities included in the payload:
LclB = {`clB(1), `clB(2), . . . , `clB(k)}. (6.9)
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VclB = {vclB(1),vclB(2), . . . ,vclB(k)}. (6.10)
Step 2: For all claimed positions, the verifier A calculates the claimed headings
Θcl:
Θcl = {θcl(1), θcl(2), . . . , θcl(k)}, (6.11)
θcl(i) = cos−1
`A(i) · `clB(i)
|`A(i)||`clB(i)|
. (6.12)
Step 3: The verifier A estimates VestB|A for all received k frames using the maximum
Doppler spread estimation method.
VestB|A = {|vestB|A(1)|, |vestB|A(2)|, . . . , |vestB|A(k)|}. (6.13)
Step 4: The verifier A estimates the velocity of B for each of the k received ADS-B
frames using VestB|A and its own velocity.
VestB = {|vestB (1)|, |vestB (2)|, . . . , |vestB (k)|}. (6.14)
Step 5: The verifier A computes the normalized root mean square error for the
velocity estimator:
RMSEv =
√√√√∑i ( |vclB(i)|−|vestB (i)||vestB (i)| )2
k
, i = 1, . . . , k. (6.15)
In (6.15), the difference in magnitude between the claimed and estimated ve-
locities is normalized to the magnitude of the velocity estimated via the maximum
Doppler spread method.
Step 6: The verifier A calculates the estimated and claimed distance covered in
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interframe time tP , using kinematic equations:
dest(i) =
|vestB (i)|+ |vestB (i− 1)|
2
∗ tP , (6.16)
dcl(i) = `clB(i)− `clB(i− 1), i = 2, . . . , k. (6.17)
Step 7: The verifier A computes the normalized root mean square error for the
distance
RMSE` =
√√√√∑i (dcl(i)−dest(i)dest(i) )2
k
. (6.18)
In (6.18), the difference in magnitude between the distance covered in tp is nor-
malized to the magnitude of the distance estimated from the relative radial velocity.
Step 8: If the RMSEv ≤ γv and RMSE` ≤ γ`, then accept VclB and LclB. Else, reject
them.
We emphasize that in Step 6, we employed kinematic equations modeling
straight-line trajectories for aircraft flying at a constant velocity. This model is
valid when aircraft fly at cruising speed, given the small duration of the verification
process (a few seconds). However, this model may not be accurate during takeoff
and landing. For the latter, a more complex flight trajectory model can be employed.
In this work, we focus on demonstrating the potential of exploiting the PHY-layer
attributes on the verification process, rather than exhausting all possible aviation
situations. The number of ADS-B frames k necessary for robust verification and the
threshold values γv, γ` are system parameters that are empirically tuned depending
on the aviation scenario. We study the impact of both parameters in Section 6.5.
6.4.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we examine if a stationary rogue station G can spoof the trajectory
of a ghost aircraft B while passing the verification process presented in the previous
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section. We examine two possible spoofing methods. In the first method, G selects
a desired trajectory represented by LclB and crafts ADS-B frames that prove LclB to
the verifier A. In the second method, G estimates the maximum Doppler spread
measured by the verifier A at k positions and attempts to find a valid trajectory LclB
that satisfies the estimated relative radial velocities.
Spoofing a desired trajectory LclB: Let G transmit k ADS-B frames, claiming
position and velocity sets LclB and VclB , respectively. First, note that sets LclB and VclB
are not independent, but are bound by the kinematic equations (6.16) and (6.17).
By fixing LclB, the claimed positions translate to a set of relative radial headings ΘclB
according to (6.2). Computation of these headings requires the knowledge of the
trajectory of A. The latter can be predicted based on the navigation information
broadcasted by A, assuming a straight line trajectory with constant velocity during
the expected broadcast of the k ADS-B frames by G. From ΘclB, the rogue station
G computes the magnitude of the relative radial velocities VclB|A that needs to be
estimated by A to pass the verification process. The VclB|A translate to a set of
maximum Doppler spread measurements using (6.3).
The problem of spoofing the desired trajectory LclB reduces to the problem of
spoofing a set of maximum Doppler spread values at A. However, the maximum
Doppler spread depends on the hGA channel, which is not under the control of G.
The only way that G can influence the estimation of hGA at A is by modifying the
preamble x(t) of the ADS-B frames. We now show that spoofing ωspD by altering
x(t) to x′(t) is hard.
Let us consider the transmission of a single ADS-B frame and a desired ωspD
to be measured at A. The rogue station G can estimate hGA(t) using the ADS-B
frames broadcasted by A (hGA(t) and hAG(t) can be considered equivalent due to
the channel reciprocity principle2). G can then alter the amplitude and phase of
the preamble x(t) to x′(t), so that A estimates a desired channel gGA(t) instead of
2The channel reciprocity principle primarily holds for low-Doppler spread channels. However,
several methods exist to compensate for RF impairments in other cases [132].
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hGA(t).
x′(t) =
hGA(t)
gGA(t)
x(t). (6.19)
The problem of backtracking the maximum Doppler spread estimation method
becomes equivalent to finding the channel samples g(jT ) at A that yield the desired
ωspD . This can be attempted via the following steps:
Step 1: Fix rh(0) to any value between 0 and 1. Using the known rh(0), ω
sp
D , fc
and c, calculate r′′h(0) from equation (6.4).
Step 2: Calculate the values of a0 and a2 from rh(0) and r
′′
h(0), respectively, using
equation (6.8). Fix a1 to any value between 0 and 1. This yields matrix
A =

a0
a1
a2
 .
Step 3: Using A and L, calculate RH = A(L
TL)(L)−1.
Step 4: RH yields the M
′ = M + 1 correlation estimates rˆh(iT ) that need to
be computed by A when sampling gGA(t). Each rˆh(iT ) is calculated by averaging
over αNs channel samples (see eq. (6.6)). This forms the following system of M
′
equations and αNs unknowns, which are the samples of the desired gGA(t) at A.
(S)

∑
j g(jT )g((jT )− αNsrˆh(0) = 0
...∑
j g(jT )g((j +M)T )− αNsrˆh(MT ) = 0
(6.20)
The equations in S form a multivariate underdefined quadratic equation system.
The general problem of solving such systems is NP-hard [124], with the best-known
algorithms performing almost equivalently to exhaustive search, even for small values
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of M ′ [124]. The problem difficulty has motivated their use in public cryptosystems.
Specifically, the so called “Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar” (UOV) scheme is
thought to be secure if 3M ′ ≤ αNs ≤ M ′(M ′+2)2 [124]. For a system with M ′ equa-
tions and αNs unknowns, the M
′ variables are said to be the “oil” unknowns and
the αNS −M ′ variables are said to be the “vinegar” unknowns. In our setup, the
number of preamble symbols Ns and the symbol duration Ts are fixed by the ADS-B
standard. Therefore, to satisfy the conditions of a difficult-to-solve UOV system,
we control the sampling period T for each preamble symbol and the number of cor-
relation values M ′ used to estimate the channel in 6.6. These values are fixed such
that 3M ′ ≤ TsNs
T
and Ts
T
Ns ≤ M ′(M ′+2)2 , so that the UOV condition [124] is satisfied.
To spoof the desired Doppler shift ωspD , the rogue ground station has to find a
solution Ψ∗ = {g(Ts), g(2Ts), . . . , g(αNsTs)} for S. However, S has many solutions
Ψ due to its underdefined nature, with only Ψ∗ leading to the computation of ωspD .
Finding Ψ∗ can only be done via exhaustive search, using methods such as the
Levenberg–Marquardt algorithm [133]. For a large number of variables, the size of
the search space is prohibitive for a timely solution. We emphasize that this spoofing
method requires knowledge of the hGA channel for crafting the preamble at G for all
k frames. The channel hGA has been assumed to be known based on the reciprocity
principle (using the ADS-B transmissions of A). However, the channel coherence
time is particularly short (less than 1 ms) due to the high aircraft velocity. Hence,
even if G estimates hAG from A’s transmissions, the hGA channel is expected to
quickly decorrelate from the observed state.
Shifting the central frequency: We now examine if G can spoof a desired tra-
jectory LclB by shifting the central frequency used to transmit the k ADS-B frames.
The idea behind this attack is to exploit equation (6.3) used for converting the
maximum Doppler spread to the relative radial velocity. Similar to the attack of
the previous section, G selects a desired LclB for the ghost aircraft B. By fixing LclB,
the claimed positions translate to a set of relative radial headings ΘclB according to
(6.2). From ΘclB, the rogue ground station G computes the magnitude of the relative
183
radial velocities VclB|A that need to be estimated by A to validate LclB. The problem
of spoofing LclB becomes equivalent to finding a set of central frequencies
F spc = {f spc (1), f spc (2), . . . , f spc (k)},
f spc (i) =
|vcl
B|A|(i)
|vB|A|(i)fc, i = 1, . . . , k. (6.21)
However, equation (6.21) is linear with fc. To change a true relative radial velocity
|vB|A| by p%, the rogue ground station has to shift fc by p%. Because fc = 1090
MHz, even a small shift in fc will cause an uncorrectable frequency offset (FO) at A.
The ADS-B standard specification requires that receivers can tolerate a FO up to
312.5 KHz [125]. This FO value translates to a possible change in the true relative
radial velocity of up to 0.03%. Any larger shifts in the center frequency will render
the ADS-B frame undecodable.
Alternate trajectory for true maximum Doppler spread: An alternate strat-
egy for G, is to spoof a trajectory that is compliant with the true maximum Doppler
spread measured at A over k ADS-B frames. This strategy is possible because the
validation of the prover’s trajectory is performed via the magnitude of the relative
radial velocity. Therefore, there can exist more than one trajectories that yield the
true ωD’s. In this spoofing attack, G first computes the set of relative radial veloc-
ities VestB|A that will be estimated by A, given A’s trajectory and G’s fixed position.
From VestB|A, the rogue ground station G attempts to find a trajectory LclB that yields
VestB|A and satisfies the kinematic equations (6.1), (6.16), and (6.17). Specifically, it
formulates the following overdefined quadratic equation system.
(P )

vestB|A(i) = |vA(i)− vclB(i)| `A(i)·`
cl
B(i)
|`A(i)||`clB(i)|
`clB(i)− `clB(i− 1) = |v
cl
B(i)|+|vclB(i−1)|
2
∗ tP
vclB(1) = v
cl
B(2) = . . . = v
cl
B(k)
The system P has k + 1 unknowns (the k locations in the trajectory LclB plus
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Figure 6.5: The possible spoofed locations of G that satisfy P .
the constant aircraft velocity vclB) and 2k − 1 equations. Finding one solution (but
not necessary for all solutions) to a system of multivariate polynomial equations
is known to be NP-hard [134]. In general, systems with random equations of this
type are not expected to have any solution, and for systems for which one solution
is known to exist, other interference solutions are not expected to exist. In our
context, at least one solution exists, which yields the true location for G. That is,
the trajectory LclB for the spoofed aircraft B degenerates to the static location of G.
By symmetry, it is easy to show that any point lying on a circle passing through
G and centered at the intersection of A’s trajectory with the perpendicular plane,
satisfies P (see Figure 6.5). This is because the headings used for the computation
of the relative radial velocity based on transmissions from G do not change if G lies
at any point of the circle. However, trajectories which degenerate to single points
are of little use to the adversary.
6.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate thresholds γv and γ` used in the position and velocity
verification. We also demonstrate that truthful location/velocity claims pass the
verification process, while spoofed ones are rejected.
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Figure 6.6: (a) RMSEv as a function of k, (b) RMSE` as a function of k, (c)
probability of a successful emulation of a trajectory spoofing attack.
Simulation Setup: We performed our simulations in MATLAB R2014a. Unless
otherwise noted, the prover and the verifier were assumed to fly at a constant cruis-
ing speed of 900 km/h−1 and in opposite directions, while maintaining a constant
altitude (as shown in Figure 6.4). The symbol duration was set to Ts = 10
−6 sec
based on the 1 Mbps transmission rate of ADS-B. We simulated a Rician channel
h(t) between the prover aircraft and the verifier aircraft. We set the K-a factor
of the Rician model to 50, which is appropriate for line-of-sight communications at
high altitude and varied the maximum Doppler shift according to the velocities of
the aircraft. We used Jake’s model to simulate the Doppler spectrum. The channel
h(t) was estimated by the verifier using the 8-symbol preamble of ADS-B frames
(Ns = 8). Finally, we set the sampling period to T = 5 ∗ 10−8 sec (20 samples per
symbol). For system (S) in (6.20), the selected parameters yield an underdefined
system of 16 equations with 16 “oil” variables and 134 “vinegar” variables, which
satisfies the required conditions for the security (S) [124].
Scenario 1: First, we considered a benign scenario in which aircraft B proves its
true trajectory to aircraft A. We measured RMSEv and RMSE` as a function
of the number of ADS-B frames k used for the verification in (6.15) and (6.18).
Two initial distances were considered between the two aircraft; dAB = 130 km
and dAB = 80 km. Figure 6.6(a) shows RMSEv and RMSE`, averaged over 100
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repeated experiment executions. Confidence intervals of 95% are also shown. We
observe that average RMSEv and RMSE` values remain relatively constant with k.
However, the variance is reduced as k increases, leading to a more robust estimation
of the aircraft location and velocity. We further measured RMSEv and RMSE`
as a function of the SNR, when k = 100. Figure 6.6(b) shows a decreasing RMSE
as the SNR improves. The RMSE plots allow us to select the thresholds γv and
γ` used to verify the validity of a location/velocity claim at different SNR regimes,
corresponding to verifications occurring at different distances between the prover
and the verifier.
Scenario 2: In the second scenario, we considered a rogue ground stationG spoofing
a ghost aircraft B at aircraft A. To spoof B, we followed the steps of the security
analysis presented in Section 6.4.3. We selected a straight line trajectory originating
at dAB = 130 km away from A, for an aircraft moving in the opposite direction of
A at 900 km/h. Based on Figure 6.6(a), we set γv = 0.25 and γ` = 0.3. We
used the trajectories of A and B, we computed the headings and relative radial
velocities that need to be spoofed by G. We assumed full knowledge of the hGA
channel at G and formed the underdefined equation system (S) in (6.20). To solve
(S), we used the in-built MATLAB solver fsolve, which employs the Levenberg–
Marquardt curve-fitting algorithm [133] to perform an exhaustive search on the
solution space. We used the set of targeted relative radial velocities as an input seed
into the algorithm. We repeated this process 10,000 times and counted the number
of times that G was capable of finding a solution to (S) that would meet both the γv
and γ` thresholds. Figure 6.6(c) shows the ratio of the successful spoofing attempts
(when both RMSEv and RMSE` are less than the corresponding thresholds) to
the total number of attempts. We denote this ratio as Pr[Success] and plot it as
a function of the number of ADS-B frames used in the verification process. Our
results show that G can spoof a ghost aircraft with low probability. Moreover, this
probability decreases with the number of ADS-B frames used in the verification.
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6.6 Related Work
Prior work on the ADS-B security has primarily focused on highlighting vulnerabil-
ities to well-known attacks in wireless communications. Sampigethaya et al. have
analyzed the security and privacy of ADS-B in the context of an “e-enabled” air-
craft [11]. They defined an adversary model for the aviation domain and enumerated
various RF communications related threats. These threats include eavesdropping,
radio-frequency jamming, aircraft impersonation, active manipulation of data, and
others. They have also proposed a list of system requirements for securing the
ADS-B operation.
Strohmeier et al. surveyed ADS-B attacks that have been reported in recent liter-
ature [122]. Specifically, they discussed eavesdropping, jamming, message injection,
message modification, and message deletion. Moreover, they presented state-of-the-
art theoretical and practical efforts to counter the ADS-B threats. McCallie et al.
also performed a survey on the vulnerabilities of ADS-B and related these vulnera-
bilities to air transportation operation and management risks [16]. They classified
attacks to a taxonomy based on their nature to facilitate the application of possible
solutions.
Costin and Francillon experimentally demonstrated the insecurity of ADS-B us-
ing solely the USRP platform and COTS radio transceivers [13]. By implementing a
practical, low-cost and moderately sophisticated attacker, they demonstrated ADS-
B message replay/injection attacks with relative ease. They also suggested solutions
relying on the integration of lightweight cryptographic mechanisms.
While the threats on ADS-B are well-documented, few solutions exist that mit-
igate such threats. Sampigethaya and Poovendran proposed a group navigation
method for verifying the message integrity of ADS-B IN messages. They presented
a framework in which aircraft are divided into groups according to average veloc-
ity, spatial dependency, and temporal restrictions derived from their trajectories.
Each group is coordinated by a leader, who verifies the position of other aircraft by
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measuring time-difference-of-arrival of ADS-B messages. They further proposed a
security simulation tool concept to visualize and asses the impact of ADS-B vulner-
abilities.
Several researchers have proposed the integration of cryptographic mechanisms
into the ADS-B standard [13,119,135]. Using well-known cryptographic techniques,
ADS-B broadcasts can be authenticated, secured from message modification and
replay, and impersonation attacks. However, such solutions require the costly re-
design of the ADS-B standard and the worldwide deployment of a security infras-
tructure. The cost and security challenges associated with key management and
inter-operability outweigh the potential benefits [123].
Krozel et al. [136] have proposed to use a suite of Kalman filters to reduce
noise within measured ADS-B signals. Noise reduction is intended to identify the
wrong data and reduce the effect of data dropouts. Further, the authors have
proposed integrity check mechanisms for ADS-B data using intent and geometric
conformance. Intent conformance is the process by which the motion of an aircraft is
compared with the broadcasted intent in vertical, horizontal, and speed dimensions.
On the other hand, geometric conformance verifies that the aircraft state lies within
the vertical and horizontal Required Navigation Performance (RNP) limits. For
intent verification, they have proposed a correlation function using the information
included in ADS-B signals. The aircraft state variables are verified independently
by separate uncoupled Kalman filters.
6.6.1 Chapter Summary
We addressed the problem of the verifying the integrity of ADS-B navigation infor-
mation without modifying the ADS-B standard. We proposed a PHY-layer verifica-
tion method that exploits the Doppler spread phenomenon and the short coherence
time of the channel between a prover aircraft and verifier aircraft to verify the ve-
locity claims of the prover. The solution proposed in this work can be applied
independently of the ADS-B standard. We further related the velocity claims to
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location claims through simple kinematic equations. We analyzed the security of
our verification scheme and showed that it is equivalent to solving underdefined
quadratic equation systems which are known to be hard.
This work can be extended to study the security and accuracy of the proposed
method in different adversarial scenarios. A natural extension considers the col-
lusion of multiple ground stations which coordinate their falsified signals to spoof
a ghost aircraft. Intuitively, the fundamental problem of the adversary is that he
is unable to solve the set of underdefined quadratic equations for determining the
signals that need to be transmitted from the multiple ground stations. A more ad-
vanced (and costly) adversary model can consider an airborne attacker that spoofs
ADS-B signals. The set of candidate trajectories that can be emulated by an air-
borne attacker warrant further investigation. Finally, the present work considers
a verification process that occurs at cruising altitude and at cruising speed. The
verification of ADS-B signals during other flight phases, such as takeoff and landing,
requires further investigation.
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CHAPTER 7
SECURE PHYSICAL LAYER VOTING
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Motivation
Distributed wireless networks fundamentally rely on the principle of cooperation.
Nodes often share information to coordinate network functions and improve the
fault-tolerance of distributed operations. As an example, cooperative spectrum
sensing is known to improve the detection of licensed user activity in dynamic spec-
trum access (DSA) [44]. Data fusion is also widely used in wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) for improving the performance of target detection, target tracking, and
distributed sensing [45].
For many cooperative functions, binary voting algorithms increase fault-
tolerance at relative low cooperation overhead. In binary voting, a community of
distributed entities shares binary decisions (“yes” or “no”) on a parameter of inter-
est (e.g., channel state, presence of a target). A combining decision rule is applied
to collectively determine the decision outcome. This rule is based on some form
of majority voting, plurality or threshold, to achieve the desired level of reliability.
Typically, binary votes are casted using a messaging scheme, in which 1-bit votes
are carried by individual messages. However, message-based voting incurs relatively
high voting delay. In this work, we define the voting delay as the time period between
the initiation of the voting process with the transmission of the first vote by any of
the participants, until all votes have been received at the tallier. The tallying time is
not accounted as part of the voting delay. For message-based voting, each 1-bit vote
is carried by a packet that contains PHY layer and a MAC layer headers. Moreover,
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Figure 7.1: The PHYVOS voting scheme.
verifying the voter authenticity and protecting the integrity of binary votes via dig-
ital signatures and message authentication codes, requires additional packet fields.
All additional fields (headers, message authentication codes, digital signature) in-
crease the overall transmission time per vote. Further, voters must sequentially
access the shared wireless channel to cast their votes. Most popular channel access
protocols include anti-collision mechanisms (e.g., backoff process) that further in-
crease the voting delay to cast multiple votes. For time-critical applications, a high
voting delay could be unacceptable [46,47].
As an example, consider the cooperative spectrum sensing mechanism proposed
for DSA networks [44]. To accurately determine spectrum opportunities, secondary
users sense licensed channels and submit state information (“busy” or “idle”) to a
fusion center (FC). The FC applies a combining decision rule (e.g., majority voting)
to reliably determine the state of each channel. Existing federal regulations mandate
that channel sensing must occur every two seconds [46], which leads to the frequent
repetition of the fusion process. At such frequency, the time delay of message-
based voting becomes problematic as the number of participants increases. Similar
time and scalability constraints are encountered in control applications of networked
multi-agent systems, where the consensus time requirement could be even more
stringent [47].
To address the poor delay scalability of message-based voting, we present a secure
and fast voting scheme called PHYVOS that implements voting at the PHY layer.
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The basic principle of PHYVOS is shown in Figure 7.1. Wireless devices exploit
the subcarrier orthogonality in the widely adopted orthogonal frequency division
modulation (OFDM), to simultaneously cast their votes to an FC within just a
few symbols. PHYVOS yields two distinct advantages relative to message-based
voting. First, participants do not have to sequentially access the shared channel to
cast their votes. This feature leads to significant delay savings, as delays due to
contention and sequential access are eliminated. Second, votes do not carry long
headers and cryptographic signatures that prolong the message transmission time.
Therefore, PHYVOS drastically reduces the delay of voting, while maintaining a
high security level. Implementing secure voting at the PHY layer involves new
security and implementation challenges.
• Voting at the PHY layer is susceptible to false vote insertion and vote modi-
fication attacks, similar to message-based voting. An adversary can alter the
voting outcome by exploiting the open nature of the wireless medium and
manipulating the transmitted signals at the PHY layer. Without access to
cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures and message authentica-
tion codes, securing the voting process is particularly challenging.
• The superposition of simultaneous transmissions from spatially-separated
senders (voters) to a combined OFDM signal requires intricate transmitter
and receiver designs [137, 138]. Senders must be synchronized in frequency
and time to achieve symbol alignment at the receiver. Maintaining accurate
synchronization in distributed systems could incur prohibitive coordination
overheads [137].
7.1.2 Main Contributions and Chapter Organization
e design PHYVOS, a PHY-layer voting scheme that reduces the voting delay by
several orders of magnitude compared to message-based voting. In PHYVOS, the
voting delay, defined as the time required to cast votes, is reduced by exploiting
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the subcarrier orthogonality of OFDM to simultaneously cast votes from multiple
participants. Vote tallying is performed at an FC that receives multiple votes as
a single OFDM symbol. We further present a fully distributed version that allows
every participant compute the vote tally, without the assistance of an FC. To over-
come the challenges related to decoding simultaneous transmissions from multiple
senders, binary votes are casted by adding energy to designated subcarriers. No
transmission of preambles and headers is required, as the receiver does not demodu-
late the OFDM signal. Simple energy detection suffices. Moreover, relying on energy
detection rather than message decodability for vote casting strengthens the security
of our scheme, as it is generally hard to “erase” energy from a channel [14,33].
We study the robustness of PHYVOS against an external and an internal ad-
versary. The former attempts to modify votes by inserting energy into various
subcarriers without knowing the subcarrier allocation. The latter is aware of any
group secrets used to assign subcarriers, but not of pairwise secrets. PHYVOS
guarantees the integrity of the voting outcome. We show that an active adversary
who attempts to modify the casted votes, cannot flip the voting outcome at the FC
with overwhelming probability. Also, the adversary cannot inject additional votes
at the FC. We improve voting robustness by incorporating the transmission of mul-
tiple OFDM symbols to cast a single vote, thus realizing a repetition code. Since
OFDM symbols have very short duration, a repetition code is still far more efficient
than messaging. We analytically evaluate the voting robustness as a function of
the relevant system parameters under a secret and an open vote model. We dis-
cuss practical implementation challenges of PHYVOS related to frequency and time
synchronization. We present a prototype implementation of PHYVOS on the NI
USRP platform. We complement the implementation with larger scale simulations
and demonstrate the PHYVOS robustness to external and internal attacks.
PHYVOS is compatible with any wireless standard that is based on OFDM. This
includes 802.11a/g/n/ac, WiMAX, UWB, DVB, and others. PHYVOS requires no
hardware modifications of the OFDM TX/RX circuitry. Participants cast votes by
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transmitting regular OFDM symbols, and the RX can decipher votes at the FFT
module of the OFDM receiver.
Chapter Organization: The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 7.2, we present the system, communication, and adversary models. Sec-
tion 7.3 describes PHYVOS. In Section 7.4, we analyze the security of PHYVOS
under internal and external adversaries. A fully distributed version of PHYVOS
without an FC is presented in Section 7.5. In Section, 7.6, we compare the overhead
of PHYVOS with the overhead of message-based voting. Practical considerations
and experimental verification of PHYVOS’ performance are presented in Section
7.7. In Section 7.8, we discuss related work and conclude in Section 7.8.1.
7.2 Model Assumptions
7.2.1 Entities
The following entities are involved in the voting process:
• The administrator (A) is responsible for initializing the participants and the
tallier with relevant cryptographic quantities, after verifying their identities.
• The M participants u1, u2, . . . , uM cast M votes v1, v2, . . . , vM to the tallier.
Each vote reflects a binary choice.
• The tallier (R) is responsible for verifying and tallying the votes of all the
participants by computing the voting outcome (T ).
• The adversary attempts to alter the voting outcome by injecting his own
signals during the voting process.
In most applications, A and R could be the same entity such as the fusion center
shown in Figure 7.1.
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7.2.2 Voting Model
During the voting process, M participants cast M votes v1, v2, . . . , vM to the tallier.
For ease of illustration, we analyze the case where binary votes are casted, i.e.,
vi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i. The tallier R computes the voting outcome according to a threshold
decision rule.
T =
1, if
∑M
i=1(−1)vi < γ
0, if
∑M
i=1(−1)vi ≥ γ.
(7.1)
The value of γ is application-dependent. As an example, by setting γ = 0, a
plurality rule is implemented. Other values of γ allow for more relaxed or stricter
agreement. The voting process must satisfy the requirements of correctness and
robustness defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Correctness). In the absence of attacks, all votes must be unambigu-
ously recorded and tallied. That is, the voting must be error-free.
Definition 6 (Robustness). A voting scheme is said to be robust against active
attacks and faults, if the estimated outcome Tˆ at the tallier equals the true outcome
T computed by tallying the vote intend of all participants.
Robustness is a weaker requirement than accuracy, because it can be satisfied
even if some votes are incorrectly tallied. However, robustness is sufficient for the
intended applications of PHY-layer voting. We emphasize that other well-known
voting requirements such as receipt-freeness [139], are beyond the scope of the en-
visioned applications of PHY-layer voting.
7.2.3 Communication Model
OFDM priliminaries: Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) is
a multicarrier modulation method adopted by many contemporary wireless tech-
nologies (e.g., 802.11a/g/n/ac/ad, LTE, WiMax, DVB-T) due to its high spectral
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efficiency. The main idea of OFDM is to divide the data stream to substreams,
which are independently modulated in closely separated, orthogonal subcarriers. A
basic block diagram of an OFDM system is shown in Figure 7.2. The data stream
is fed to a serial-to-parallel (s2p) converter to generate N bit streams, where N is
the number of available subcarriers for data transmission. The N streams are mod-
ulated (using BPSK, QPSK, QAM, etc.) and an N -point inverse Fourier transform
(IFFT) is applied on the complex symbols. The IFFT output is fed to a parallel-
to-serial (p2s) converter and further processed by a D/A converter to compose the
baseband OFDM signal. At the receiver, after the downconversion to the baseband
frequency, the analog signal is digitized by the A/D converter. The Fourier trans-
form is applied to recover the complex constellation symbols and the N substreams
are combined by a p2s converter to form the original data stream. The discrete time
domain representation of the baseband OFDM signal x(n) is given by [140]:
x(n) =
N−1∑
k=0
xk(n) ∗ e
j2pink
N , (7.2)
where xk(n) ∈ {α1, α2, . . . , αq} is the complex modulated symbol at each of the N
subcarriers transmitted at time n, and α1, α2, . . . , αq are the possible modulation
symbol values (q denotes the modulation order). By selecting xk(n), the energy that
is injected at each of the N subcarriers can be controlled. This energy is detected at
an OFDM receiver by passing the time domain signal through an FFT. The energy
detection at each subcarrier is the basic PHY-layer function exploited by PHYVOS
for implementing the voting process.
We consider a one-hop communication topology, where every participant is either
within the communication range of the tallier (star topology), or within one hop of
each other (complete graph). Therefore votes are directly casted without a relay.
Participants cast their votes to the tallier using an OFDM system with N orthogonal
subcarriers, denoted by f1, f2, . . . fN . Participants could be at varying distances from
the tallier. Moreover, participants and the tallier are synchronized to a time-slotted
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Figure 7.2: Block diagram of OFDM.
system with a maximum synchronization error of ∆t, which depends on clock drifts
and multipath. Note that time synchronization is already required for other network
functions such as media access control.
Each participant must meet a minimum SNR requirement to cast a vote. This
assumption is also true for message-based voting, where a sufficiently high SNR must
be achieved to perform error-free decoding. As our method relies on energy detec-
tion, no other requirements are placed on the channel model. Different channels
(e.g., AWGN, Rayleigh, Rician) could model the participant-to-tallier communica-
tions. If a participant’s channel has an SNR below the required threshold for vote
detection due to destructive interference, for all practical purposes this participant
is no longer part of the voting. Finally, the channel state is assumed to be difficult
to predict without being very close (within a few wavelengths) of the receiver, and
without the transmission of preambles. This is true for most multipath scenarios,
as it has been demonstrated by several works (e.g., [14, 33,141,142]).
7.2.4 Adversary Model
The adversary aims at flipping the voting outcome Tˆ computed at the tallier. The
adversary could be external or internal. An external adversary is unaware of any
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Figure 7.3: The vote casting phase for M participants voting over N subcarriers
(here N = 2M).
cryptographic primitives used to initialize participants. An internal adversary on
the other hand, is a legitimate participant with access to any group secrets. We
assume that the adversary does not launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that
prevent the computation of any voting outcome (e.g. by eliminating the votes of
every participant). Such an attack is easily detectable. The adversary is loosely
synchronized to the tallier with the same synchronization error as the rest of the
participants. Two different voting models are considered with respect to the secrecy
of the vote intent of each participant:
Secret vote model: In the secret vote model, the adversary is not aware of the
vote intent of the participants.
Open vote model: In this model, the adversary is aware of the vote intent of
the targeted participants. The vote intent can be determined by some side-channel
information. For instance, in a spectrum sensing application for CRNs, the vote
intent of an honest participant can be determined by performing spectrum sensing
on a nearby location.
7.3 PHYVOS: Physical Layer Voting
The key principle of PHYVOS is to simultaneously cast votes by injecting energy
on designated subcarriers. An adversary attempting to modify a vote on subcarrier
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fi, would have to “erase” the signal received by the tallier on fi and simultaneously
inject energy on some other subcarrier. This is generally a hard problem that
requires knowledge of the signal transmitted at fi, the precise time that the signal
was transmitted, the signal propagation delay, and precise channel state information
[14, 33, 143]. This knowledge needs to be collected and synchronized for all voters.
PHYVOS consists of four phases: the setup phase, the vote request phase, the vote
casting phase, and the tallying phase.
7.3.1 Setup Phase
In the setup phase, the administrator initializes the tallier and the M participants.
If the tallier and the administrator are the same entity, only the M participants
need to be initialized. The initialization process is as follows.
Key generation: The administrator A executes a probabilistic key generator
algorithm KeyGen(1τ ) → K. This algorithm takes as input a security parameter
τ , and outputs a master key K. A derives M + 1 additional keys from K with
Kperm = Hperm(K) and Kvote,i = Hvote(K, i) for i = [1..M ], where Hperm and Hvote
are cryptographic hash functions.
Key assignment: A loads Kperm and Kvote,i with i ∈ [1..M ] to R. It also loads
Kperm and Kvote,i to each ui. At the end of the setup phase, R shares one pairwise
key Kvote,i with each ui and a common key Kperm with all uis.
7.3.2 Vote Request Phase
In the vote request phase, the tallier synchronizes all participants for simultaneous
voting. This phase is necessary to ensure that delay overhead gains are achieved
by the simultaneous vote casting. Periodic or on-demand voting can be employed
to request a vote. In periodic voting, participants exploit their synchronization to
a common time-slotted system to cast their votes at fixed time intervals without
an explicit request from the tallier. This operation mode is suitable for periodic
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network operations. In on-demand voting, the tallier broadcasts a vote request
synchronization message to all participants to initiate the voting process.
7.3.3 Vote Casting Phase
During the vote casting phase, participants simultaneously cast their votes to the
tallier. Each vote vi consists of a series of ` symbol votes vi(n0), vi(n0+1), . . . , vi(n0+
`−1) casted over ` consecutive time slots. The ` symbol votes operate as a repetition
code to improve the robustness of vote casting in the presence of an adversary.
To cast a symbol vote vi(n) at the n
th time slot, a participant ui is assigned two
subcarriers f 0ui(n) and f
1
ui
(n). One subcarrier is used to cast a “no” vote whereas
the other is used to cast a “yes” vote. We note that in the absence of an adversary,
a single subcarrier is sufficient to cast a binary vote. However, the adversary could
easily modify the vote that corresponds to energy absence by injecting energy on
the alternative subcarrier. Therefore, we adopt a two-subcarrier solution.
Moreover, the subcarriers assigned to each participant are permuted per time
slot to hide the assignment from the adversary. This is achieved by applying a
pseudo-random permutation on the subcarrier assignment. Finally, for a given as-
signment f 0ui(n) and f
1
ui
(n) to participant ui, the mapping to “yes” and “no” votes is
randomized by the application of a pseudo-random binary sequence shared between
ui and R. This prevents an internal adversary from determining the subcarrier that
corresponds to a specific vote. Formally, vote casting involves the following steps:
1. Subcarrier assignment: Each participant ui applies pseudo-random func-
tion
ΠF : {0, 1}τ × [1..N ]× Z+ → [1..N ],
to map subcarrier with index p during slot n, to subcarrier ΠF (Kperm, p, n).
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Participant ui is assigned subcarriers
f 0ui(n) = fΠF (Kperm,(2i−1),n),
f 1ui(n) = fΠF (Kperm,2i,n).
2. Pseudo-random sequence generation: Each participant ui applies
pseudo-random generator function
Φ : {0, 1}τ × Z+ → {0, 1}
to generate a binary sequence Ri = {ri(1), ri(2), . . .} with ri(n) = Φ(Kvote,i, n).
3. Symbol vote casting: Let voting casting be initiated at slot n0. To cast a
vote vi ∈ {0, 1}, a participant ui generates ` symbol votes vi(n0) = vi(n0+1) =
. . . = vi(n0 + `− 1) = vi. Each vi(n) is represented by an OFDM symbol with
the following values per subcarrier
xk(n) =
αy, f
vi(n)⊕ri(n)
ui (n)
0, otherwise,
(7.3)
where αy is a randomly selected modulation symbol and n0 ≤ n < n0 + `.
Note that the placement of energy of either f 0ui(n) or f
1
ui
(n) is based on the
XOR between the vote value vi(n) and the random bit ri(n).
The vote casting phase for three participants and six subcarriers is shown in
Figure 7.3. In Step 1, participants apply the pseudo-random permutation to obtain
the subcarrier assignment. For the first four time slots, the subcarrier permutations
are {f6,f2,f3,f4,f1,f5}, {f1,f3,f5,f6,f4,f2}, {f3,f1,f6,f2,f5,f4} and {f5,f4,f2,f1,f6,f3}.
Participant u1 is assigned {f 0u1 , f 1u1} : {(f6, f2),(f1, f3),(f3, f1),(f5, f4)}, partici-
pant u2 is assigned {(f3, f4),(f5, f6),(f6, f2),(f2, f1)} and participant u3 is assigned
{(f1, f5),(f4, f2),(f5, f4),(f6, f3)}. In Step 2, each participant ui generates the
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pseudo-random sequence for slots 1 − 4. For u1, r1 = {0, 1, 1, 0}, for u2, r2 =
{0, 0, 1, 1},, and for for u3, r3 = {1, 0, 1, 0},. In Step 3, participants cast votes at
the designated subcarriers. In our example, u1 wants to cast a “yes” vote (v1 = 1).
He XORs v1 with r1 and determines the active subcarriers as {f2, f1, f3, f4} for slots
1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. The active subcarriers for other participants are similarly
determined. The symbol votes arrive (almost) time aligned at the tallier such that
OFDM symbols are formed as shown in Figure 7.3.
7.3.4 Vote Tallying Phase
In the vote tallying phase, the tallier computes the voting outcome T according
to the threshold rule in (7.1). To infer the votes of each participant, the tallier
computes the FFT of the digitized baseband OFDM signal to separate the spectral
components to each of the subcarriers. The tallier then uses an energy detector at
each output of the FFT block to detect the transmitted symbol votes. Note here
that no symbol demodulation is necessary to determine the presence of energy. At
time n, a symbol vote vi(n) is computed only if the detected average power is beyond
a threshold γD on only one of the two designated subcarriers. In any other case, the
symbol vote is recorded in error. Formally, for a participant ui, the recovery of vi
at the tallier is performed as follows.
1. Energy detection: Sample the FFT output of subcarriers f 0ui(n) and f
1
ui
(n)
assigned to ui and compute the average received power over L samples:
p0ui(n) =
1
L
L∑
i=1
|yj(i)|2, p1ui(n) =
1
L
L∑
i=1
|yj+1(i)|2, (7.4)
with n0 ≤ n < n0 + `.
2. Extract symbol votes: The symbol votes vˆi(n) are computed by XORing
the subcarrier superscript were energy was detected with the pseudo-random
sequence shared between ui and the tallier to correctly map the subcarrier
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index to the vote value.
vˆi(n) =

0⊕ ri(n), if p0ui(n) > γD, p1ui(n) ≤ γD
1⊕ ri(n), if p0ui(n) ≤ γD, p1ui(n) > γD
e, otherwise.
(7.5)
with n0 ≤ n < n0 + `.
3. Compute the final vote: The final vote vˆi is computed by discarding all
inconclusive symbol votes.
vˆi =

0, if
∑n0+`−1
n=n0,vi(n)6=e(−1)vi(n) > 0
1, if
∑n0+`−1
n=n0,vi(n)6=e(−1)vi(n) < 0
e, otherwise.
(7.6)
4. Compute the final voting outcome: The final voting outcome Tˆ computed
according to:
Tˆ =
1, if
∑M
i=1(−1)vˆi < γ
0, if
∑M
i=1(−1)vˆi ≥ γ.
(7.7)
The voting outcome Tˆ is estimated by tallying all votes using eq. (7.1), where the
vote values vi have been substituted by their estimates vˆi, i ∈ [1..M ]. The tallying
operation is shown in the example of Figure 7.3. For participant u1, the tallier
detects an average power over γD on subcarriers {f2, f1, f3, f4}. By XORing the
output {1, 0, 0, 1} with the random sequence R1 = {0, 1, 1, 0}, it obtains the symbol
votes vˆ1(n0) = 1, vˆ1(n0 + 1) = 1, vˆ1(n0 + 2) = 1, and vˆ1(n0 + 3) = 1, indicating a
final vote vˆ1 = 1. Similarly, participant u2 uses random sequence R2 = {1, 1, 0, 1}
to compute v2 = 0. The vote computation proceeds in parallel for all participants.
The voting outcome is estimated to be Tˆ = 1.
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7.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of PHYVOS under the external and
internal adversary model.
7.4.1 External Adversary
Under the external adversary model, the adversary is unaware of the cryptographic
keys Kperm and Kvote,i used to permute the subcarrier assignment per time slot and
also randomize the symbol votes. Therefore, his best strategy is to inject energy
on randomly selected subcarriers. Let us consider the vote vi of ui, consisting of
` symbol votes vi(n0), vi(n0 + 1), . . . , vi(n0 + ` − 1),. To successfully cast vi, the
adversary must guess the subcarrier of ui that dictates the vote opposite to vi for
` symbol votes. Even if the subcarrier is correctly guessed, the adversary cannot
“erase” the energy injected by the legitimate participant on the complementary
subcarrier. Erasure of the modulation symbol ay transmitted by ui requires the a
priori knowledge of ay, knowledge of the channel between the voter and the tallier as
well as the adversary and the tallier, and precise synchronization between the voter
and the adversary [143]. We note that ui randomly selects ay for each symbol vote.
Moreover, the channel between ui and tallier rapidly decorrelates with the distance
from ui. Unless the adversary is very close to ui, the channel between ui and tallier
is unpredictable [144].
Without the opportunity to flip votes, the adversary can flip the voting outcome
if he nullifies a sufficient number of in favor votes to overcome the decision threshold
γ. Vote nullification occurs, if energy is present on both subcarriers assigned to a
participants over the ` symbol votes. Let the adversary inject energy on J ≤ N
subcarriers of his choice in order to flip the voting outcome T . Without loss of
generality assume that votes in favor of T outnumber the votes against T by a
voting margin µ. The probability of flipping the outcome to an estimate Tˆ 6= T is
given in Proposition 10.
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Proposition 10. Let participants cast M votes over 2M ≤ N subcarriers by trans-
mitting ` symbol votes. Let an external adversary inject energy on J ≤ N subcarri-
ers. The probability of flipping the voting outcome is
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
Pr[Z = z], (7.8)
where n1 =
M+µ
2
denotes the number of votes in favor of T and n2 = M−µ2 denotes
the votes against T .
Pr[Z = z] =
∑
x
(n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
)((N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
) )`
−
min{n1−x,J−x}∑
w=1
w−z∑
k=0
(
n1 − x
w
)
(
n2 − x+ z
k
)(N−n1−n2−4x+2z
J−w−k−2x+z
)(
N−x
J−x
) )
(
1(
N
J
))`
 . (7.9)
Proof. Let a vote process with M participants lead to a voting outcome T , selected
with a margin µ. Without loss of generality, assume that the votes in favor of T are
“yes” votes. For a margin µ, it is straightforward to show that there are n1 =
M+µ
2
“yes” votes and n2 =
M−µ
2
“no” votes. To flip T through vote nullification, the
adversary must nullify at least µ− γ more “yes” votes than “no” votes to make the
vote difference less or equal to γ.
Let X be a random variable (RV) denoting number of nullified “yes” votes when
the adversary injects energy on J subcarriers on each of the ` voting slots. To nullify
x “yes” votes, the adversary has to pick at each slot those subcarriers that nullify
the “yes” votes of a set of x participants. Similarly, let Y be an RV denoting the
number of nullified “no” votes, when the adversary injects energy on J subcarriers
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on each of the ` voting slots. Let also Z = X − Y denote the excess number of
nullified “yes” votes relative to “no” votes. The pmf of Z can be computed using
Pr[Z = z] =
∑
x
Pr[X = x,Y = x− z]
=
∑
x
(n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
)((N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
) )`
−
min{n1−x,J−x}∑
w=1
w−z∑
k=0
(
n1 − x
w
)(
n2 − x+ z
k
) (N−n1−n2−4x+2z
J−w−k−2x+z
)(
N−x
J−x
) )
(
1(
N
J
))`
 (7.10)
In eq. (7.10), the first term denotes all possible combinations of x subcarriers
that nullify x out of n1 “yes” votes, which fixes the combination of x votes that are
nullified after ` slots. Similarly, it has all possible combinations of x− z subcarriers
that nullify x − z out of n2 “no” votes. This term is multiplied by the number of
ways of choosing J − 2x+ z subcarriers from the remaining N − 2x+ z, and divided
by all possible ways of choosing J subcarriers out of N . The second multiplier is
raised to the power of ` because the subcarrier selection is repeated with every time
slot in an independent fashion. Note that the first multiplier is not raised to the
power of ` because the set of votes to be nullified remains fixed after the first slot.
The second term, excludes all possible combinations of additional “yes” votes and
“no” being nullified due to the selection of the remaining J − 2x + z subcarriers.
This term computes all possible selections of J−2x+z subcarriers in which at least
one subcarrier is assigned to the remaining n1 − x “yes” votes and n2 − x+ z “no”
votes and this subcarrier is present on all the ` slots, multiplied by the probability
of occurrence for each selection.
The probability of flipping the voting outcome is equal to the probability of
nullifying at least µ − γ more “yes” than “no” votes, i.e., Z ≥ µ − γ. Summing
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Figure 7.4: (a) Minimum number of symbol votes ` to guarantee robustness p0 for
an external adversary for va, (b) minimum number of symbol votes ` to guarantee
robustness p0 for µ = 4 and various J .
(7.10) over all z ≥ µ− γ yields,
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] = Pr[Z ≥ µ− γ]
=
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
Pr[Z = z], (7.11)
where Pr[Z = z] is given by (7.10). This completes the proof.
Selecting the Security Parameter `: Proposition 10 allows us to select the
number of symbol votes ` to guarantee robustness with a desired probability p0.
The following corollary yields a lower bound on ` such that Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] ≤ p0.
Corollary 2. For an external adversary, Pr ˆ[T 6= T ] ≤ p0 if
` > d 1
log 1
C1
log
C0
p0
e, (7.12)
where
C0 =
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
((
n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
))
, (7.13)
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C1 =
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
(
N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
) . (7.14)
Proof. We wish to determine the value of ` for which Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] ≤ p0. From (7.11),
it follows that
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
(n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
)((N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
) )`
−
min{n1−x,J−x}∑
w=1
w−z∑
k=0
(
n1 − x
w
)(
n2 − x+ z
k
) (N−n1−n2−4x+2z
J−w−k−2x+z
)(
N−x
J−x
) )( 1(
N
J
))`

<
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
(n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
)((N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
) )`

<
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
((
n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
))min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
((
N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
) )`
<
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
((
n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
))min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
(
N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
)
`
(7.15)
Limiting the right hand side of (7.15) by p0 and solving for `,
` > d 1
log 1
C1
log
C0
p0
e, (7.16)
where
C0 =
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
((
n1
x
)(
n2
x− z
))
, (7.17)
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C1 =
min{n1,J}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,J}∑
x=z
(
N−2x+z
J−2x+z
)(
N
J
) . (7.18)
This completes the proof.
From Corollary 2, we observe that the required number of symbol votes ` drops
linearly with the logarithm of p0. This is also confirmed by Figure 7.4(a), which
shows ` as a function of p0, for a total for 20 participants voting over 52 subcarriers.
In Figure 7.4(a), we set J = 12, γ = 0 (plurality rule) and varied the vote margin
µ. We observe that a relatively small number of symbol votes (` < 5) allows us to
achieve high levels of robustness for relatively small margins.
An obvious tactic for the adversary is to increase the number of attacked sub-
carriers. In Figure 7.4(b), we show the number of symbol votes required to achieve
a desired robustness level for various J , when the vote margin is fixed to µ = 4.
We observe that if small number of subcarriers are attacked, the achieved robust-
ness is high for small `. The adversary’s success increases with J at the expense of
increased presence over the various subcarriers.
To prevent the adversary from flipping the voting outcome via vote nullification,
the tallier can reject the voting outcome if the fraction of nullified votes exceeds
a certain threshold. This threshold can be defined to exceed the expected number
of nullified votes under unintentional interference. In Section 7.7, we explore this
prevention method by determining the pmf for the number of nullified votes due to
the imperfections of the wireless channel. The pmf is used to select the threshold
for rejecting the voting outcome.
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7.4.2 Internal Adversary
An internal adversary could be any malicious participant aiming at manipulating
the voting outcome. Such an adversary has knowledge of the key Kperm used for the
subcarrier assignment. Therefore, it can target particular subcarriers to nullify votes
of certain participants. Note that we do not consider the case where the adversary
compromises the credentials (pairwise keys) of several participants by, for example,
gaining access to the participants’ devices. In this case, the adversary can imperson-
ate the compromised participants and cast votes on their behalf. For all practical
purposes, such impersonations cannot be authenticated using cryptographic meth-
ods, and can only be detected using radio fingerprinting methods. Such attacks are
possible against message-based voting systems as well, and cannot be defended by
standard cryptographic methods of authentication and message integrity.
Modifying a Single Vote: We first analyze the modification of vote vi of a
targeted participant ui. Let ui initiate its voting at time slot n0 by submitting `
symbol votes. Although the adversary is aware of the subcarriers assigned to ui,
he is unaware of the pseudo-random sequences used to map the subcarriers to the
“yes/no” votes. Without access to the pairwise key Kvote,i, the adversary can at
best guess the subcarrier where energy must be injected to emulate a “yes” or a
“no” vote. We consider two possible adversary strategies. In the first strategy,
the adversary randomly selects one of ui’s subcarriers to emulate a target vote.
In the second strategy, the adversary nullifies vote vi by injecting energy on both
subcarriers assigned to ui.
Strategy 1: In the first strategy, the adversary A emulates the voter behavior
by injecting energy to either f 0ui or f
1
ui
. Let A target the casting of vi = 0. To
successfully cast vi, he can guess the subcarrier mapping with success probability
0.5, for every symbol vote. The adversary can still hope to nullify the vote
of ui (i.e., change the value of vˆi(n) from vˆi(n) = vi to vˆi(n) = e). According to
(7.6), to nullify vˆ(i), all symbol votes vˆi(n0), vˆi(n0 + 1), . . . , vˆi(n + 0 + ` − 1) must
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Figure 7.5: Minimum number of symbol votes ` to guarantee robustness p0 (a) under
the secret vote model for Strategy 1, (b) for µ = 4 and various δ, under the secret
vote model and for Strategy 1, (c) under the open vote model for Strategy 2, (d)
under the secret vote model for Strategy 2.
be nullified. This is equivalent to guessing the subcarrier index used by ui to cast
each of the ` symbol votes. As the subcarrier carrying each symbol vote is selected
pseudo-randomly and independently per symbol vote, the probability of nullifying
vˆi becomes:
Pr[vˆ(i) = e] = Pr[vˆi(n0) = e, . . . , vˆi(n0 + `− 1) = e]
= 0.5`. (7.19)
Note that eq. (7.19) is true even if the value of vˆi is known a priori because the
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index of the subcarrier carrying vˆi(n) is XORed with ri(n) (see eq. (7.3)). From
(7.19), we can select ` to drive Pr[vˆ(i) = e] to any desired level.
Modifying the Voting Outcome: We now analyze the probability of modifying
the voting outcome under the secret vote model and the open vote model stated in
Section 7.2.4.
Proposition 11. Let an internal adversary attempt to nullify the votes of δ par-
ticipants and let p = Pr[v(i) = e] denote the probability of nullifying a singe vote,
as given by (7.19). Under the secret vote model, an internal adversary following
Strategy 1 can flip the voting outcome for a decision threshold γ and a margin µ
with probability
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
δ∑
i=µ−γ
HG(n1,M, i, δ)
i∑
z=µ−γ
min {i, δ+z
2
}∑
x=z
(
i
x
)(
δ−i
x−z
)(
δ
2x−z
) B(2x− z, δ, p),
where n1 =
M+µ
2
denotes the number of votes in favor of T .
Proof. Let a vote process with M participants lead to a voting outcome T , selected
with a margin µ. Without loss of generality, assume that the votes in favor of T are
“yes” votes. For a margin µ, it is straightforward to show that there are n1 =
M+µ
2
“yes” votes and n2 =
M−µ
2
“no” votes. To flip T through vote nullification, the
adversary must nullify at least µ− γ more “yes” votes than “no” votes to make the
vote difference less or equal to γ. For an adversary that attempts to nullify a total of
δ votes, the probability that i of them are “yes” votes is given by a hypergeometric
distribution.
Pr[I = i] = HG(n1, N, i, δ) (7.20)
Each vote is successfully nullified with probability p = Pr[vi = e] = 0.5
`. Let
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X be an RV denoting the number of successfully nullified “yes” votes, when x
“yes” votes are attacked. Because the nullification of each vote is an independent
Bernoulli trial (the adversary randomly picks one of the two subcarriers assigned to
each attacked participant), X follows the binomial distribution
Pr[X = x] = B(x, i, p), p = 0.5`. (7.21)
Similarly, let Y be an RV denoting the number of “no” votes that are successfully
nullified. For Y,
Pr[Y = y] = B(y, δ − i, p), p = 0.5`. (7.22)
The probability that the number of successfully nullified “yes” votes exceeds the
number of nullified “no” votes by exactly z votes is given by RV Z = X−Y. The
pmf of Z can be computed using the convolution formula.
Pr[Z = z] =
∑
x
Pr[X = x,Y = x− z]
=
∑
x
Pr[X = x] Pr[Y = x− z|X = x]
=
∑
x
B(x, i, p)B(x− z, δ − i, p)
=
min {i, δ+z
2
}∑
x=z
(
i
x
)(
δ−i
x−z
)(
δ
2x−z
) B(2x− z, δ, p). (7.23)
The probability of flipping the voting outcome is equal to the probability of nullifying
at least µ− γ more “yes” than “no” votes, i.e., Z ≥ µ− γ. Summing (7.23) over all
z ≥ µ− γ yields,
Pr[Z ≥ µ− γ] =
i∑
z=µ−γ
min {i, δ+z
2
}∑
x=z
(
i
x
)(
δ−i
x−z
)(
δ
2x−z
) B(2x− z, δ, p). (7.24)
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Using (7.20) and (7.24), we compute
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
n1∑
i=µ−γ
Pr[I = i]Pr[Z ≥ µ− γ]
=
n1∑
i=µ−γ
HG(n1, N, i, δ)
i∑
z=µ−γ
min {i, δ+z
2
}∑
x=z
(
i
x
)(
δ−i
x−z
)(
δ
2x−z
) B(2x− z, δ, p).
Proposition 12. Under the open vote model, an internal adversary following Strat-
egy 1 can flip the voting outcome for a decision threshold γ and a margin µ with
probability
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
δ∑
i=µ−γ
B(i, δ, p). (7.25)
where δ denotes the number of votes that the adversary attempts to nullify, with
δ ≤ n1.
Proof. Let a vote process with M participants lead to a voting outcome T , selected
with a margin µ. Without loss of generality, assume that the votes in favor of T are
“yes” votes. For a margin µ, it is straightforward to show that there are n1 =
M+µ
2
“yes” votes and n2 =
M−µ
2
“no” votes. Consider a voting outcome T with a margin
µ with the in favor votes be “yes” votes. Under the open vote model, the adversary
only targets subcarriers that are assigned to participants that intend to vote “yes”.
The voting outcome T is flipped if at least µ − γ “yes” votes are nullified. The
adversary successfully nullifies an attacked vote with probability p = 0.5`. As the
success of nullifying each vote is an independent event (the adversary picks one of
the two subcarriers assigned to each attacked participant at random), the number of
nullified “yes” votes when a total of δ “yes” votes are attacked, follows the binomial
distribution with parameter p.
Pr[X = x] = B(x, δ, p), p = 0.5`. (7.26)
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Summing over all values of x ≥ µ− γ yields,
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
δ∑
i=µ−γ
B(i, δ, p), p = 0.5`. (7.27)
The value of δ is smaller or equal to the number n1 of “yes” votes, as there is no
benefit to nullifying “no” votes.
Selecting the Security Parameter `: Propositions 11 and 12 allow us to select
the number of symbol votes ` to guarantee robustness with a desired probability.
Suppose we want to limit Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] ≤ p0. Then, we can select ` to guarantee p0,
as shown in Corollaries 3 and 4.
Corollary 3. For the secret vote model, Pr ˆ[T 6= T ] ≤ p0 if
` >
⌈ 1
log 2
log
δ
∑δ
i=µ−γ HG(n1, N, i, δ)
∑i
z=µ−γ
1
z
p0
⌉
.
Proof. We wish to determine the value of ` for which Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] ≤ p0. From (7.23),
it follows that
Pr[Z = z] =
∑
x
(
i
x
)(
δ−i
x−z
)(
δ
2x−z
) B(2x− z, δ, p) (7.28a)
<
∑
x
B(2x− z, δ, p) (7.28b)
<
δp
z
(7.28c)
In (7.28b), we used the fact that
(
N
n
)(
M
m
)
<
(
N+M
n+m
)
. In (7.28c), we used the Chernoff
bound to limit the tail sum of the Binomial distribution. Substituting to (7.20)
yields,
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] <
n1∑
i=µ−γ
HG(n1, N, i, δ)
i∑
z=µ−γ
δp
z
. (7.29)
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Limiting the right hand side of (7.29) by p0 and solving for p results in
p <
p0
δ
∑n1
i=µ−γ HG(n1, N, i, δ)
∑i
z=µ−γ
1
z
. (7.30)
Substituting p = 0.5` and solving for ` completes the proof.
Corollary 4. For the open vote model, Pr ˆ[T 6= T ] ≤ p0 if
` ≥
⌈ 1
log 2
log
n1
(µ− γ)p0
⌉
.
Proof. The proof follows by using the Chernoff bound to limit the tail probability
of the binomial distribution in (3.5).
From Corollaries 2 and 3, we observe that the required number of symbol votes
` drops linearly with the logarithm of p0. This is also attested by the plots in
Figure 7.5, which show the required ` as a function of p0, for various margins µ and
number of attacked votes δ (to demonstrate the linear relationship of ` with the
logarithm of p0, the ceiling function has not been applied). In Figure 7.5, a total of
20 participants were considered and the voting threshold γ was set to zero (plurality
rule). Finally, δ was set to the number of positive votes.
Figure 7.5(a) considers the secret vote model under Strategy 1. As µ increases,
fewer symbol votes are necessary to provide the same robustness. However, without
knowing the vote intend, the adversary nullifies both “yes” and “no” votes, thus
making it harder to close the vote margin. In Figure 7.5(b), we plot ` as a function
of p0 for different δ and for µ = 4 under the secret vote model. If few votes are
attacked (small δ), the achieved robustness is high for relatively small `. When
δ increases, a larger ` is needed to achieve the same robustness. However, the
adversary’s gains diminish beyond a certain δ. As more “yes” votes are initially
corrupted, the number of remaining “yes” and “no” votes is balanced, thus becoming
equally likely to nullify votes of both types with the increase of δ. Such nullification
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does not close the voting margin. Figure 7.5(c) considers the open vote model under
Strategy 1. Comparing to Figure 7.5(a), we observe that a higher ` is necessary to
provide the same level of robustness when compared to the secret vote model. This
is because the adversary only attacks participants that intend to cast votes in favor
of T .
Strategy 2: In the second strategy, the adversary injects energy on both subcarri-
ers assigned to a targeted participant to nullify the participant’s vote with certainty.
This strategy comes at the expense of increased presence (many subcarriers are at-
tacked). The probability of flipping the voting outcome with Strategy 2 is expressed
in Propositions 13 and 14 for the secret and the open vote models, respectively.
Proposition 13. Under the secret vote model, an internal adversary following Strat-
egy 2 can flip the voting outcome for a decision threshold γ and a margin µ with
probability
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
min{n1,δ}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,δ}∑
x=d δ+z
2
e
(
n1
x
)(
n2
δ−x
)(
M
δ
) , (7.31)
when attempting to nullify δ votes.
Proof. Consider a voting outcome T with a margin µ with the in favor votes be
“yes” votes. Let an internal adversary intend to nullify a total of δ votes. Under the
secret vote model, the adversary is unaware of the vote intend of each participant.
Therefore, the δ votes are selected at random from the total M votes casted by the
participants. Of these M votes, n1 =
M+µ
2
are “yes” votes, whereas the remaining
n2 =
M−µ
2
are no votes. The adversary successfully flips the voting outcome if
at least µ more “yes” votes are nullified relative to “no” votes, when a total of δ
are nullified. Note that under Strategy 2, vote nullification occurs with certainty,
because the adversary injects energy on both the subcarriers assigned to a targeted
participant. This is independent of the number of symbol votes `. Let X and Y be
two RVs denoting the number of nullified “yes” and number of nullified “no” votes,
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respectively. Let also Z = X−Y. It follows that
Pr[Z = z] =
∑
x−y=z
Pr[X = x,Y = y]
=
min{n1,δ}∑
x=d δ+z
2
e
(
n1
x
)(
n2
δ−x
)(
M
δ
) . (7.32)
In (7.32), we used the hypergeometric pmf to account for the selection of x votes
from the n1 “yes” votes and x − z votes from the n2 “no” votes, when a total of δ
votes are nullified. Note that the adversary only targets the subcarriers assigned to
the M participants and ignores any of the unassigned subcarriers if N > 2M (this
is not the case for an external adversary). Also, the difference between x and y is
fixed to be equal to z, independent of the number of nullified votes δ. From (7.32),
we calculate the probability that at least µ more “yes” votes are nullified relative to
“no” votes, by summing over all z ≥ µ.
Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] =
∑
z≥µ−γ
Pr[Z = z]
=
min{n1,δ}∑
z=µ−γ
min{n1,δ}∑
x=d δ+z
2
e
(
n1
x
)(
n2
δ−x
)(
M
δ
) . (7.33)
Proposition 14. Under the open vote model, an internal adversary following Strat-
egy 2 can flip the voting outcome for a decision threshold γ and a margin µ with
certainty, or Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] = 1, when injecting energy in J ≥ µ− γ subcarriers.
Proof. The proof immediately follows by noting that the adversary must nullify
µ − γ votes in favor of T to flip the voting outcome at the tallier. Each of the
µ − γ votes is submitted by injecting energy to one of the subcarriers assigned to
the corresponding participant. Injecting energy in both those subcarriers nullifies
an in favor vote with certainty. Targeting a total of J = 2(µ − γ) subcarriers that
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correspond to in favor votes (the vote intend is known under an open vote model),
nullifies µ− γ in favor votes with certainty, thus flipping the voting outcome.
Figure 7.5(d) shows the probability of flipping the voting outcome as a function
of J for various µ, under the secret vote model. This probability decreases with µ
because the adversary must nullify more in favor votes. Moreover, it increases with
J . Note that the probability of flipping the voting outcome no longer depends on
the security parameter `. This is because the adversary injects energy over both
subcarriers assigned to a targeted participants, and therefore nullifies the targeted
vote with certainty, irrespective of `.
When Strategy 2 is employed under the open vote model, the voting outcome can
be flipped with certainty by attacking a number of votes equal to the vote margin.
This is because the energy injection is limited to the subcarriers of participants that
intend to cast in favor votes. Nullifying µ of those votes is sufficient to close the
voting margin.
Subcarrier sequence preloading: To cope with an internal adversary following
Strategy 2, we design a method for concealing the subcarrier assignment between
participants. Without knowledge of the subcarriers assigned to others, an internal
adversary becomes equivalent to an external one. He can only blindly inject energy
on various subcarriers hoping to nullify in favor votes and flip the voting outcome.
To hide the subcarriers used by each participant, we modify the setup and vote
casting phases as follows.
Setup Phase: In the setup phase, the administrator preloads relevant quantities
to the participants and the tallier.
Key generation: The administrator generates keys Kperm and Kvote,i as described in
Section 7.3.1.
Key assignment: The administrator preloads Kvote,i to each participant ui. The
administrator preloads Kvote,i and Kperm to the tallier.
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Subcarrier sequence preloading: The administrator computes the subcarrier assign-
ment for each participant ui by applying pseudo-random function
ΠF : {0, 1}τ × [1, N ]× Z+ → [1..N ],
to map subcarrier with index p during slot n, to subcarrier ΠF (Kperm, p, n). For
each participant, it computes
Fui = {(f 0ui(1), f 1ui(1)), (f 0ui(2), f 1ui(2)), . . . , (f 0ui(n), f 1ui(n)}
where, f 0ui(j) = fΠF (Kperm,(2i−1),j), and f
1
ui
(j) = fΠF (Kperm,2i,j). Sequence Fui is
preloaded to participant ui
1.
Vote Casting Phase: The vote casting phase remains the same as in Section
7.3.3, with the exception of skipping the subcarrier assignment step. By preloading
the subcarrier sequence at each participant, an internal adversary ui cannot infer
the subcarrier assignment of any other participant. The adversary is only aware
of his own sequence Fui . Without access to Kperm, the adversary can only select
the subcarriers where energy is injected at random. In this case, the robustness of
PHYVOS under an internal adversary model becomes equivalent to the robustness
of PHYVOS under an external adversary, as it is analyzed in Section 7.4.1. Note
that a formula adjustment is needed in Proposition 10 to account for the reduction
in the number of subcarriers unknown to the adversary. Since ui is aware of his own
subcarrier assignment, it selects to inject energy to J out of the remaining N − 2
subcarriers (as opposed to J out of N as stated in Proposition 10). Nevertheless,
the robustness computation follows along the same lines as in Proposition 10 and
therefore, it is omitted.
The subcarrier sequence preloading comes at the expense of extra storage at each
participant, which is linear to the number of voting rounds. The storage required to
1If preloading is not possible, the sequence Fui can be generated by the tallier that stores
Kperm. The tallier can securely communicate Fui to a participant using Kvote,i.
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Figure 7.6: The PHYVOS distributed voting scheme. Wireless devices cast their
votes to each other using orthogonal subcarriers. Each participant tallies all votes
and computes the voting outcome.
support L voting rounds with ` symbol votes per round is equal to 2dlog2Ne`L bits
(each voting round consists of ` symbol votes casted in one of the two subcarriers
indexed by 2dlog2Ne bits). For example, a sequence of 80 Kbytes would support
105 voting rounds over 64 subcarriers.
7.5 Voting Without a Centralized Tallier
In this section, we design an implementation of PHYVOS without a centralized
tallier. The scenario is depicted in Figure 7.6. A set of six participants co-located
within the same collision domain cast their votes. Each participant acts as a tallier
by independently tallying the votes casted by other participants and computing the
voting outcome. All participants end up with the same voting outcome estimate
Tˆ . To maintain the parallel nature of our PHY-layer voting technique, participants
must be capable of simultaneously cast votes and performing the tallying operation.
This entails the simultaneous transmission and reception over the OFDM band,
that is the operation of each participant in full duplex (FD) mode. We outline two
transceiver solutions that enable this concurrent transmission and reception. The
first solution exploits self-interference cancellation (SIC) techniques to enable the
FD mode. The second solution explores principles similar to OFDMA to allow for
the simultaneous vote casting from multiple participants
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7.5.1 Full Duplex OFDM
Recent advances on SIC techniques have shown that it is feasible to transmit and
receive over the same frequency band [145, 146]. This is achieved by suppressing a
significant portion of self interference, using a combination of antenna-based SIC,
signal inversion, and RF/digital interference cancellation. In these techniques, the
transmitted signal is subtracted from the received signal such that the former does
not occupy the dynamic range of the ADC, allowing for the decoding of the incoming
signal. For OFDM systems, FD can be realized by independently reducing self-
interference at each subcarrier using narrowband cancellation techniques [146,147].
The operating characteristics of PHYVOS, make the adoption of SIC based FD
OFDM easier than its use for the communication of messages. First, each transmit-
ter injects a signal on a single subcarrier, leaving the rest of the subcarriers empty.
Thus, the self-interference in other subcarriers is small and primarily limited to the
adjacent subcarriers. Applying SIC on the specific subcarrier used to cast a vote
further reduces the interference on other subcarriers. Moreover, no signal decoding
is necessary. Determination of votes is performed by detecting energy at the output
of the FFT block. An imperfect cancellation at subcarrier f jui used by a participant
ui to cast a vote vi does not affect the tallying of vi at ui. Participant ui is already
aware of his own voting intend and does need to decode the symbol transmitted on
f jui to determine vi.
7.5.2 OFDMA
If participants are not equipped with SIC-capable transceivers, FD operation can
be achieved by applying OFDMA. Assuming that the transceivers can concurrently
operate their transmission and reception radio chains, they can rely on frequency
separation to enable the simultaneous vote transmission and reception. Using the
adjacent subcarrier method (ASM) [148], participants can form subchannels from
adjacent subcarriers so that additional frequency separation is created. In partic-
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ular, each subchannel consists of three adjacent subcarriers. To cast a vote on a
subchannel, energy is injected on the middle subcarrier, using the adjacent subcar-
riers as guards. Although this approach limits the spectral efficiency of OFDM by
essentially converting it to a FDD system, it still provides significant delay reduction
for PHY-layer voting relative to message-based voting.
7.5.3 Decentralized PHYVOS
Similar to the centralized tallier scenario, the decentralized PHYVOS consists of
four phases: the setup phase, the vote request phase, the vote casting phase, and
the tallying phase.
Setup Phase: In the setup phase, the administrator initializes all M participants
by preloading Kperm to each participant. Note that the pairwise keys Kvote,i used
for sharing a pairwise secret random sequence between each voter and the tallier
are no longer used. The sequences were applied to each symbol vote to conceal
the vote-to-subcarrier mapping from internal adversaries (Step 3 of the vote casting
phase). When the tallier is replicated at every participant, all sequences Ri must be
disclosed to participants, thus negating their security function.
Vote Request Phase: The vote request phase follows the same steps described in
Section 7.3.2.
Vote Casting Phase: In the vote casting phase, participants cast and receive
votes simultaneously using FD-OFDM. Each vote vi consists of a series of ` symbol
votes. The vote casting steps are as follows:
Subcarrier assignment: The subcarrier assignment is performed in the same
manner as in Section 7.3.3.
Vote casting: Let voting casting be initiated at slot n0. To cast a vote vi ∈ {0, 1},
a participant ui generates ` symbol votes vi(n0) = vi(n0 +1) = . . . = vi(n0 +`−1) =
vi. Each vi(n) is represented by an OFDM symbol with the following values per
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subcarrier
xk(n) =
αy, f
vi(n)
ui (n)
0, otherwise,
(7.34)
where αy is a randomly selected modulation symbol and n0 ≤ n < n0 + `. Note
that the placement of energy of either f 0ui(n) or f
1
ui
(n) is solely based on the value
of vi(n).
Vote Tallying Phase: In the vote tallying phase, each participant ui individually
computes the votes of other participants by applying Steps 1-4 outlined in Sec-
tion 7.3.4. The only difference is in the application of Step 2 for extracting symbol
votes. Eq. (7.5) is modified as follows to omit the XORing of the symbol votes with
the pseudo-random binary sequence.
vˆi(n) =

0, if p0ui(n) > γD, p
1
ui
(n) ≤ γD
1, if p0ui(n) ≤ γD, p1ui(n) > γD
e, otherwise.
(7.35)
7.5.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we briefly sketch the robustness of PHYVOS with a decentralized
tallier under an external and internal adversary model.
External adversary: An external adversary is unaware of the cryptographic key
Kperm used to permute the subcarrier assignment per symbol vote. Therefore, his
best strategy is to inject energy on randomly selected subcarriers. Let the adversary
inject energy on J subcarriers, as in the case of centralized PHYVOS. Consider the
tallying operation occurring at participant ui. By injecting energy on J subcarriers,
the adversary can potentially impact any vote but vi, because vi is known to ui a
priori. If vi is in favor of the voting outcome T , the adversary has to successfully
nullify µ − γ votes excluding vi in order to flip Tˆ . This probability is given by
Proposition 10 by adjusting the number of in-favor votes that can be nullified to
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n1 =
M+µ
2
− 1. If vi is against the voting outcome T , the probability of flipping the
voting outcome is given by Proposition 10, without adjusting n1.
Internal adversary: An internal adversary is aware of cryptographic key Kperm
used by each participant for generating its subcarrier assignment. This allows the
adversary to identify the subcarriers used by specific participants to cast votes.
Moreover, the subcarrier-to-vote mapping is known because it is no longer random-
ized by the pairwise secret sequences Ri. The application of these sequences is no
longer effective because every participant must be aware of them to correctly tally
votes. With full knowledge of the subcarrier assignment, flipping the voting out-
come can be achieved by nullifying µ− γ in-favor votes by targeting exactly µ− γ
subcarriers.
Although the tally modification cannot be prevented, it is easily detectable by
legitimate participants. In-favor participants can determine that their votes are nul-
lified by detecting energy on the opposite subcarrier from the active one. Moreover,
the number of nullified votes received by each participant (tallier) is indicative of
an ongoing tally modification. In this case, the voting results can be invalidated.
7.6 Voting Overhead
In this section, we compare the voting delay of PHYVOS with the voting delay of
message-based voting. Suppose a popular OFDM-based protocol such as 802.11g
is used for message-based voting (MV). Each 802.11g packet consists of a 20 µsec
preamble (5 OFDM symbols), a 30-byte MAC header and a 4-byte CRC code.
Moreover, the vote integrity is protected by a message authentication code based
on a secure hash function such as SHA-256 [103]. The message digest size for
SHA-256 is 32 bytes. Assuming the highest possible transmission rate for 802.11g,
each OFDM symbol can carry 6 bits per subcarrier, times 48 data subcarriers =
36 bytes. Therefore, one vote can be transmitted in 7 OFDM symbols. Ignoring
any contention for capturing the wireless medium, participants must wait at least
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a DCF interframe space (DIFS) between transmitting messages. For 802.11g, DIFS
= 13 OFDM symbols. The total delay required to cast M votes becomes
DMV = 20M − 13 OFDM symbols. (7.36)
In PHYVOS, up to 26 participants can simultaneously cast their votes using `
OFDM symbols (for 52 subcarriers and no pilots). For M > 26, a second voting
round is required. The value of ` is based on the analysis presented in Section 7.4.
For our comparison, we set ` = 11 symbols, which yields a robustness level of 10−3
(we note that this is an online attack, without any opportunity for repeated trials.
Therefore, a robustness of 10−3 is acceptable). The total delay required to cast M
votes becomes,
DPHY V OS =
⌈M
26
⌉
` OFDM symbols. (7.37)
Figure 7.7 shows the voting delay as a function of the number of participants M ,
assuming a typical OFDM symbol duration of 4µsec. PHYVOS reduces delay by
one order of magnitude for M = 11 and two orders of magnitude for M = 50. Note
that for M = 26, the MV incurs a delay of at least 2 sec.
We note that in most modern OFDM systems the number of available subcarriers
could be substantially higher than 52. For instance, the number of subcarriers in
LTE exceeds 300 and can reach up to 1,200 when the allocated bandwidth is 20 MHz.
Therefore, a much larger number of participants can be simultaneously supported,
although we do not anticipate that this number will be large for one-hop scenarios.
In the event that multiple rounds are needed to accommodate the number of voting
participants, the individual delay until a each participants casts its vote does not
affect the voting delay, which is defined as the delay until all votes are casted. If an
application requires rectifying the unfairness in the individual voting delay, a round
robin approach can be used to alternate between voting groups on every voting
round.
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Figure 7.7: Voting overhead as a function of M for message-based voting (MV) and
PHYVOS.
7.7 Practical Considerations and Implementation
7.7.1 Frequency Synchronization
Radio oscillators do not operate at the same nominal frequency due to manufacturing
imperfections. This frequency misalignment is known as carrier frequency offset
(CFO). OFDM systems are particularly sensitive to CFO due to the subcarrier
orthogonality requirement. The CFO has two critical effects on demodulation. First,
subcarriers are no longer orthogonal causing inter-carrier interference (ICI) and
reducing the SNR. Second, symbols at each subcarrier appear arbitrary rotated in
the constellation. Finally, a large CFO can cause a subcarrier shift at the receiver,
whereby a symbol transmitted over subcarrier fi is mapped to fj. This shift occurs
if the CFO is larger than the subcarrier spacing [149,150].
To mitigate the impact of CFO in practical systems, receivers estimate the CFO
using the preamble transmitted with every packet. In PHYVOS, no preamble is
present with the transmission of votes to save on messaging overhead. However,
the lack of frequency synchronization does not impact the correct vote estimation,
because no demodulation is performed. Any symbol rotation in the constellation
map does not affect the energy estimation on a given subcarrier. After all, the
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Figure 7.8: (a) Increasing the CP, (b) casting a symbol vote in two symbol durations.
symbol transmitted to realize a vote is selected at random and does not convey
any information. Furthermore, for a CFO that does not cause a subcarrier bin
shift, the strongest ICI component comes from adjacent subcarriers. To limit ICI,
the subcarriers assigned to each participant can be spaced as far as the number
of participants allows. For instance, for 10 voters and 64 subcarriers, every 3rd
subcarrier is used to cast a vote.
7.7.2 Time Synchronization
Another practical problem for PHYVOS is that symbol votes do not reach the tallier
perfectly synchronized. Differences in propagation delay and device clock drifts can
cause a time misalignment between the symbol votes casted by each device. This
misalignment will affect the set of samples that fall within the FFT window of the
Fourier transform applied at the receiver for extracting the spectral components of
the OFDM signal. This is similar to symbol bleeding caused in OFDM systems when
delayed copies of OFDM symbols arrive at the receiver due to multipath effects.
The solution applied in OFDM is to append a cyclic prefix (CP) to every symbol,
which is in the order of 0.8 µsec.
For PHYVOS, the time misalignment ∆t between symbols at the receiver can
be greater than 0.8 µsec. For a typical WiFi range of 300m, the propagation delay
difference between two devices can by up to 1µsec. Moreover, the typical clock error
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Figure 7.9: (a), (b) Normalized average received power per subcarrier, (c), (d)
received power per subcarrier as a function of time.
for modern clocks is well below 5ppm [151]. If clock synchronization is performed
every 100msec (typical beacon transmission period for WiFi base stations), the
expected clock error between two devices can be up to 1µsec, making the total time
misalignment ∆t ≤ 2µsec.
To cope with the symbol misalignment, we can extend the CP duration to 2µsec
to account for the maximum expected ∆t. The increase in CP comes at the expense
of a higher overhead to cast a symbol vote (5.2 µsec vs. 4 µsec). Note that the
increased CP duration is adopted only for vote casting and is not part of the normal
OFDM operation for data transmissions. Alternatively, to maintain compatibility
with the current OFDM specifications, we can extend the symbol vote duration to
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two OFDM symbols, without increasing the CP duration. This solution comes at
the expense of doubling the overhead for casting a symbol vote. A similar solution
was adopted in [138]. The two solutions are shown in Figure 7.8.
7.7.3 PHYVOS Implementation
Testbed setup: We implemented PHYVOS on NI USRPs 2921 devices, operating
in the 2.4 GHz band over a 39.6 MHz spectrum. A total of four radios were at our
disposal. Under normal operation, three radios operated as voters, whereas one radio
operated as the tallier. One radio was switched to an attacker role for adversarial
scenarios. Voter radios were placed in a LoS configuration at varying distances from
the tallier within an office environment. We divided the 39.6 MHz spectrum to 64
subcarriers. To cast a symbol vote, each radio used BPSK modulation to transmit
a random symbol at the designated subcarrier. The CP value was set to 0.8 µsec,
as the time synchronization error between the different radios was relatively small.
We used a 64-point FFT to collect the symbol votes from each subcarrier. The
transmission power of each radio was set to 20 dBm (0.1 W).
Selection of threshold γD: In the first experiment, we investigated the selection
of the power threshold γD used in eq. (7.5) for detecting votes. We assigned the 1st,
5th, and 9th subcarrier to each of the three voter radios. Each voter casted 1,000
symbol votes at its designated subcarrier by transmitting 1,000 BPSK symbols. The
rest of the subcarriers remained null. A time gap of100 msec was imposed between
two consecutive votes. Figure 7.9(a) shows the normalized magnitude of the FFT
output at the tallier, averaged over the 1,000 transmitted symbols when the three
voters are placed 5ft away from the tallier (topology A). Figure 7.9(b) shows the
same results when the three voters are at 5ft, 10ft, and 15ft away from the tallier
(topology B).
Figure 7.9(c) and 7.9(d) show the received power as a function of time for 100
consecutive symbols. For topology A, the power of active subcarriers is approxi-
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mately -42dBm, whereas the power of null subcarriers is -90dBm. The recorded
-90dBm value for the null subcarriers is well above the noise floor due to the op-
eration of nearby devices over the ISM band. For topology B, the received power
from the farthest radio dropped to -49dBm. Based on the recorded values, we set
the threshold γD for the detection of a symbol vote to -80dBm, which is well above
the receiver sensitivity.
Time synchronization: In the second experiment, we studied the effect of time
synchronization on the correct operation of PHYVOS. The experimental setup is
shown in Figure 7.10(a). We used one USRP as the FC, while three USRPs were
setup as voting participants. We set the CP value to 2.0µsec, the FFT window
to 1.2µsec, and varied the time synchronization error between the participants.
This was achieved by adjusting the firing times of the USRP devices for symbol
transmissions, while the USRPs were placed at different distances from the FC. The
three participants u1, u2, u3 were placed as follows: u1 was placed at 15ft from the
FC with a LoS channel, u2 was placed at 10ft from the FC with a LoS channel,
whereas u3 was placed at 5ft from the FC, but with an obstruction on the LoS
path. This created different profiles of synchronization offset for different users
due to multipath and also clock errors. For each synchronization offset (∆t), we
transmitted 106 votes.
Further, we performed the experiment for two subcarrier allocations. In the first
allocation, the USRP devices were assigned non-adjacent subcarriers, (1,2), (9,10),
and (15,16) for submitting yes/no votes. In the second allocation, USRPs were
assigned adjacent subcarriers (1,2), (3,4), and (5,6). In Figure 7.10(b), we show the
fraction of erroneously received votes as a function of the maximum synchronization
error ∆t between any two devices. We note that as long as the CP duration is larger
than ∆t, votes are correctly inferred despite the symbol misalignment. The scenario
with non-adjacent subcarriers achieves slightly better performance, as the sample
misalignment does not impact adjacent votes.
We repeated the above experiment for the topology of Figure 7.10(c), where u3
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Figure 7.10: (a) The USRP topology used to evaluate the effect of time synchro-
nization, (b) fraction of erroneously decoded votes at the receiver as a function of
the synchronization error (∆t) between participants, c) the USRP topology used to
evaluate the effect of NLoS paths, and (d) fraction of erroneously received votes as
a function of the synchronization error (∆t) for the topology of Fig 7.10(c).
was placed on the outside of the room that housed the FC, thus obstructing the
LoS path. In Fig 7.10(d), we show the fraction of lost votes as a function of ∆t. We
observed similar results to the performance under the topology of Figure 7.10(a),
indicating that the use of a longer CP alleviates the misynchronization phenomenon
even for NLoS channels.
Voting in the presence of an internal adversary: In the third experiment, we
implemented Strategy 1 for an internal adversarial. One of the three USRPs was
assigned the role of an internal attacker that is aware of the subcarrier assignment to
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Figure 7.11: (a) Probability of tallying the correct vote v(i), having an inconclusive
vote e, or flipping the vote to comp(v(i)), and (b) probability of tallying the correct
vote v(i), having an inconclusive vote e, or flipping the vote to comp(v(i)).
other voters. Voter #1 was assigned the 1st and 2nd subcarrier while voter #2 was
assigned the 5th and 6th subcarrier. For each symbol vote, the attacker randomly
selected one subcarrier per voter and injected a random symbol in order to nullify or
flip the casted vote (Strategy 1). The experiment lasted for 106 symbol votes. Figure
7.11(a) shows the probability of tallying the correct vote v(i), having an inconclusive
vote e, or flipping the vote to comp(v(i)), as a function of the security parameter `
for topologies A and B. The theoretical values for tallying the correct vote v(i), and
having an inconclusive vote e are also shown (solid lines). The theoretical values
are computed according to equation (7.19).
We observe that the experimental values are in close agreement with the theoret-
ical ones. As expected, the probability of tallying the correct vote rapidly converges
to one with the increase of `, whereas the probability of an inconclusive vote becomes
small (zero for ` > 8). In our experiments, some votes were actually flipped indicat-
ing a drop in the received power on a designated subcarrier to a value smaller than
γD for ` consecutive symbol votes. However, this occurred with very low probability
and was not observed at all when ` > 2. The results were similar for topology B
(see Figure 7.11(b)), with a slight increase in the probability of flipping a vote. This
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was primarily observed due to the near-far effect for the most distant voter (placed
at 15ft from the tallier).
7.7.4 Simulated Experiments
The USRP experiments involved a small number of devices and were primarily used
to study the implementation nuances of simultaneous vote casting. In this section,
we perform simulated voting experiments with a large number of participants.
Simulation setup: We simulated PHYVOS using MATLAB R2015B [152]. We
initially considered 26 participants casting votes over 52 subcarriers to a FC. We
repeated some experiments for 100 participants. The wireless channel between the
tallier and each participant was simulated by a Rician fading model with maximum
path delay 1.5×10−6 sec, a K-factor equal to two, and a LoS SNR equal to 15dB. The
Rician channel was selected because it is representative in many one-hop topologies.
To cast a symbol vote, participants randomly selected a QPSK symbol. The symbol
vote detection threshold γD was set to -80 dBm. A plurality vote criterion (γ = 0)
was applied to compute the voting outcome.
Vote nullification due to channel imperfections: In the first set of experi-
ments, we measured the probability of unintentional vote nullification due to wire-
less channel imperfections. In the absence of an adversary, we varied the SNR of the
participant-tallier channel and measured the number of nullified votes at the tallier.
Each vote consisted of three symbol votes. Figure 7.12(a) shows the CDF of the
nullified votes for different SNRs. We observe that even at low SNR values (≤ 10
dB), less than four out of the 26 votes are nullified due to fading, with probability
over 95%.
We also measured the number of unintentionally nullified votes due to CFO and
time offsets. These effects are discussed in Section 7.7.1 and 7.7.2. Each participant
was randomly assigned a CFO of either 0 KHz or CFOmax. We opted to combine
participants with and without CFO to allow the maximum frequency misalignment
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between certain subcarriers at the tallier. Figure 7.12(b) shows the CDF of the
nullified votes for various CFOmax. For typical CFO values, less than two out of
26 votes are nullified in 95% of the observed runs. Vote nullification occurs when a
sufficient amount of energy is leaked to adjacent subcarriers due to the CFO. The
effect of the CFO can be mitigated if the tallier compensates for it before vote tally-
ing. The tallier can record the CFO of each participant using the preambles of prior
packet transmissions. Note that CFO estimation must be repeated infrequently, as
it varies very slowly with time.
Furthermore, we simulated the impact of time synchronization errors caused by
the misalignment of symbol votes due to time offsets (∆t). Each participant was
assigned a time offset of either 0 µsec or ∆tmax µsec at random. The tallier used the
two symbol vote estimation technique outlined in Section 7.7.2 to compensate for
the symbol time misalignment. Figure 7.12(c) shows the CDF of the nullified votes
for varying ∆tmax. We observe that two symbols for the symbol vote estimation
eliminates the impact of misalignment.
In Figure 7.12(d), we show the CDF of the nullified votes when fading, CFO,
and time misalignment are all present in the same experiment. We observe that
under typical values (SNR = 15dB, CFO = 25kHz and ∆t = 1 µsec), less than
one votes are nullified, on average, with probability over 95%. In worse conditions
(SNR = 5dB, CFO = 100kHz and ∆t = 1.5 µsec), less than six votes are nullified
with probability over 95%. This CDF shift is primarily due to the low SNR. We
use Figure 7.12(d) to set the threshold γnull to six votes. Recall that γnull is used
to detect the presence of an adversary if an unusual number of votes are nullified at
the tallier.
Finally, we performed a simulated experiment to evaluate the effects of various
channel models on vote correctness. We measured the number of erroneously re-
ceived votes at the FC for an AWGN channel, a Rayleigh channel with a maximum
path delay of 1.5µsec, a Rician channel with a K factor of 2, and a maximum path
delay of 1.5µsec and a Nakagami-m channel with fading factors 0.5 and 10. A total
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Figure 7.12: (a) CDF plot of number of nullified votes due to wireless channel noise
for varying channel SNR, (b) CDF plot of number of nullified votes received due to
carrier frequency offset error for varying CFO, (c) CDF plot of number of nullified
votes received due to synchronization error for varying time offset, and (d) CDF of
the nullified votes when the fading, CFO, and time misalignment phenomena are all
combined in the same experiment.
of 106 votes per participant were transmitted. In Figure 7.13, we show the fraction
of erroneous votes received at the FC as a function of the transmit power in dBm. It
can be observed that the vote error remains below 10−5 for all transmit powers and
it drops with the power increase. The Nakagami-m channel with a fading factor
of 0.5 yields the worst performance, but the error is still quite low and does not
significantly affect the energy-based vote detection.
Effect of varying participant distances: In this scenario, we placed two par-
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Figure 7.14: (a) Energy assignment to subcarriers for all voting combinations, and
(b) probability of votes received incorrectly plotted against normalized power of
votes received for all possible voting combination.
ticipants at different distances from the tallier in order to vary the received power
ratio between subcarriers at the tallier. We considered the subcarrier assignments
shown in Figure 7.14(a). Votes of type A represent cases where two participants
inject energy on subcarriers separated by a single subcarrier, votes of type B rep-
resent cases where the subcarrier separation is equal to two, whereas votes of type
C represent cases where the two participants inject energy on adjacent subcarriers.
Figure 7.14(b) shows the probability of vote nullification for any of the two partic-
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ipants as a function of the power of the more distant participant, normalized over
the power of the closest participant. The probability of vote nullification remains
low even when the power of the distant participant is half of the power of the closest
one. Votes of type A have the highest probability of being nullified, because energy
from two active subcarriers “bleeds” into a common adjacent empty subcarrier. On
the other hand, votes of type B and C exhibit the same probability of vote nulli-
fication, because only one active subcarrier “bleeds” into an inactive one. As the
transmission powers between the participants become equal, the probability of vote
flipping attains very low values.
External adversary: In the third set of experiments, we evaluated the robustness
of PHYVOS against an external adversary. The adversary attempted to flip the
voting outcome by injected energy to J randomly selected subcarriers. The tallier
used the threshold γnull to detect an ongoing attack, if a large number of votes
are nullified. We also fixed the number of symbol votes to ` = 3 and the voting
margin to µ = 3. Figure 7.15(a) shows the tradeoff between probability of flipping
T and rejecting the voting round as a function of J . As J increases, the probability
of flipping the voting outcome improves for the adversary until J equals 3/4 of the
available subcarriers. Any further increase of J has a negative effect. This is because
the adversary nullifies votes that oppose the voting outcome. On the other hand, the
probability of rejecting the voting round strictly increases with J . For the value of
J that maximizes the probability of flipping the voting outcome (Pr[Tˆ 6= T ] = 0.1,
for J = 3N
4
), the voting round is rejected with probability 94.2%.
To verify that PHYVOS is scalable, we repeated the simulated experiments for
100 participants who casted votes over 52 subcarriers. As there are only 52 sub-
carriers available, the participants were divided to three groups of size 26 and one
group of size 22. Participants of the same group casted their votes simultaneously
using ` symbol votes, requiring a total of 4` symbols to complete a voting round.
Figure 7.15(b) shows the tradeoff between probability of flipping T and rejecting
the voting round as a function of J . We observe that the increased number of
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Figure 7.15: (a) Probability of flipping voting outcome and rejecting a voting round
as a function of the number of attacked subcarriers (J) in presence of an external
adversary, and for 26 participants, (b) probability of flipping voting outcome and
rejecting a voting round as a function of the number of attacked subcarriers (J) in
presence of an external adversary, and for 100 participants, (c) probability of flipping
the voting outcome as a function of the number of symbol votes (`) in presence of
an internal adversary, and for 26 participants, and (d) probability of flipping the
voting outcome as a function of the number of symbol votes (`) in presence of an
internal adversary, and for 100 participants.
participants does not qualitatively affect the robustness of PHYVOS.
Internal adversary: In the fourth set of experiments, we evaluated the robustness
of PHYVOS against an internal adversary when applying Strategy 1. Using his
knowledge of the subcarrier assignment, the adversary injected energy at one of the
two subcarriers assigned per participant. In Figure 7.15(c), we show the probability
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of flipping the voting outcome as a function of number of symbol votes `, and for
µ = {2, 4, 6}. Solid lines indicate the values obtained via simulation, whereas dotted
lines show the theoretical values calculated using (7.20). For the simulation results,
we also plot the upper bound of the 95% confidence intervals (the lower bounds
are omitted due to the log scale on the Y axis). The simulation results verify the
theoretical analysis for the probability of flipping the voting outcome. Using larger
values of ` allows the tallier to substantially reduce this probability. We repeated our
experiments for 100 participants who casted their votes in groups. Figure 7.15(d)
shows similar results to Figure 7.15(c). This is expected, as only 26 participants
vote at every slot.
7.8 Related Work
The use of voting for improving reliability has been studied since the 1950s [153],
with a long literature on various reliability and efficiency aspects (e.g., [154–159]).
Levitin proposed a weighted mechanism for binary voting where each vote is
weighted based on the participant’s identity [155]. The author showed that for
participants with different decision times, a tradeoff exists between reliability and
delay. He proposed an algorithm to maximize reliability under a time constraint.
Barbara and Molina studied the reliability of voting mechanisms, when participants
are divided into groups and are assigned a number of votes [157]. The group with
the voting majority is prioritized to perform critical system operations. They pro-
posed several vote assignment heuristics to improve the overall system reliability.
Kwiat et al. examined three binary voting rules for fault tolerance and evaluated the
resulting reliability and security [158]. They proposed a random selection algorithm
for computing the voting outcome from a set of votes that contain malicious ones.
We emphasize that PHYVOS implements a PHY layer vote casting mechanism that
guarantees vote integrity. The voting rules (majority, random selection, number
of votes per participant, vote weights, etc.), which is the subject of most previous
studies in reliability and fault-tolerance, is complementary to our method.
241
In the context of wireless networks, voting finds wide application to data fusion,
intrusion detection and secure localization in WSNs [45, 160–162], real-time coor-
dination in multi-agent systems [47], and fault-tolerant protocols [163, 164] The de
facto voting mechanism adopted in these works is message-based voting, in which
votes are casted through messaging. Message-based voting also facilities the inte-
gration of security measures for preventing the manipulation of the voting outcome.
Voters can be authenticated, and vote integrity can be verified using standard cryp-
tographic primitives such as digital signatures, message authentication codes, and
digital certificates [103]. Compared to message-based voting, PHYVOS requires
significantly less communication overhead, without sacrificing robustness to vote
manipulation.
From an implementation standpoint, the most relevant works to ours are pre-
sented in [137, 138]. In [138], Dutta et al. proposed SMACK, an acknowledgment
scheme for implementing a reliable broadcast service. Similar to PHYVOS, SMACK
exploits the subcarrier orthogonality of OFDM to allow the simultaneous submis-
sion of acknowledgements in response to a broadcast message transmitted by a
single source. In [137], Rahul et al. proposed SourceSync, a distributed wireless
architecture that explores sender diversity in OFDM. SourceSync enables the re-
ception and demodulation of OFDM symbols composed of symbol transmissions
over individual subcarriers by a diverse set of senders. Contrary to SMACK and
PHYVOS, SourceSync can demodulate the combined OFDM symbol and retrieve
the individual data streams of each sender. This capability comes at the expense of
complex symbol-level synchronization and channel estimation at the senders, per-
formed through the transmission of preambles.
Recently, the infeasibility of erasing energy from a wireless channel was chal-
lenged. Po¨pper et al. showed that under stable and predictable channel conditions
(e.g., LOS), an attacker utilizing a pair of directional antennas for relaying the in-
verse of the received signal could cancel a signal at a targeted receiver [14]. Such
powerful signal cancellation attacks are hard to launch in practice against PHYVOS
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due to the multiple wireless channels used by the participants for the simultaneous
communication with the tallier. Moreover, channel estimation of any of those chan-
nel within the channel coherence time becomes difficult without the transmission of
preambles.
7.8.1 Chapter Summary
We presented PHYVOS, a secure and fast PHY-layer voting scheme for wireless
networks. In PHYVOS, no explicit messaging is necessary. Participants cast their
votes simultaneously by exploiting the subcarrier orthogonality in OFDM. PHYVOS
is aimed at reducing the delay overhead for wireless applications where secure voting
is time-critical. We analyzed the robustness of PHYVOS against both external and
internal adversaries who aim at altering the voting outcome at the tallier. We
showed that PHYVOS maintains the integrity of the voting outcome with high
probability, without using cryptographic primitives. We extended PHYVOS to a
decentralized operation scenario, in which participants can determine the voting
outcome without the presence of a centralized tallier. We implemented PHYVOS
on the USRP platform and verified the robustness properties via experimentation
and simulations.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we developed techniques for bootstrapping trust between de-
vices which do not have pre-shared secrets. In particular, we focused on in-band
trust establishing techniques that are resistant to both active (MitM) and passive
adversaries. To achieve the robustness we proposed secret-free authentication and
message integrity techniques that rely on a combination of applied cryptography
and PHY-layer properties. Our main achievements and finding are summarized as
follows.
In Chapter 3, we proposed a new PHY-layer integrity protection scheme called
HELP that is resistant to signal cancellation attacks. Our scheme operates with the
assistance of a helper device that has an authenticated channel to the A. The helper
is placed in close proximity to the legitimate device and simultaneously transmits at
random times to allow the detection of cancellation attacks at the A. We showed that
a pairing protocol such as the DH key agreement protocol using HELP as integrity
protection primitive can resist MitM attacks without requiring an authenticated
channel between D and the A. This was not previously feasible by any of the pairing
methods if signal cancellation is possible. We studied various implementation details
of HELP and analyzed its security. Our protocol is aimed at alleviating the device
pairing problem for IoT devices that may not have the appropriate interfaces for
entering or pre-loading cryptographic primitives.
In Chapter 4, we propose SFIRE a secret-free protocol that achieves the secure
pairing of COTS wireless devices with a hub. Compared to the state-of-the-art,
SFIRE does not require any out-of-band channels, special hardware, or firmware
modification, thus it is applicable to any COTS device. We showed that SFIRE
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is resistant to the most advanced active signal manipulations that include recently
demonstrated signal nullification at an intended receiver. These security properties
are achieved in-band with the assistance of a helper device and by using the RSS
fluctuation patterns to build a robust RSS authenticator. We performed extensive
theoretical analysis and attested the finding with experiments using COTS devices
and USRP radios and validated the security and performance of the proposed pro-
tocol.
We presented VERSE in Chapter 5, a new PHY-layer group message integrity
verification primitive resistant to MitM attacks over the wireless channel. We ex-
ploit the existence of multiple devices that act as verifiers of the protocol transcript
for integrity protection. When three or more devices perform an integrity check,
it is infeasible for the adversary to simultaneously manipulate the wireless signal
at all devices, based on geometrical constraints. We presented a DH-based device
bootstrapping protocol that utilized VERSE, which only requires in-band commu-
nications with minimal human effort during initialization. We formally prove the
security of both VERSE and the bootstrapping protocol against active attacks.
With a real-world USRP testbed, we experimentally validated our theoretical re-
sults by showing that an increasing number of devices significantly weakens the
adversary’s ability to successfully manipulate wireless signals. This is in contrast
to prior state-of-the-art where the attacker’s success probability increases with the
number of devices.
In Chapter 6, we addressed the problem of the verifying the integrity of ADS-B
navigation information without modifying the ADS-B standard. We proposed a
PHY-layer verification method that exploits the Doppler spread phenomenon and
the short coherence time of the channel between a prover aircraft and verifier aircraft
to verify the velocity claims of the prover. The solution proposed in this work can be
applied independently of the ADS-B standard. We further related the velocity claims
to location claims through simple kinematic equations. We analyzed the security
of our verification scheme and showed that it is equivalent to solving underdefined
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quadratic equation systems which are known to be hard.
We presented PHYVOS in Chapter 7, a secure and fast PHY-layer voting scheme
for wireless networks. In PHYVOS, no explicit messaging is necessary. Participants
cast their votes simultaneously by exploiting the subcarrier orthogonality in OFDM.
PHYVOS is aimed at reducing the delay overhead for wireless applications where
secure voting is time-critical. We analyzed the robustness of PHYVOS against both
external and internal adversaries who aim at altering the voting outcome at the
tallier. We showed that PHYVOS maintains the integrity of the voting outcome with
high probability, without using cryptographic primitives. We extended PHYVOS to
a decentralized operation scenario, in which participants can determine the voting
outcome without the presence of a centralized tallier. We implemented PHYVOS
on the USRP platform and verified the robustness properties via experimentation
and simulations.
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